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FOREWORD ' .
I
In the summerof 1988, members of NASA Headqumers, in particular, the Office of
Space Science andApplications (Code E), the Office of Aeronauticsand Space Technology
_: (Code R), and the Office of Space Station (Code S), along with the George C. Marshall
Space Flight Center came to a conclusion that a broad-based review and discussion of
Space Station internal contamination issues would be desirable.
Teledyne Brown Engineering (TBE) in Huntsville, Alabama was contracted to
organize, conduct, and document a workshop with the theme "Space Station Freedom
Toxic and Reactive Materials Handling". TBE mailed over 150 invitations to civilian and
military government agencies, research organizations, universities, and industries in the
U.S. Also, the Space Station international participants were invited and representatives
from ESA and NASDA were in attendance. A number of persons were personally invited
to present papers.
The workshop took place at the Hilton Hotel in Huntsville, Alabama on November 29
through December 1. Thirty-two papers were given, supplemented by many lively
discussions. Among the 220 persons in attendance were astronauts Dr. Owen K. Garriott,
Dr. William Pogue, and Dr. Bonnie J. Dunbar.
Although the workshop had originally been planned to address only questions related
to internal contamination issues on the Space Station, presentations, and particularly
discussions, covered a larger scope including external contamination issues. Some Key
workshop results included an increased safety awareness for Space Station Freedom
Program participants, clairification of some key safety requirements, and initiation and
continuation of dialogue between various programparticipants.
A panel was formed to moderate the discussion, answer questions, summarize the )
workshop discussion, and to make recommendations. The panel consisted of Dr. Bonnie _.
J. Dunbar, NASA!JSC, Dr. Martin E. Coleman, NASA/JSC, and Mr. Kenneth L.
Mitchell, NASA/MSFC. The panel's summary report and recommendations are included .t
in this proceedings document. i
Many attendees expressed the desire that a similar workshop should be convened in
the near future.
t
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NationalAeronauticsand .,.. = .,,..__ .. '
SpaceAdministration _ I
u 'qPW mare, IF .
Lyndon B. Johr_son Sl)aCe Center
Houston, Texas
77058
December 16, 1988
Mr• Paul Galloway
Workshop Coordinator
Teledyne Brown Engineering
Cummings Research Park
Huntsville, Alabama 35807
Dear Mr. Galloway,
i
, Thank you again for the opportunity to participate in the Space Station Freedom
Toxic and Reactive Materials H&ndling Workshop• We believe that the workshop
_ was a very successful exchange of reformation between diverse technical
communities and provided useful recommendations for approaching future Space
Station designs and operations.
As a panel, we were tasked to "enhance the productivity of the workshop by
ensurir,g that the findiblgs of the workshop did not fall between the cracks '. We
were asked to summarize the workshop discussionsand to provsde ret nmmend-
ations related to safety issues,technology development efforts, and other follow-
on tasks which might be required. The nature of thi._ workshop end our directive
required usto focus on topics of concern; however, this should pot d,mlnish the
positive contributions which both NASA and its contractors have raven to these
comp;ex problems. The solutions to technical and operational p,oblems which
remain will require a united and cohesive application of our best resources.
Our final panel report _senclosed. While we believe that more workshops in the
future will benefit Sp;,ce St,ltion design and utilization, we also believe that
immediate action is r:_quired for some identified issues. Should questions arise
regarding this report, please contact any member of the panel, i
It has been our pleasure to have participated in this workshop, i
Sincerely, _
3
A_tronautNASA/JSC, t
Panel Chairman I
t
• Kenneth L MitChell Martin P..C;oleman, ring ;
NASA/MSFC, ECLSS NASA/JSC, Toxicologist
!
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INTRODUCTION:
Teledyne 8rown Engineering (TBE) was tasked by several _JASAOrganizations to
organize, conduct and document a workship devoted to Space Station internal
contamination issues. These organizations included the Office of Space Station
(Code S), the Office of Space Science ano Ai:plications (Code E), and Office of
Aeronautics and Space Technology (Code R). Representatives from NASA, NASDA,
ESA,SpaceStation contractors and the private sector were invited to attend.
Approximately 200 individuals attended, representing a broad _pectrum of
industries and organizations.
"he official program was divided into several sessions which addressed the
following topics:
1. Past Flight Experience (Skylab and Spacelab missions)
2. Present Flight Activities (Spacelabs and Soviet Space Station IVlir)
3. Future Activites (Materials Science and Life Scienc_ Experiments)
4. Space Station Capabilities (PMMS, FMS, ECLSS,and US Laboratory Overview)
5. Mcnned Systems/Crew Safety
6. Internal Contamination Detection
7. Contamination Control - Stowage and Handling
8. Contamination Control - Waste Gas Processing
In order to document and summarize the findings of this workshop, TBE appointed
a panel consisting of the following members: Dr. Bonnie J. Dunbar (NASA/JSC), Dr.
Martin Coleman (NASA/JSC), and Mr. Kenneth Mitchell (NASA/MSFC). The panel
facilitated discussion during the sessionsand summarized these discussions and
resulting recommendations at the completion of each days activites.
This report is a compilation of issues,concerns, and other topics which arose during
the workshop. It isdivided into three sections. In the first section, Space Station
design assumptions are discussed. The second section discusses issuesand concerns
as they relate to (I) policy and n_anagemenL (2) subsystem design, (3) experiment
design, and (4) internal contamina_¢,,_ detecl ion andcontrol. The last section ,I
summarizes the recommendations generate_ durinc_ the three day workshop. Most ,
of the concerns and recommendations .cu.r",marized in this report were not the result
of single sessions, but appeared as recurring themes during the workshop. !
The panel believes that the workshop was very worthwhile and that serious
decisions must now be n'._de. We believe that, in order to avoid costly redesign in
the future, the issues and concerns identified in this report should be receiving
' maximum attention by the Space Station Project in its early engineering ,
development of subsystems and experiment facilities. !
t
t
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!SPACE STATION DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS:
Space Station Freedom design is currently comprised of one habitability modul_, and ,
of three laboratory modules; one each from the United States (USL), Japan (JEM),
and the European Space Agency (Columbus). All four of the modules are
interconnected by nodes. The experiments which will involve the bulk of the
hazardous materials to be handled represent two disciplines: life sciences and
; materials sciences. While both of the disciplines have flown on prior Skylab and
Space Shuttle missions, the Space Station will include many new in $itu =ample
_ preparataons. For the mat_.rials sciences,this includes a family of liquid etching
acids for which we have no prior space flight experience. In the field of life sciences,
although we have previously "fixed" samples on orbit, both animal dissection and
cell cultures will introduce new experiment materials and operations to the Space
Sta;ion.
i There ar_ several fundamental design and operations concepts which are applied to
terrestrial laboratories and which can be considered relevant to a space-based
facility. They are the following: (!) the Space Station Freedom is _1 international
laboratory which should be governed by well und_tood and consistent safety
policy/guidelines, (2) facility design isthe first line of protection against t azardous
situations but operations ot the design must also be well understood, (3) if the
-_ facility design/operations fail, then appropriate detection should be in place to
annunciate the hazard to the crew, (4) there must be preplanned on -orbit
methods to recover and handle wastes, in,duding accidental in-cabin spills, _)
procedures and hardware must be _resent to medically treat crewmembers, and (6)
the wastes must be transported safely to the ground for further disposal.
The handling of toxic and reactive materials aboard the Space Station will be
particularly challenging for the following reasons: (1) The Statmn is nearly a closed
environment-- rapid evacuation is not possible, (2) the I_boratory researchers must
habitate a volume intimately connected to their laboratory, and (3) m=_terials
science and life science experiments wil be conduced ,n the sar,le laboratory; this
does not occur in ground based ;aboratories.
There are presently three Station subsystems being designed which are involved in
the detection and/or control of toxic and reactive materials: the Environmental
Control 3nd Life Support System (ECLSS), the ProcessMaterials Management
Subsys*em (PMMS), and the Fluid Management System (FMS). .:,
The primary U.S Lab sub._ystem being designed t_ ateract with hazardous/toxic _nJ
reactive materials isthe PMMS. It consistsof the following elements.
- ProcessFluids Storage and Distribution
- Chemical Storage
- Materials Transport
- Ultrapure Water Management
-Waste Materials Handling
- Leak Detection
," - Crew/hardware decontamination
- Vacuum Venting (high quality source and waste gas vent) L1
The Spac_ Station ECLSSprovides trace contaminant gas removal frnm the crew's
breathable atmosphere aswell as :';.'onitoring of atmospheric contamman,; (gases
and particulates). These trace gas_.sare primarily generated from metabolic
t-3
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processesof the crewandelectronicsequipmentoff-gassing.ThePMMSand/orthe
payload will provide containment and control fo, their non-standar_ substanc_s--
not the ECLSS.
TheFMSinteractswith the P_IMSinthe vacuum,--ent;ngof wa_e gasesand the
resupply of fluids (water, mitrogen) to the U.S. Lab. The =liowabie v_aste gas
constituent.e, are being defined to the work pack,_ges and the Intern=tionai partners
through a Level II FMSworkir, g group.
!
I
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FINDINGS AND CONCERNS
POUCYAND ORGANIZATION
1. THENEEDFORA SAFETYATTITUDE
t
Although enginering solutions are being designed to handle toxic and reactive
materialson a routine basis,we found alack of emphasison bcjth operations and
the exploration of accidentscenarios.Clearly, the designers must prepare for the
worst in addition to designing to prevent it. Specifically,more emphasisneeds to be
placed upon approachesto "in cabin spills"resulting in the cleanup of hazardous or
. toxic materials,and the isolationof contc ._ninatedmodules,. Thiswas well
reinforced by severalof the private sectorpresentersat the w¢rkshop. Additionally,
the responsiblitytor these activities should be assignedto an organization. There
]t_ appeared to be no one who believed that to be in their charter . _he safetYr;'foattitude isge_ane to any research program, it isa day to day responsibiity
everyone involved.
i- 2. THENEEDFORA UNIFORM SAFETYPOLICY
Thisworkshop wasorganized for all SpaceStation participants. However, ESAsen_ i '
•_ one representative who was not,a professionalsafety employee and NASDAsent
two representatives,but their safety policywas not voiced. Fromthe discussions I
which occurred,we crmcludedthat the Safety Policieswhich we believe are !n effect !
_. for SpaceShuttle anr_which clrebeing developed for SpaceStation are not be;ng
: communicated to our i_ternational partners. Asa matter of information, the ESA
inform_.<lrepresentative the gro_p that ESAassumed that NASAwould dictate
• safety requiremen'csto them, and had not yet taken a formal look at safety in the :
Columbusmodul_:d_velopment. Implementation of safety policiesin the US ,.
module alone will not prot.ecta crew from catastrop.%;cevents.
The Station must_e:viewed asone resource oper_Jtingunder one standard of
Safety, for both eKgerimentsand subsystemdevelopment. Reference sho_Jh:lbe
madr to the NRC_ries on "Prudent Practic_ for Handling HazardousCh_:r..cals in
Labr_ratories".A(_ditionally,the cjuestionof who isvestedwith final resr_c)nsibility
for safety o_the !;tation's internal environment should be clarified
3. THENEEDFORA MATURESAFETYORGANI7:AT!ON
Dur:r_gthe workshop, both SpaceStation subsystemdesi_lner'_(r_CLSS,FMS, PMMS), '
: and experiment developersstated that their hardware c_esi_nswere dependent
ui_on clearly articulated safety requirements. Withou_ sp_c,ficdesign requirements
and accessto past flight experience_, hardware is subier'cto later redesign, r
However,the SpaceStation Safer/organization isstil_being dev,.Ioped and not in
the positionof advisingeither system _esignersor experiment developers
,_ (particularly material processingfurnaces)on suchitems asfault tolerance, triple
containment, etc.
Although the JSCSafety Boardshave addressedmany of these,_me questic)nswith
respectto the SpaceShuttle/Spacelab subsysterasand payload;, most of these
designersdo not have accessto th._seboards. _nmany cases,the designers, by not
: being familiar with past flight experiencesu_ing similar designs,were re-inventing
] 99 ] 0066 ]7-0 ] 2
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the wheel'. Forexample, the PMMS and FMS are at a point wh,n seriousdesign
decisionsmust be made (these are discussedlater). The early involvement uf flight
safeR personnelwith facility des!gners/experimenters should resolvemany issues,
avoiding sermusreaeslgn OTequlr_ment.
One suggestedsolution isto utilize the safety organization at NASA/JSCfor a_ :,
interim period of time, sothat "dmelyresponseisavailable to the hardware
_ designers. However, with ,theadvent of the SpaceStation Safety boards, cor tinuity ._*
, should be maintained. The utilization of different NASAsafety organizat!on_ should
'_ be virtuallytransparent to a userof either Shuttle or SpaceStation. Many p_yl,)adswill fly on Forexample, the furnaceswhich
anbOth, are.being developed _y ES_,_rJASDA, many USusers for SpaceStation will ,y Tirs'¢on St=acelabfhghts.
Another suggestion isto combine these NASAsafety orqanizatio,"_s,_.herebv
reduc!ngthe number of safety interlaces for a user,and-r' _ovid,ngconsisten_j and a
pastnight experience data base to the evaluation of su_/,_/ste_designs. Consistent
__ safety policy isimportant for all spaceflight elements.
_ Memoers of the workshop suggested th _t until mr,re accessto the Safety\_ Organization isavailable, the SpaceStab,onproo:arn _hould provide safety related
._ design requirements in a "UsersMan,,al'. Thi_ m;_ual should provide hardware
design options and clearlydefine suc.rconce_tsas'two fault t.'Jlerance,triple
i containment and hazard control". Fu,rnace designers wish to understand the
_ concept of "credible failure" and how procedures, function;_lfeatures (e.g door
interlocks,etc) and negative pres_r,: or,erations contribute to their design.
_ Communication of pastand present fl',ghtexperience related to safety and facility
_esigns isessential. Designersshr.luJjalso have accessto Sr_acelabHazard Analyses
_ and SafetyCompliance Data. Fo_many users,the nee(] for this documentation is
_ now.
Unless the development of the Safety organization can be expedited, both the
" _t._tion schedule and cost at,: at risk.
4. THENEEDFORBETTERCOMMUNICATIONS
Better communicationsare required a_rossthe board: Between the international r
partners, between the.,NASACenters, between the contractors and NASA, between
NASAand t',dustry, _nd between all elements and the flight operations
organizations. The Office of SpaceFlight (Code M) was not an official organizer of
thisworkshop bu_.isresponsiblefor flight crew training and safety. Future
discussionsregarding operational experiencesand approaches to on-board safety
n,,aybe directe_Jto the Flight Crew Operations u_ice (FCOO)at NASA/JSC.
FCODhasseveral in_.._rnalAstronaut organizations expresslyestablishedto develop
an earlyworking relationship with flight hardware designers: the Shuttle Mission
. Development Group, the SpaceStatio_ Group, and the ScienceSupport Group.
Communicationsmust be open, frequer,_, and alongmo clearlydefined paths
among Centers and other organizations. Our _ast flight re
_ experience with STS-51L
, ,andthe emphasisthat the RogersCommissionpl_ced-on communic&tions _:ust not
De _essonslearned" which are lost. Thls workshop was believed by all participants
to be an important first step in that direction.
1-6
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5. COMMONALITY
The question of commonality, which hasarisen in other systemdesigns affecting the
international modules, iseven more important in the arena of safely handling toxic
and reactive materials. There isnot a common design approach for the handling of
these materials and it isnot apparent that the international partners are actively
, _ addressingthe potentional problems. Again, the agencyisfaced with defining
• safety design criteria and then implementing theseas requirements. An important
question ishow NASAwill taskthese requirements to the partners and oversee their
implementation. The SpaceStation crewsmust not be trained to safe three
different systemdesigns. The lack of commonality between safety systemsisa well
known contributer to industrial and aircraft accidents.
STATIONSUBSYSTEMDESIGN
6. UTILIZATIONOFGROUND BASEDLABORATORYSAFETYFEATURES
Proceduresand d_,tagenerated by ground based laborabories isan excellent
resourcedata base for understanding and implementing procedures/hardware for
the safe handling of toxicand reactivechemicals. NASAshould not re-invent the
wheel. One representative from the semiconductorindustry stated that we were
about _years behind industry in our approach to the problem. At the sametime,
I le_
,,j,:rsstated that new safe handhng procedures which NASA may develop for this
. more restrictiveenvironment may have commercialapplications on the cjround.
More interaction with both industryand commercial laboratories should be
pursued.
7. NUMBEROF ECLSSSTATIONSFORMONITORING TRACEGASES
" i !
The total number of ECLSSIocatiorls for monitoring trace gase.cin the cabin i
atmosphere needsto be evaluate_' with respectto the entire monitoring systemsin I ;
the USL,JEM,and Columbus. Cub'r_'ntly7 locationsare baselined in the Space _ !
station configuration with the inten,.ational modules attached. Thismay not be
enough, part=cularly if early "leak wan'.ing" needsto be annunciated to the crew. i
The PMMS plansto detect at the rack level, but it isnot clear if these will be _
experiment specificor general detectors.
8. PMMS DESIGNLIMITATIONS
Asdesigned, the PMMS proposesto collect a variety of both life scienceand
materials sciencewastes. In this respect, it hasa much broader __¢opethan any
existingground basedlaboratory or industry. However, it haslimited the typesof
waste it will handle. The limitations to experiment development are not clear.
Experimentdesigners need this information in order to procede. Questions
remaining include which wastesare regenerable (besidesthe water recovery
feature) and what waste storage systemswill PMMS provide for returning
hazardouswaste to earth via the logisticselements.
The current PMMS baseline design hasa centralized waste material approach.
Tradesare to be performed on alternate approaches: decentralized storage of ',
1-7 .
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waste by PMMS versus user provided waste storage at the rack level. Current
Shuttle/Spacelab operations do not use a common waste collection system.
Chemicals (e.g. varieties of acids) used in the etching of metrology specime'_s might
be better handled within the glovebox and stored in a separate container for
transport back to the ground. The mixing of acids, cell cultures, fixatives, and etc
presents an infinite matrix of design requirements for a disposal system. Since
Space Station facilities are being designed now, there isa definite need to identify
their interfaces and requirements for waste disposal. As an added note, neither the
JEM or Columbus have an interface with the PMMS, which may result in at least
three methods for storing and transporting experiment wastes. Experiments which
may design their interfaces for the US lab may find that although they have access
to the ESAor Japanese labs, their experiment interfaces are incompatible.
i Finally, NASA should review certain design features of the PMMS using past
experience with liquid transport systems(e.g. Shuttle/Spacelab and Skylab). For
example, it is not clear how the wastes from a glovebox operated experiment are
actually introduced to the PMMS water lines in a micro-cl environment; how
residue left in containers are handled" how wastes whic_t may have deposited on
the interior of the large volume gloveboxes are collected for disposal, and how the
task for predicting multi-chemical reactions in a "holding tank'will be
accomplished, particularly if the chemicals used in metrology or cell fixation today
may not be the same ones we use in 10 years.
9. ISOLATION OF THE ECLSSAVIONICS AIR COOLING LOOP
The isolation of the avionics air loop from the equipment containing toxic chemicals
could be a design issue. More investigation of the user requirments for cooling and
the hazards associated with the equipment requiring cooling must occur.
|0. HUMAN FACTORS ARE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN SAFETY DESIGN
Facilities should consider the mainenance and re_aif capabilities of the crew on
orbit, particularly if a system iscritical to continued safe functioning of the station.
_ Hazard detection and adequate alerts to the crew are essential. As illustrated by
both the Skylab and Shuttle crewmembers, alerts should identify both the location
of the hazard aswell as the type.
11. CONTINGENCY PLANNING IS ESSENTIAL
Contingency planning should be an essential element of hardware design.
Unexpected events should be expected and planned for. It was recommended that
procedures and hardware be developed for in cabin spills (for both subsystem and
experiment ,ailure) and that hazardous payloads be manifested far from exits.
, Participants felt that Iocatingthe emergency shower or an alternate
• decontamib_ation system in the node would provide better isolation of a crewman
from a spill and allow more ready accessfrom the ESA _=ndJEM modules.t
I 12. DESIGN OF A CREWMEMBER DECONTAMINATION SYSTEM
Ground based laboratories usually utilize emergency showers and eye wash systems
to rapidly remove contaminating materials from the body. Space Station has
: located a hygiene shower in the U.S. Laboratory which will also be used as an
emergency shower. Several aspects of this approach must be evaluated: (1) will a
shower work as effectively in a zero G environment as it does in one G? (2) what are
1"8
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the ramifications of detoxifying a crew member in the module which must be
isolated? (3) will crewmembers working in other modules having no _imilar system ',
be able to use the system and won t crosscontamination become a problem? and (4)
what other neutralizing systems and treatment are also readily accessible?
Ground based showers use a deluge system and rely on a large volume of water to
dilute contaminants on the body and deliver them away from the body. In zero G,
such a shower would require immediate storage accessand a large vacuum to pull
water from the body and surrounding shower surfaces.
13. SPACESTATION SMAC VALUES MUST BE EXPEDITED
The spacecraft maximum allowable concern:ration (SMAC) levels for trace
contaminants in the cabin atmosphere have not been defined for space station.
Current designs use shuttle data for a 10 day mission. NRC is under contract to JSCto
develop design criteria. The ECLSSand the PMMS need this data as soon as possible
in order.to design control and monitoring systems.
14. DESIGN VERIFICATION ABOARD THE SHUTTLE
Many of the new fluid handling systems represent new technologies and will
receive their first flight test once installed on the Space Station. Consideration
;hould be given to flight verification of some of these newer systems prior to
im,_lemention on the station. ESA is currently using Spacelab flights for Columbus
subs;,stem and experiment development. Flight test should ideally occur in 1990 to
support development schedules (CDR) but the lack of accessto the manifest and the
estimated costs ($44M/flight for ECLSS)are presently formidable barriers.
15. DE._',JNING AIR FLOWS FOR SAFER OPERATIONS
In microgravity, it may be beneficial to consider designing air flows to give
directionality to the movement of fluids in the Space Statior modules. In ground
based facilities gravity is relied upon to pull hazardous and toxic chemicals down
away from the faces of experimenters. On th_ Space Station, crPative solutions may
be required to perform a similar function. The greatest personn ' hazards are from
eye contact, in_&lation, and ingestion. _.
16. DECEN ,RALIZATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE i
Dec_,_tralization rather than centralized handling of waste again b,_came a theme _,
r_ the "Industry approach °. Control the hazard as quicki_ as possible and isolate it
from other locations in the system. This applies even to the laboratory module
level. Industries' laboratores are isolated totally from the rest of the facilities. The i
Space station EC_.SSintegrates the module atmospheres for control o_ the total
pressure, oxyg,an pratial pressure, C02 removal, trace gas contaminant monitoring
and co,_tr¢l, and some humidity control. If an emergency occurs within a module,
there is the capability to isoate it from the rest of the staion configuration but this _-
occur'. ,=fter the fact. Normally, in the interest of safety and crew rescue, hatches to
:he experiment modules should remain open during experiment operations and
only closed in the event of an emergency.
!
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EXPERIMENT DESIGN
17. IS VACUUM VENTING ALLOWED ?
Many of the experiments in high temperature materials science require an external
vent line for two reasons: (1) to rough pump a vacuum on the experiment and (2) to
expell inert gases ',e.g. He and At) which have been used during the experiment
process. Although vacuum venting has been used on previous 5pacelab flights,
there was consiaerable disagreement regarding its allowance on Space Station.
Arguments largely related to the degree of contamination to the external
environment. Additionally, although the US usersare actively debating this
question, it appears that ESA will continue in the Spacelab mode. Therefcre, the
present station design calls for a USlab which will not allo_ users to vent inert gases
overboard, therefore constraining or eliminating many experiments, while the
Columbus will allow it. Resolution of this question must occur as soon as possible.
Systems design can not proceed without a decision, and analyses will be required in
any case.
18. THE NEED FOR AN EXPERIMENT DESIGN DATA BASE
Asstated earlier there is much confusion among new experiment/facility
developo, rs concerning levels of containment, hazards, fault tolerance, etc. There is
an early need to establish a data base of criteria and acceptable designs which have
previously flown. Many new furnace designers are again re-inventing the wheel
and not benefitting from the data generated during Shuttle and Spacelab flights.
19. AVAILABLE CREW TIME FOR EXPERIMENTS
There isstill considerable discussion regarding crew availability to perform
experiments, experiment reconfiguration, and repair. While crew time may be a
favor in equipment design, the science objectives shouldn't be comprom,sed in
orcler to achieve total autonomy. Whether or not an experiment requires extensive
crew time depends somewhat on itsdiscipline (e.g. life science experiments may
require much crew time) and its objectives. Designers should try to optimize both .;
automation and crew interaction. Where treys:operation is required to achieve iscience bjectives, then this should be articuial and coordinated early in the
design process. In many cases,automation is lessflexible, more costly, and more
complicated than use of the crew. Automation lends itself to routine and repetitive
tasks and should be used accordingly. Astronauts at NASAJJSChave established a
Science Support Group to work with scientists and engineers early in the design
process.
i
20. GLOVEBOX DESIGN AND USERREQUIREMENTS !
l
The Glovebox briefings revealed the need for more user involvment to define user ]
requirements. It wasn't clear whether the potential users of the glovebc x (who i
must interface their experiments with it) were at the workshop. Users must spend
more time with the designers and representatives of the astronaut office discussing i
experiment operation and requirements. Unless this occurs, equipment such as the
I-I0 1
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lovebox, the PMMS, and the general lab support equipment will not be properly
eveloped. More meetings between real lab users and the hardware designers
must occur.
INTERNALCONTAMINATION DETECTIONAND CONTROL
J
19. EXPLOREINSTRUMENTATIONTECHNOLOGYMORE THOROUGHLY
Presentationson internal contamination and control showed exciting ap,)licat_,_s
to spacestation problems. In particular, the government's military proe,rar,ls or_
chemicaland biological warfare hasproduced instrumentation and rem,)'/al d( vices
_hateha;eat:'_.nifNi_tlyem_r_oC:Px_,_'rietYt_;an_vYe_fph_r,r__:_r_ibeinghether
they are first generation systemsfor the spacestation or secondgt.neration,
evolutsonary systemsthat we could place on the st=tion within it,,30 year life. The
specificitemsare the MS/MStechnology pre.;ented by Dr. Marsh and the reactive
bed plasmasystemfor contamination control pre,;ented by Mr. Joe Birmingham.
The particulate detection technology preset:ted h,yMr. Robert Caldow appeared to
have SpaceStation applicationsaswell.
i-ii
1991006617-018
- I| ....
RECOMMENDATIONS
" POUCY ANOORGANIZATION
1. Establish clear and uniform Safety Policies for all modules: JEM, Columbus and
USL. Approaches to safety policy impl,,mentation should be similar to thOSe used
for ground based nat0onal laboratories (consult NRC guidelines).
2. Expedite development of the Space Station Safety Organization and utilize
existing NASA safety organizations as required. (Flow chart the different center
responsibilities)
3. Develop accident scenarios, such as for "in-cabin spills', and assign responsibility
for det,ection and removal (both hardware and procedures development) to
approl_riate organizations.
4. Require aii modules to develop common approaches to the distribution,
handling, containment, and use o t toxic and reactive materials. Safety dictated
designs should immediately be transmitted to JEM and Columbus developers.
5. Improve communications across the board: NASA centers, International
partners, contractors, users, industry, flight operations, safety organizations, etc
6. Schedule more user designer operator workshops to communicate safety related
design requirements.
STATIONSUISYSTEMDESIGN
7. Utilize more ground based laboratory saf_.ty features.
-j
8. Reevaluate the total number of ECLSSstations for trace gas monitoring.
9. Conduct a separate review of the PMMS in the following areas: waste storage
systems, commonality with JEM and Columbus, 30 year flexibility, waste limitatmns
as they relate to user requirements, introduction of wastes te the system, and
quantity of water required for operations.
IU. Evaluate potential locations and design requirements for a decontamination
' center in leiu of an "emergency shower'.
11. Reevaluate isolation of the ECLSSavionics air loop from experiments.
12. Review ECLSS,FMS, and PMMS designs with respect to human factors:
maintenance and repair, caution and warning, and emergency procedures.
13. Expedite the definition of Space Station SMAC levels.
1-12
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14. Examinethe benefits and limitations for decentralization of hazardous
l materials handling.
15. Determine if design verification for certain fluid handling systemsisrequired
aboard SpaceShutlle flights prior to SpaceStation implementation.
q
16. Optimize air flows within the modules and the gloveboxes for safer operations.
i-
_t EXPERIMENTDESIGN
. 17. Determine the statusof potential contamination due to external venting of
experiment waste gasesby all module elements. This information must be acquired
immediately sothat design processesfor the FMSand experiments can continue.
(The External EnvironmentsWorking Group may be performing this a_,_essment)
18. Generate a SpaceStation User'smanual and an experiment design data base
:_ which discussesdesign requirements asthey relate to safety.
19. Re-examinecrew operations of e_periments both from a safety point of view
and for optimizing scientificreturn. Optimize the automation/crew operation mix.
20. Reevaluate the glovebox design and user requirements (utilize previous flight
experiencewith tht.=ES_glovebox flown on STS-61A)
INTERNALCONTAMINATION DETECTION AND CONTROL
_ 21. Improve communicationswith both industry and the military for detection,
i removal, and control of toxic and reactive r_laterials.
s
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2. WELCOME t
Edgar R. Pevey and Kenneth R. Taylor
Edgar R. Pevey*
Good morning ladies and gentlemen. On behalf of Teledyne Brown Engineering,
NASA Headquarters, Marshall Space Flight Center, and the MMPF Study Team --
welcome to Huntsville, Alabama, the Huntsville Hilton, and, in particular, to our
workshop "Space Station Toxic and Reactive Materials Handling". I am Ed Pevey,
Manager, Eagineering Studies, Advanced Programs Department, Space Programs Division
at Teledyne Brown.
Prior to the start of the workshop, I wish to recognize some of our key players and
those team members responsible for pulling together the participants in this workshop.
First, from Marshall Space Flight Center, our cqstomer Mr. Ken Taylor, Chief,
Materials Processing in Space Group; a member of Ken's group and the Contracting
Officer's Representative for the MMPF Study - Mr. George McCanless. This workshop is
being funded by Codes E, R, and S and to them we are srateful for this opportunity.
Next, from Teledyne Brown Engineering, our Vice President of Space Programs
Division - Dr. Owen Garriott. The Manager of Advanced Programs - Mr. Anthony
Sharpe. My workshop team: The workshop coordinator - Mr. Paul Galloway and
administrative assistants Ms. Becky Dew and Ms. Teresa Strother.
We are indeed pleased to recognize and welcome several former astronauts/mission
specialists Dr. Bill Pegue, a former Skylab astronaut, and Dr. Bonnie Dunbar, a mission
specialist on the Spacelab D1 mission.
Next, I wish to recognize our Session and Panel Chairpersons. i
Session 1 - Mr. Charles Baugher, NASA/MSFC 1
Session 2 - Ms. Judith Robey, NASA HQ Code S i!
Session 3 - Mr. Richard Tyson, NASA HQ Code R
i
Panel Chairperson - Dr. Bonnie Dunbar, NASA/JSC t
Panel Members - Dr. Martin Coleman, NASA/JSC
Mr. Kenny Mitchell, NASA/MSFC.
!
i
*Manager,MicrogravityMaterialsProcessingFacility(MMPF)Project,TeledyneBrownEngineering i
|
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sAgain, to all of you -- both participants and attendees - a ver_ warm Alabama
welcome.
At this time, I present Mr. Ken Taylor for his opening comments.
Mr. Taylor has over 26 years of experience as a Project Engineer, systems engineer,
and Program Manager. Mr. Taylor is chief, Materials Processing in Space Group within
the Advanced Systems Office of the Program Development Directorate at NASA's George
C. Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, AL. The Materials Processing in Space
Group is the focal point for pianning and managing activities in the new field of materials
processing in space.
Mr. Taylor is currently a member of the AIAA _'echnical Committee for Space
Processing. He is a graduate of Mississippi State University with a degree in mechanical
engineering.
Please welcome Mr. Ken Taylor.
Prior to our fu,'stspeaker I have a fe_/ administrative announcements.
• "l'heregistration desk will be maintained just outside this room. There to assist
you with telephone messages, etc. are Becky and Teresa.
• Dinner tickets are on sale - encourage you to invite your spouse.
• We have microphones in the audience - if you have a question please step to the
; microphone, state your name, and then ask your question or provide comments.
If we run out of time for questions, feel free to question the speakers off-line or
bring your question up during the panel discussions.
• Our daily schedules are fight - please observe the start time and be seated on time.
Now, I present Mr. Anthony Sharpe who will provide the oudine of the Workshop
Program.
Mr. Sharpe has over 25 yeas of combined aerospace and space experience as
Manager and Project Manager of various systems engineering and Space Station definition
studies. Prior to coming to Teledyne Brown Engineering he was with SPAR Aerospace
Limited in Canada where he was a Manager in the Shuttle Remote Manipulator System
Division. With Teledyne B;'ownEngineering, he is Manager of the Advanced Programs
Department, Space Programs Division. He received his Bachelor of Science degree from
, the University of Leeds, England. Please welcome Mr. Tony Sharpe.
l
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Kenneth R. Taylor • i
From a payload point of view, the advent of Space Station off-_rsus tremendou_
increases in the capability to operate in space.
• Aboutanorderofmagnitudeincreaseinpower
• Over 5 times the time compared ;o 10 shuttle flights per year
• Significant increases in volume
• • Pe,"hapsanorderofmagnitudeincreaseinmassofon-orbitpayloadequipment
Inspacejustasonca.,'th,theamountofR&D thatcanbcdoneistoa largedegree
dependentuponthetimeavailabletodowork,thepoweravailable,andthevolumeend
massoftheequipmentavailable.So,theSpaceStationffersussomegreatopportunities
toexpandR&D inspace.Moreover,thecostofspaceR&D, whichparticularlyimportant
tocommerci,dusers,isdirectlyaffectedbythevolumeofpayloadactivity.Thefixedcost
oflaunchandoperationscanbedilutedbyincreasingpayloadactivityoyieldlowercost
perexperimentrun.
Therefore,we believewe nccdtoprepareourselvestocapitalizeuponthese
opportunitiesby ensuringthatwe know how toopclateR&D payloadson theSpace
Station.
Essentiallywe intendtocomparewhatisrequiredwithwhatisavailableinorderto
determinewhatweneedtodotocaptalizconSpaceStationtothefullest.
Fortunately,we havealotofbackgroundavailabletous.
• Thereisourpastexperienceonskylabandwe havepeoplethatworkedonboard
thatvehicie and on the project.
• We have similar expertrisefrom the Spacelab Module Project.
I
• We havedesigners,developers,andhwestigatorsnthekeyitemsofcurrentand '_!
future payloads that will be adapted to or designed for the Space Station.
!
• We have expertise on the measurement, monitoring, and control of materials.
• And ofcourse,we havekeySpaceStationparticipants, i
, O1._rgoalisaninterchangebetweenyouthatwillbegintodevelopthedesignand '
operational guidelines that enable us to fully capitalize upon space to advance material
science and technology, in particu'.,a',and space re,c,a.rchand development in general. You
#
•Chief, Materials Processing in Space Group, NASA/MSFC
#
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-_'ethe key to obtaining this goal. Y_u h:: ., -_._invited not only for your expertise, but
c_¢ of your dedication and can-dor _, - -_--'_to yourwork.
Therefor,,-, we appreciate ":,_,J_L .,,._dhope that each of you benefit from this
worgsho_ :_sr;l_:Chas the w(_r!csh, • ' .,:fit from you.
p
1
1
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3. INTRODUCTION
OUTLINE OF WORKSHOP PROGRAM
Anthony Sharpe*
The advent of the Space Station will mark the beginning of a new and enormously
exciting era of space exverimentation and operations for NASA and this nation. For the
f'wsttime since the Skylab days, people w,il live and work for extended periods of time in a
permanent orbiting space facility. Their home will be the habitat rr",dule, in which they will
eat, sleep, exercise and simply relax. Their wonq31acewill be the laboratory modules, in
which they will conduct a wide variety of materi_ls ._cocess:.ng and life science
experime.,,.ts, timeshared witi. many other operations (ranging from routine maintenance
and repah-,to monitoring and controlling external attache[ payloads). In the development of
these modules the highest possible priority will be given to establishing provisions that will
ensure crew comfort and safety at all times. This : _I1be particularly challenging in the case
of the laboratory modules, since certain activities wltlainthese modules (examples of which
are: experiment setup, sample change'_ut, sample analysis, and experiment hardware
cleanup) may require crev, interactions with hazardous materials.
NASA Headquarters and the Marshall Space Flight Center recognize that the need to
accommodate and handle the wide variety of materials anticipated within the labcratory
modules gives rise to major crew safety issues that must be resolved early in the Space
Station program. Appreciating that, when complex issues have to be addressed, many
heads axe better than one (especially if they belong to experts!), NASA Headquar:,ers
(Codes E, R and S) - up,der the auspices of the "Space Station Environmental oreenng
Group," have given Teledyne Brown Engineerin,,, the task of organizing this workshop
with the theme: "Space Station Toxic and Rea,:tiveMaterials Handling. i
We would like to extend a very warm welcome to all of you who have accepted our i
invitation to attend this workshop. Our aim, of course, is to "pick your brair.s"; but we _
also hope that these three days at Huntsville Hilton will prove useful and rewarding to you J
in youc own work.
The workshop consists of three one-day sessi9_s, organized in a logical sequen'ce,
b,_ginning with a consolidation of hazardou., materials handling requirements for Space 1
Station, in Se3sion 1; continuing with a review of current Space Station concepts (both -_
hardware and operational) for handling hazardous mater'als, in Session 2; and concl._ding 1
*Manager, Advanced Programs Department, Teledyne Brown Engineering
L
i
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with a review of existing a.jd advanced systems for detecting and controlling chemical i
;
contaminants, in Ses:;on 3.
Specifically, in Session 1, we will review our past experience in handl_r,ghazardous
materials in space, and will include presentations on previous Skylab and Spacelab
missions. Our review of present activities will benefit from ?resentations (,n upcoming
Spacelabmissionsandthecurrentworkbeingperformedby theSoviets.The future
requirementsformaterialsprocessingontheSpaceStationwillbereflectedinpresentations
on thesixCodeEN experimentfacilities.Also,a presentationon lifesciencepayload
. requirementswill identifythe uniquerequir..mentsof th'; life _ci'.:ncecommunity.
In the first half of Session 2, we will have at. overv;_w of the Space Station, and
._ thosesubsystemsthatarededicatedtotke rolec,fhandlinghazardousmaterialssafely.
Two majorSpaceStationsubsystemsthat'willbediscussedaretheEnvironmentalControl
andLifeSupportSubsystemandtheFluidManagementSubsystem.Alsodiscussediathe
Session2 willbethecapabilitiesandinterfacesoftheProcessMaterialsManagement
Subsystem,whichistheprimarysubsystemoftheUnitedStatesLaboratorychargedwith
thetaskofhandlinganddisposingofhazardousmaterials.Inaddition,theSpaceetation's
logisticscapabilitiesw llbeaddressed.
The secondhalfofSession2 willcometogripswiththesubjectofmannedsystems
and crewsafety,whichistheprimarypurposeoftheworkshop.NASA shouldbe
commendedforaddressingthecrewsafetyissuearlyi'_"heSpaceStationprogramwhile
modificationstothehardwareandoperationalconceptscanbeincorporatedwithlittlecost
and schedule impact.
Our thirdand finatsessionwilladdressinternalcontaminationdetectionand
contaminationcontrol.We willhavepresentationshighlightingexistingcontamination
controlaevices,suchas g]oveboxes,and we willexamineadvancedtechnology i
developments and new processes for their potential application to the Space Station i
program. Varic_ustechnical approaches to chemical contamination detection will be
discussed in this session. Rapid and reliable chemical contaminat;,ondetection will be one [
of the greatest technical challenges of the Space Station program !
Many of the speakers in the third session are not involv_l in the Space Station
program, but have extremely relevant knowledge and experience to share v4th us. We do
appreciate their willingness to spend this time with us and we are gra,'efu! tor their technical 4
contributions to this workshop. .,
Following each of the three sessions, there will be panel discussions, in which the
subjects broughtout durins the sessions will be discussed by the panel members. We hope
I
forstrongaudienceparticipationinthesepaneldiscussions.
3-2 :
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This workshop is intended to address Space Station laboratorymodule internal !
i
!contamination issues and to answer some key associated questions. It is quite likely, i
however, that we will raise as many new questions as we answer! | :_
On Thursday, there will be a summary of the entire workshop, with an outline of the I
major findings, conclusions, recommendations, and remaining concerns _at surfaced _.
during the presentations and discussiov_ of the previous two days. Again, we hope for _
lively discussions on the part of the attendees and participants of the workshop.
A banquet is planned for tonight. We will have me great pleasure of an after-dinner
speech by a former Skylab and Shuttle Astronaut, Dr. Owen Garriott, who is now Vice
President of the Space Programs Division of Teledyne Brown Engineering.
It is our sincere wish that the outcome of this workshop will, in terms of value, be )
greater than the sum of its par.s, providing a much-enriched knowledge base fr¢,m which
we can all work.
I would like to extend my own very best wishes to all of you for an enjoyable and
profitable time in Huntsville, where the sky is most definitely not the limit!
It is now my pleasure to introduce the Session 1 Chairman, Mr. Charles R. Baugher.
w
t
: 3-3
.i
1991006617-027
I:
.t SESSION 1
!
i SUMMARY AND KEY ISSUES IDENTIFICATION
-2
2.
_. by
Session 1 Chairman: Charles R. Baugher
NASA - MSFC
i
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SESSION 1
l
t
(
fd.LMMAB.Y
Session 1 consisted of an overview of the United State's past, present, and future :"
requirements for handling hazardous materials in space. The presentations or past ,
experience included America's first Space Station, or "Skylab", and two Spacelab missions j
(D-1 and SL-3). Present space activities that were highlighted in the workshop were the
upcoming Spacelab J and 3pacelab USML-1 missions. Also, an overview of the Soviet
MPS activities in space was provided as a basis for comparison of the planned U.S. MPS
activities for the Space Station Freedom. The future requirements for handling hazardous
materials in space were covered in presentation on the six code EN or MSAD Space Station
faciliti¢,, which are the current MPS experiment facilities. In addition, the hazardous
materials and operations associated with non-human life science payloads were detailed in
' an informative presentation by a representative of the life science community.
" One former and one current astronaut, Dr. William Pogue and Dr. Bonnie Dunbar,
participated m the workshop and made presentations concerning lessons learned on Skylab
and $paceiao. The information provided by these astronauts has direct application to the
: Space Station program. For the reason, it is ;mportant to provide in detail the key issues
discussed by these representatives of the astronaut community.
Former astronaut Dr. William Pogue, who flew on the last Skylab mission recounted
several experiences from his flight and made several points. First, was his concern for the
potential of off-gassing from materials. Skylab had over-heated and several hardware
items released toxic fumes as a result. Slcylab's air was changed out twice before the crew
entered it to eliminate most of these gases. Second, was his concern with leakage. The !
!
Skylah cooling system used g!yco[, and this syste,n developed a leak. Dr. Pogue pointed ,.
out that the Skylab cooling system was designed to be a leak-proof system. Inadequate i
eqmpment was providedforthe cleanup and the leakingmaterialspreadsomuch that glycol
was detected in d:.eair filters. Metabolic waste and other m_terials were a frequent source
of spills, (for example, sweat thrown from the exercising crew members). Inadequate !
procedures existed for clean-up. Future missions should provide for these activities. Even _
with the best designs, accidents will happen. Procedures and tools should be developed to
accc,mmodate these contingencies. Thirdly, Pot;_e was concerned with particulates and
their collection and removal. Air filters became packed with contaminants which were very
difficult to remove. The vacuum system provided for removing such material was
inadequate. A good vacuum system on future missions is highly recommended. Filters i
should also be large and be placed in locations with easy access, so they van be readily
7
t
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cleaned. Fourth,Skylab suffered from many false alarms. This can lead to desensitization
of the crew. Any f'u'¢deletion or leak detection system should be designed to reduce false
alarms. Fifth, fire andleak detection systems should reveal location of problem and hand-
held units should be provided for furtherassistance. Skylab did not have this capability
andit took an unncces:_.xi!ylong time to research false alarms. Plus, in a real emergenc?
the soonera locationis known the betterme potenfi_ forremedialaction. Sixth, any future
gas detection system should be capableof detectingall conmminm+_. $kylab had ,,u ieak
detection system. Seventh, a tool was usec'on Skylab which P.ada numbering system
associated with the mechanism. These numberswere glued on andeventually c._meoff.
Futurelabeling systems should not be prone to this problem. Eighth, some combustion
tests haveindicatedthat entrainedairin a fire exunguisbersexhaustmay actuallyfeed a f'u'c.
More research needs to be done in th;s _.r_.a.Ninth, Skylab tests showed that porous
materials bum readily in a low-g envh'onment. Lastly, Pogue was concerned by reliance
on containment. On Skylab a camera was opened and it was full of broken glass. This
glass was supposed to be contained within the camera. The main point is don't depend
upon containment. Procedures and tools should be developed to overcom_ accidental
+ material release.
Dr. Bonnie Dunbar gave an informative presentation on the Spacelab D1 mission.
'- Her presentation was primarily an overview of the mission. She pointed out that a large
: reason for the missions success was because of extensive preflight training. She also
l emphasized the importance of crew members having extensive knowledge of the
experiments and materials they are expected to handle. One minor ._int brought out wasl
_" th_: the airflow fromSpacelab is into the Shuttle middeckand flight deck area. Therefore,
I debris from Spacelab tended to collect in those areas. It was later pointed out that this
would not be a desirable air flow pattern in the case of a hazardous material. One would
want the air flow to be away from the crew. In discussing material science experiments,
Bonnie pointed out that many materials are toxic only at high tempe,'atures. One sample
failed in the gradient heating furnaceon this mission. However, a rewievaJprocedure had
been practiced on the ground, this was successfully used on-orbit. The sample that failed
was a late mission add-on, which had its composition changed from the sample it replaced.
However, the crew was not informed of this change and used an incorrect thermal profile.
This anomaly points up the need for tight control between any changes that the
• experimenterm_es to his facility or materials and the need for the crew to be completely
familiar with those changes and their consequences. A nmjor failure occurred on D-1,
silicone oil leaked from a facility and the oil spreadover the rack surfacesand contaminated
4-3
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otheradjacentSpacelabequipment.This incidentoccurredbecausesiliconeoilwill
daoroughlywetalmostanysurfaceitcomes incontactwith.
No proceduresor toolshad bccn providedforclean-up.Futuremissionshave to
considerthesecvcntualitites.Dunbarencouragedrackdeveloperstoprovidetheirown
uniquetoolsforequipmentrepairandoperation.Dunbarconcludedby saying:l)Safetyis
thekeytoasuccessfulmission,2)aninternationalpo icyforsafetyandthesecxpcr:.mcnts
isrequired,3)thefullsafetyburdenshouldbcsharedbetweenSS systemsandexperiment
facilities,and4)reLiablechemicalcontaminationdetectionu itsarcneedednow. Shealso
recommended a new NRC safetydocument.She alsohadone comment on automation.
You can'tautomatewhatyoudon'tgnow,thecrewwillberequkredtomake mochfications
tohardwareandprocedures.
As tberesultofDunbar's-)resentationseveralcommentsweremade. One was thatin
considering triple containment one needed to consider each material on an individual basis.
Some materials are safer than others. A disc ::sio_, of fault tolerance as opposed to triple
containment then arose. Another point raised was that the SS does not allow ,Sreeventing,
wl_ich the Spacelab does. What operational impacts will this have on the users? Dunbar
' mentioned here that the glovcbox on D-1 worked well except that it had only one glove
4 size, which was too large for her after it was stretched out. Dr. Dunbar recommended
!
,- various glove sizes for the gloveboxes that will be flown on Space Station.
It/,X_KS.5.U./
1. There is a strong conflict between the payload desire to vent waste and the restrictions
on external contamination. Sixty-six percent of the existing MPS payloads ,'equire
venting. The venting requirements do not define a venting allocation for each Space
Station Module. All sides appear to be unaware of the rationale on the part of others, ,:
and little information is being exchanged. This issue calls for coordination by Level
II since it involves many Codes and Work packages. ,_q
2. Off-gassing of equipment must be considered a source of potential noxious material, i
Strict controls should be imposed to reduce or eliminate this hazard, i
3. Adequate equipment for lab cleaning must be provided. Filters and other hardware to j
, be cleaned must be easily accessible and must be designed with cleaning requirements
in mind.
-- 4. Little consideration was given to ground operations with these hazardous materials.
Who is responsible for these areas and what plans have they made for these i_
operations? More attention needs to be given to this area. 1
5. The potential for various levels of waste treatment exists: at the rack level, at the !,
module level, and for the entire SS. The specifics of these levels of processing need i
4=4
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to be defined as soon as possible as they will impact user hardware design. Many of
these designs will be entering Phase A/B development v_y soon.
6. It is critical that fire and leak detection systems be designed to locate a leak or fire
source. General alarms are inadequate. Reduction of false alarms is desirable and
hand-held portable units for alarm foUow-up are also desired.
7. The current requirement concerning storage of potentially explosive materials is
misleading as stated. Strict interpretation of the requirement would indicate that
hydrogen gas would have to be stored outside the module.
8. More organized and direct communications are required between Space Station and
User techni_:_l personnel. In many cases the laboratory users are among the most
knowledgeable authorities on handling compounds associated with their experiments
and their expertise should be directly focused in a visible fashion. In addition, lack of
information to design teams tends to lead to "worst case" over design as engineers
attempt to develop systems to accommodate vague generalities. ,.
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SPACE STATION FREEDOM I
TOXIC AND REACTIVE MATERIALS HANDLING WORKSHOP
PAST EXPERIENCE :_
%
"SKYLAB MISSION"
i_' Bill Pogue, Pilot, Skylab 4 j
The design of the Skylab missions, 1973-74 was intended to exclude
any direct handling of hazardous, toxic or reactive materials. The
._ materials processing facility and multlpurpose furnace provided
a _Jntalned environment for conducting metals melting, brazing,
sphere forming and crystal growth experiments. _t the end of the
% third mission, following the completion of all other experiments,
the materials processing facility _as used for a series of flam- !
mability experiments. The flam/nability tests were done last because ,
i of the contamination expected from the bu,'ning of materials within
__ the facility. The flammability tests demonstrated a number of
ii peculiar effects that have implications for future design(firedetection, location and suppression/control).
Although the results of the flammability tests contain lessons
appropriate to planning, a number of events during the flight
illustrate situations or conditions that pose considerations
beyond the commonly accepted range of concern for safety-related
matters. This presentation will include a discussion of:
-Skylab flammauability studies and the implications for fire
suppress!on/control;
-False fire alarms and the Skylab fire detection system;
-Space environmental effects on materials that are normally benizn;
-Spills/relea, se of contaminants;
-The detrimental effect that the release of non-hazardous materials
have on detection system_;
-The problem o£ locating sources/originating point of hazards. i
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6. SPACELAB D-1 MISSION
i
Dr. Bonnie J. Dunbar
NASA/JSC, Astronaut
(Note: Thispaper hasb_n reproducedfromropes.)
Thankyou, and Bill, we d_,: 'cam from the lessons of Skylab+ There were several
documents printed after those flights called Lessons _ed from Skylab. rye read them
and found them v_y informationaland I think you'll be please,d to know that I think the
vacuum cleaner now works beu_. We did use it for some furnace cleaning and we do
clean the film's out andwe have improvedthe access. W©haveensuredthat we don'thave
to take off all those bolts again.
What I would like to do today is talk about the D1 mission from a couple of
+ perspectives. The first one, of course, is from the point of view of safety, materials
handling, toxic mater.aSs,but the other is from the point of view of the laboratory and the
+ equip_nent we used and some of the different philosophies utilized on this flight. My
!
Ph.D. is in Biomedica ,_ngineering but most of my professional life has been in materials
-i and most of my labc,n tory experience has been with high-temperature furnaces and
diagnostic devices and s_ forth. So I find ,..hathis is a very inten=stingpart of theresearch
that'soccurringon S.r,acclabmissions, on the middeck, and wiUoccur on Space Station.
(First slide)
: I will introduce the crew and backgrovnd to you. This flight was called 61A in the
NASA language. It actually had another name, DI (Dcutchland Eins) which was the first
German-sponsored Spacelab flight. Germany, not ESA, but DFVLR in Germany, bought
this flight, the launch for about 59M. They invested about 229M of their funds in the
experimental hardwarematwent inside the lab flight. This was a f'u'stof a series of flights, j
D2 will occur in late 1991. Their stated intent is not only science but the development of
hardware for Space Station. So, 1991 will see us with a couple of new furnaces that
: i
i actually won't be heated up but will b¢ tested for advanced technology and will eventually
t
be used on the Station. The crew consisted of five NASA career astronauts. The J
commander, Hank Hartsfield with NASA, the pilot Steve Nagel from the Air Force with
NASA, the Mission Specialists myself- MS1, MS2 Jim Buchli with NASA from the I
. Marine Corps,MS3 Guy Blufordfrom the AirForce. Guy and I were assigned as the two
people on board in charge of the Spacelab subsystems, much as Owen was on his flight
and also assigned the task of training for the experiments. There were three Europeanson i
board.ProfessorReinhardFurrerfromBerlin,Dr.Wubbo OckelsfromtheNetherlands, l
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iwho is an ESA astronaut and flew on this _ght because about 30% of the hardware was
ESA. It was part of the cooperative agreement ESA had with Germany. And then,
Professor ErnstMesserschmid Stuttgart. The five of us then were called the payload crew.
We then trained primarilyin Europestartingabout 19 months prior to the flight. We spent
i
about 6 and 1/2 months in Europe and therest of the time in Houston. Guy and I trained
with the rest of the crew on the Shuttle and the Spacelab systems.
Just to review a little for you what Spacelab is, it is actually an in-the-bay laboratory
connected to the middeck with a tunnel and it's a shirt-sleeve environment. There are two
hatches that separate the lab from the middeck at launch, one here in the middeck and one
about here at this area. Veryoften, we carrypallets behind the laboratory,when we fly with
otherexperiments and we did so cn this flight. This is not our configuration. But we did
carry a U.S. pallet in the back which contained the MaterialsExperimentAssembly which
was an automated, high-temperature levitation furnace.
Tb,e experiments, as I said before, within _e lab were primarily German. We did
have a cooperative physiological experiment with MIT which war,in here. And then, tkere
were nine middeck lockers devoted to supporting the work in the laboratory. Just.a note
about air flow. The air flow in this system was such that the c_bin air flowed this way
through the tunnel into the middeck so that the iaboratory erwironment was really quite _
clean. It was the cleanest part of the Shuttle. Air debris or environmental debris builds up
over time, so by the seventh day all of that those flakes of skin, hair, paper, and food that
might be out were really accumulating on the middeck. Filter cleaning was a routine and
important part of our mission and every other mission as well. We have improved the
access so we don't have to take off the panels with large amounts of screws.
Just a quick look at the lab as it is in MBB/ERNO. You can see the pressure holes on
the end and then the experiment racks themselves. Each rack comes _Ath a standard set of
facilities. For instance, air handling tubes and electrical cables for data handling and for J
power, i
And as it iooked in the payloadbay. This was from the middeck back at the lab and
you can see the tunnel, the hand rails for the EVA access if we needed to go outside.
This is in German so don't worry about reading the print at the top. It's only one
side of the lab but I wanted to briefly explain the disciplines we had to deal with. Thirty
perr:nt of this flight was devoted to materials science. Everything from high-temperature !
I
processing of metal alloys and semiconductor material such as gallium-antimonide to i
looking at basic science using laser interferr -eu-y to study Marangoni Flow, for instance, |
i
and inter-diffusion of melts. The way the mgnt was organized was that each rack had a
discipline so there was not a mix of disciplines within racks and those racks were integrated I
f
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st a subcontractorbefore they ,vent to Bre_aenfor a test within the lab floor. The blue rack
. is a subsystem rack in the Spacelab that ha_ the data or high-data rate recorder, the ',
computer interface here for the subsy;tems, also the black boxes, for instance, inverters
and computers within it. The red racks represented one side of the experiment racks.
-- There was a large materials science double rack. MSDR flew for the first time on Spacelab '
1 and this was its second flight. So, those p,'oblemsthat they had encountered on the first4
flight in 1983 they attempted to fix on this flight in October of 1985. Next to that was a
stowage rack. There's also a rack called process commer. This was the rack which
; contain,.'dthe smal_ lasers. And, then, next to that a stowage rack with equipment for this
7
vestiI'.'' arsled. Vestibular science is comprised of about another 30% of the flight. On the
i other side, not shown, was another large double rack of material science that was called
MADEA. There was also a glovebox, a biological glovebox, and you will see that in a
moment. In the back you do s_ the Materials Experiment Assembly here and then three
GAS cans, communications experiments flown by the Germans.
.. Like most Spacelab flights, the scientists on these flights are tied in d:rectly to the
crew. We don't have this capability fight now for middeck experiment; but it is a
particularly nice feature of Spacelab flights in that the scientists on the groun, _can int6ract
with the crew on board and it is something that we do encourage. However, what was
unique about this flight is th-t the scientists were not at Marshall or a U.S. remote POCC.
They were all at a POCC, or Payload Operations Control Center, within Germany at
Oberfafenhoven. This is what our communications looked like. Here's the Shuttle. We
communicated to the TDRSS satellite down to White Sands. This went to a domestic
. satellitesignal relayed to Goddard to JSC. The experimental data, because the Germans are v
interested in Spacelab subsystem data, they ere using their POCC to develop a Space
Station capability. They asked that some of that be shipped over as well so we sent that to
!ntelsat 5, which is a commercial satellite over Germany that went down to northern
Germany and then by land line to Obeffafenhoven near Munich. There's a picture out of
their control center. It's the same facility that has controlled their satellites. They're using i
it for their Spacelab missions and they will probably use it to interface with their Space
Station operations as well. They do have one feature we don't have and that's color CRTs
at their control sites.
On board, you see one of the two shifts working. This is myself and Reinhard and
t Ernst working in parallel to a flight plan that's been developed over time in 5-minute
increments because time is money with a certain amount of time padded in each day for
contingencies because tb,ere is no perfect world. In-flight maintenance is an important part
of every lab whether it be on the g. und or on board. In this photo, I have some tools on
t
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my leg. You always carry scissors and pencils and other tools _round. I'm checking some
data in an incubato, Reinhard's at the materials science double rack and Ernst is at the rear
probably looking at some vestibular science hardware.
This is glovebox that we carried on board developed by ESA. In this facility, the
whole rack contained two incubators, a freezer, a cooler, and the glovebox. This facility
was flawless - first flight. It contained over g0 different boxes, which I'll show in this
next photo, containing a number of experiments. This is one of the incubators. Each of
these little cigarette-shaped boxes contained an experiment. Some were sort of autonomous
in that you would rotate the sample from a freezer to a cooler, then maybe to an incubator,
and then back into a freezer. Others were actually plugged into little chips at the end of this
box and then the data went to the CRT display who would either initiate the experiment,
monitor it, or it would let us know when it was finished.
Here's a closer look at the box. This is built by Domier who built all the boxes and
then all the experimenter had to provide was generally the interior. This provided one level
of containment. Inside might he something like this. Inside this little box were maize
seeds and there were two plungers at the end. One of the plungers provided the water to
germinate the seeds and the other one may have been the f'L_adve which we later plunged
; down and fixed the samples. When we worked with these samples (took them in and out
of the box), the glovebox itself was considered one level of containment and that's
something to remember when designing experiments. We have a triple containment rule
"_ but there are ways of providing that rather than putting everything into three boxes and then
not leaving access to them.
On the other side of the lab you see myself and Wubbo working. I'm in front of the
MDEA facility which included a gradient heating furnace and a mirror heating furnace.
The samples, as you can see here, are all outside the furnace and they are exchanged. This
was routine for all five high-temperature furnaces we carried. I think it is important to J
,
remember that the materials that we carried, such as gallium-antimonide, are only toxic at
temperature, not at ambient conditions, as long as they d__a't have _,high vapor pressure
and you are not actually touching the surface. So, in a lot of cases such as this one, that
t
sample has a glass tube around it but you might say that is single level of containment. But
once I put it in the furnace and close the door and there is an interlock there that as soon as I
start heating it up will prevent me from ever opening that door again until it is back at 1
)
temperature. We operate in a safe environment. There are a lot of interlocks a,_d safety t
features built onto this furnace. I consider this the most sophisticated rack facility we have i
probably ever flown. It has microprocessors which plug under the front which contain the i
I
I
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thermal processing curves. There are codes built into the samples themselves that go out
and fetch the processing curves. It protects proprietary data and yet it is safe.
This happens to be a drawer full of spare lamps. We were also able to exchange
lamps. They are, again, glass lamps or glass bulbs. I don't know if you can see them on
the end there, but they are carried up in plastic and foam and then exchanged on orbit.
In the gradient heating furnace we carded very benign metal alloys and the alloy
samples themselves are a little over l foot. That's the end of the sample which .',;so
happens to be a door of the furnace and in that door of the furnace which screws in is a
cable that plugs into the front of the panel which then goes to the PROM and fetches all of
the necessary information to process or gives the necessary information to process that
sample. We did have one problem with the gradient heating furnace sample. One of them,
there are thermocouples inside these samples, and, for some unknown reason, one of them
broke in the furnace and I pulled it out and recogn,:ed that we had less than a full sample
down there. We knew it was a non-toxic material• 1 used a flashlight to look down into
the bowl of the furnace and saw the rest of the sample down them. We had long forceps.
We retrieved the rest of the sample and there was some debris in there. We put the vacuum
cleaner over the front of the furnace and sucked out the debris. We took a bottle brush,
cleaned out any powder that might have been in there, and then continued processing the
rest of the flight. Now I should add that was not an "on-the-wing" procedure. Preflight,
we had tried to provide for all these contingencies and that was a planned operation in case
we had any problem with these materials.
A closer look at the materials science double rack. You will see some of this in the
short f'dm that I am going to show from the flight. It was called the fluid physics module.
We also had a cryostat device for growing protein crystals. We had an isothermal heating
furnace, a gradient heating furnace, and then the power boards and so forth.
This is the mixror heating furnace in which we did some of the single crystal silicon
and some of the other semiconductors. In this case, the crewman here has it open and is ti
actually cleaning it out. This was one problem we did have on flight and there are probably i
several reasons this happened. We think that there are two possible things that happened. :
We know a sample overheated. We think that one plausible reason is that the sample that
was provided to us late was not the one that was coded in the computer or documented. In
order to start this furnace you have to go up to another minicomputer, you type in a code, i
and it echos back to you. It is an "arm and fire" situation. You read that code, you press
an ENTER, and that puts in the proper thermal profile. In looking back through the data, t!
we think that a slighdy different composition sample was provided late by the experimenter
I
and we are trying to tighten up that safety loop to make sure we fly what we think we ace
I
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flying and that we have the proper p.,"oceduresto respond to it on board. There ark other
details to this that I can _scuss off-line but that was probably one of the things that caught
our attention i_ :hat we had something there we didn't know we had.
We can do a lot of things on board now that require small, painstaking actions. Here
Ernst is taking small plant roots and cutting them with a razor blade. We are doing more
laboratory operations, we are still remaining safe. Everything has a tether on it -- every
scissor, every forcep, every razor blade has a tether and velcro because we can't afford to
let it loose. We can't afford to let it be a hazard to the rest of the crew. We know it is there
but someone else may not.
And the fluid physics module, the question came up about cleaning up fluids. We
worry about fluids getting loose that may not be toxic to you and me in a 1-g environment,
but in the eye or other membranes can be toxic, and this case is silicon oil. It has a
: tendency to wet everything once it gets loose. Towels help to some extent but the real
'_. action one must take is to prevent it, to contain it, to ensure that the surfaces being used are
¢
not wetted by it unless that is part of the experiment and it is contained. On the ftrst flight
; of this rack some silicon oil inadvertently was let loose. The crew thought they had cleaned
it up, the rack was sent back to Germany to DFVLR. It had crawled back behind the tack
along every piece of cable back there to the underneath portion of the Spacelab floor and it
took them nine months to clean up that hardware.
I mentioned in-flight maintenance. The Space Shuttle has its own IFM tool set, the
Spacelab has its own IFM tool set,and sometimes experiments provide their own. We do
encourage it. We have a group in the astronaut office called the Science Support Group
and we start workir_ ,,,:.:_ _x_nmenters xly trying to pass our lessons learned in
experiment operations and how to desit;n them and how to provide access. One of the
things we do encourage is it may break. We would all like to think our stuff doesn't break.
It may break, it may provide a hazard. So show us how to get in to it, provide us the
opportunity for access, and make sure we have the tools on board to do it.
I have just a few concluding remarks. Safety_ I think, is the bottom line of any
laboratory operations. Not just the Station or the Shuttle but any lab and I've worked in a
number of them. I remember some ver_ drastic procedures that were imposed at the
University of Washington while I was a graduate student after two very fatal accidents.
One where a student walked between two large capacitors and died. Another in which a
student froze a fixative in the chemistry department. The refrigerator explode_ and he died.
So it is not just a Station, it is not just a Shuttle matter, laboratory safety is important to all
of us.
I
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Because of that, I was sortof interested in what was happening in laboratory safety +
and I recendy found that the NPC was too. They just put out a new book called Prudent ++
Practices for Handling Hazardgus Chemicals in Laboratories. The first th'.ng it says you
have to do is develop a philosophy. I would like to encourage us today to talk about what
that philosophy is, not just for the U.S. Lab, not just for U.S. hardware, but remember
that we are connected to two other nati.,nal laboratories and that we have to have an
international safety policy and word., to the effect that we are going to do closed-hatch
operations are not acceptable. We cannot leave people alone in an environment in which
they may not be safe. We have a common environment. We do not have enclosed life
support systems. The air that I breathe is the same air that someone on the other side of the
Station may breathe. And so, we woulr_like to pass that on. To recommend a uniform
safety policy for the internationa[ lab. We don't think the full burden should be on the
experimenter, but also on the systems. I think that's happening. In other words, the
Spacelab comes with scrubbers and so forth. Not every experiment is expected to do its
own scrubbing and provide all the leve!s of containment. If we did that we'd have no
science on board. Nobody could afford it. But we need to have clearly articulated
requirements for what the experimenter is supposed to do in proving three levels of
containment for instance. We need a reliable contaminant detection, as was mentioned
before. I know there are a lot of efforts on mass spectrometers. We don't need them for
Station, we need them now. We need to have the various groups working together on it.
We need them now because we have a CDSF, Commercially Developed Space Processing
Facility, or the Industrial Space Facility that's going to come on board that we are going to +
revisit. We have to know what the environment is like before we enter. Just for a
comparison, when we e_:',,r the lab and we know we have scrubbed it before we go up, we
t
look at some parameters on the onboard displays before we ever open the hatch. We look _.
'T
first of all at pressure. We look at pressure over time, the PDT, to make sure we don't $
have a leak. We look at PPO2 - partial pressure of oxygen - and CO2. Then we try to get a
+
look with the cameras. There are cameras hooked up inside to ensure that we don't have
anything else rattling around there such as glass shards or other debris that could be a +
hazard to the crew. So, we do need reliable contaminant detectior and we need to have it
real time and as soon as possible and v,e'd like to test it on the Shuttle before we put it on
the Station. }
Some of the lessons learned in developing, experiments. This is maybe not a safety
point but _omething that I would like to pass on. You can't automate what you don't il
know. If yon could automate early on in the process or the experimental development you ',!
would not need graduate students. In all the years I spent in the lab before I came to
I
t
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NASA, [ found that when you are trying to develop an experiment or a piece of hardware,
you need to tweak it, you need to change process variables, and so forth. We are trying to
encourage people to use the human element when it is practical, automate where it is
necessary, and come to the best medium of both worlds. Now, some of those experiments
will eventually be totally automated, they may even be outside of Space Station. They may J
be material processing facilities that float out there and we just recover samples ever so
often. In the area of life sciences, they may never leave the Station. They may just nmture
but still remaha inside the environmen_
Spacclab, Space Station, is a laboratory• It's also unique. It is, in itself, in a
hazardous environment and we cannot escape. I am very gratified that this conference is
occurring because it will allow us to discuss what we can do to enhance our scientific
i
return at the same time as being safe. The experiences of Skylab, Shmde, and Spacelab
will hopefully lay a foundation for what we have done and how we can build upon it. I
think that we need to work very vigorously in this area. My personal opinion was after
having flown this flig!,.t that Germany had a more aggressive plan in how they were going
to utilize their flights tc develop Station hardware and I certainly would encourage you, if
you are developivg hardware, to think about prototypes being flown on Spacelab flights.
Maybe nor the final version• For instance, on D-2 we will see two new facilities. One is
called Rotex. It is an automated furnace facility but it is being flown fh'st inside the lab to
ensure that it works because it uses an uplink command capability from Germany.
Germany will command across tl,e ocean to JSC and uplink through to JSC and shuttle
these commands to operate this furnace. Perhaps something that will go on a free flyer
eventually. Also, there is a new furnace on board in the materials science double rack. It is
called Isothermal Heating Furnace-T. The T is turbine blade. They have a lot of interest
from their power plant companies in Germany on single-crystal turbine blades. I do not _++
know the details of this. It may or .Hay not heat up, but I think it will be a high-temperature !
furnace and a developmental furnace. And if you read all of their charts they state as a
Spacelab goal development for Space S,ation. )
In any case, welcome, and thank you for affording me the opportunity to pass these
l
comments on. -_
i
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SPACELAB 3 MISSION
Bonnie P. Dalton
I
ABSTRACT
Spacelab 3 (SL-3) was the first microgravity mission of extended duration
involving crew interaction with animal specimens. This interaction involved
sharing the Spacelab environmental system, changing animal food, and
changing animal waste trays by the crew. Extensive microbial testing was
conducted on the animal specimens and crew and on their grouted and flight
facilities during all phases of the missionto determine the potential for cross
contamination.
Macroparticulate sampling was attempted but was _successful due to the
unforseen particulate contamination occurring during the flight. Particulate
debris of varying size (250 um to ._everal inches) and composition was
recovered post flight from the Spacelab floor, end cones, overhead _reas,
avionics fan filter, cabin fan filters, tunnel adaptor and from the crew module.
These data are discussed along with solutions, which have been implem,anted,
for particulate and microbial containment for future flights' facilities.
INTRODUCTION
SPACELAB 3 (SL-3) was launched on April 29, 1985 and heraqdc_the use of
the Spacelab in support of animal facilities for biomedical investigations. Thus
the goal on thi3.initial flight of twenty-four rodents and two squirrel monkeys,
was verification of the Research Animal Holding Facilities (RAHFs) under
microgravity conditions. The main objectivesof the Payload were: 1) evaluate
the operations and procedures for missioncare of animals, 2) provide in-flight
biocompatabilityassessment between animals and the RAHF, 3) gain mission
operational experience, 4) study physiological, behavioral and morphological
changes occurringas a resL,.Itof containment in the RAHF during space flight,
and 5) verify principal hardware elements to be reflown.1 Much data was -,
gained from SL-3; all of it was positive in terms of animal maintenance, but J
particulate contamination as a result of RAHF c_,erations had to be corrected, j
before RAHFs could be flown _;gain. This paper will address the SL-3 data and
changes implemented as a result of SL-3.
t
ANIMAL MAINTENANCE VERIFICATION _
Verification, during SL-3, included the capability of th-_ RAHFs to maintain the
animals under conditions comparable to _arth based vivarium controls in the
laboratory in terms of temperature, humidity, air exchange (carbon dioxide _{
removal and oxygen replenishment), waste management, feeding and
watering. The environmetltal control system of the RAHF utilized circulating I
fans and thermal electric units (TEUs) fc,' air exchange and temperature control i
," |
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while a condensate separator/collection system main*.ainedhumidity control.
The RAHF environmental control system is i!lustrated in Figure 1. Food and
water were available on demand throughan automated watering system with a
self contained water tank and crew replaceable food cartridges. From m lignt
RAHF environmentaldata and postflight physiologicalanalysis of the anJ',_a,stt
was shown that the flight facilities maintained an envirorln,ent compara_'ieto
that of the groundvivarium. Physiologicalchanges oberved in the animals post
f,ght were readily identifiedas adaptationsto the microgravityenvironment.2,3
CONTAINMENT VERIFICATION
Verification also included operation within the Spacelab without
microbiologicalcross contamination between th_ human crew and the non-
human biospecimens, without odor, and without paniculate contamination.
These verification requirements were to be met through the use of in-line
microbiologicalfilters (0.3 micron HEPA _ ,'orm_:_ming and exPing air, through
the use of odor absorbing charcoal beds and phosphoric acid treatea waste
pads to prevent ammonia accumulation _nd inhibit microbial growth, and
throughmaintenance of the RAHF at a slightlynegativepressure with respect to
the cabin.
MICROPARTICULATES--The goals of microbiological containment were
accomplished during SL-3. Extensive testing was conducted on the animals,
crew, facilities housing both animals and crew, and on th- Spacelab, orbiter
flight deck, and RAHF surfaces during all phases of the mission to _horoughly
characterize the microbiologicalprofiles.4 The success of that testing program
was the result of a cooperative effort by the Ames, Johnson, and Kennedy
Space Centers which were responsible for the flight biospecimens, crew ar,_l
flight facilities, and ground facilities' sampling, respectively. Over 1500
sampleswere collected fromthe pool of animals intendedfor flight to insure the
Specific Pathogen Free (SPF) microbiological integrity of those animals finally
selected. An additional total of 175 preflight, 81 inflight, and 98 postflight
samples were obtained from the selected flight animals, crew, and
environ,_,._ntalsuP,aces during the SL-3 mission. This extensive sampling j
revealed _lo t,nusual microbiologicalaccumulations during the course of the
mission. In f_:t it has been reportedthat "levels of airborne microorganismsin _;
the Spacel_,o were low compared to values obtained from the Orbiter during !,
previous missions."5
t
Only two instances were reported of isolation of microbiological species of
possibleanimal origin external to the RAHF. These were isolated fro,,; a crew
member's hand following waste tray changeout and from an air return screen
on the Orbiter Flight Deck. Unequivocal determination of origin was not i
possible. The Spacelab microbiologicalintegrity was maintained even though
a slight increase of bacterial growth was observed on RAHF interior samples
taken immediately postflight. It must be noted that the organisms of
significance, the fecal markers (F=,._G_,_ and a pathogen
(_i_ZY..L_,g_ aureus), were only isolatedfrom RAHF intedorsurfaces.
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Particulates were measured throL,gh use of air strip adhesion both preflightand
at L+O h.,,iowingthe openingof the Sp._celabmodule. The postflightparticulate
strip could not be enumerated as a result of the extersive fine particulate dust
(presumably foodlSarcrumb.s) releas-d during flight. Infiight particle counts
observea in the Mid Deck, Fight _,¢,ck,end ,Sl:,acelabranged from <5,000 to
34,000 particulates/m3. Partic,.aatecount :"rang focd canister _nd waste tray
changeout ranged from <5,000 to 12,000 particulates/m3.6 Particulate levels
in the Sp_.celab were highest during and following waste tray changeout.
_,,99..g.cgJ_,__sp.was the only potentially pathogenic microorganism isolated
during the inflightSpacelab sampling. Sample sites were external to the RAHF;
n,.)fecal coliformswere isolated.
Table 1 (SI.-3 Mid Deck, Flight Deck end Spacelab Particulates) compares
particulate levels from the three Iocati¢_nsover t,_e duration of the m;ssion.
Though measured particulates in the Mid Deck decreased during the flight,
Flight Deck values were high. The elovated values were assessed to have
bern the resultof the directional_. _lowfrom the Spacelab to the FlightDeck.
In conclusion, though increased particulate levels were observed, _he
microbiological filters employed in the RAHF along with maintenance of
Specific Patho.,en Free (SPF) animals ensured no cross contamination
between crew and biospe_.,:nens. The reader is directed to Reference 4 for
complete details of microbiologicalresult._.
MACROPARTICUL&']'ES-."Macroparticulatas" were collected post fhgt,t by
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) p_yloads processing personnel. Debris
removed from the OV-O99 Crew Module was analy_ed by t,_e KSC
Microchemical Analysis Branch. Where possible, debris _a_. identified
optically. Other methods included scanning electron microscope energy
dispersive analysis (SM/EDS) or use of infr3red (IR) for orgar,,icsubstances.
Table 2 (Crew Module Particulates) indicates sample site, predominant
particulates found c'_d predominant chemical characteristics. The conclusion
by the KSC analysisteam was that debris in the cabin appeared to be of human
1 origin. Cne bit (_fdebris found in the aidock did providuidentical analysis t._that -
observed in the rat fond, although the analysis team also stated that, "Most
samples wer6 _o mixed that exact identificationwas very difficult."7
Avionics and cabi,I air filter debris were transferred to Marshall Space Flight i
Center and suosequer,tly to Ames Research Cent_'. The material we.
identified as _etdeved from sever different sites: _
Group 1 Floor, end cones, overhead areas
.- Group 2 S'1"3inlet screen d_,3._s ._Group 3 Avionics fan filter debri
Grc ,p 4 Cabin far:.filter debris )
Group 5 Avionics f_n filter, _Jose
Group 6 Tunnel debris t
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Group 7 Cabin fan filter debris, loose
Group 8 Port side rack ex!erior
A description the materials identified from these specific locations and their
weights is indicated in Table 3 (Avionics and Cabin Filter Debri).
RAHF REDESIGN
Though odor was reduced, it was nct eliminated. Control ot odor and
particulaterelease was the primarygoal in the post SL-3 redesignwork on the
RAHF. Means of obtainingthis goal addressed: 1) containment of debri at the
source, 2) control of air flow during operations requiring opening the cage or
moduleto the cabin, and 3) controlof odor throughreductionof module leaks.
Figure2 illustratesthe changes incorporatedin the redesigned RAHF, hereafter
referred to as the SLS-1 RAHF (Spacelab Life Sciences 1 RAHF).
Modificationsfor particulatecontainment include the addition of a single ;.)ass
auxiliary fan (SPAF_.to create a high inward air flow during all open-door
operations, sealing of the cage/cage module interface, and totally sealing the
cages to prevent particles of 150 micronsor greater from escaping. The total
leak rate for the RAHF is currentlyless than 10 cfm at 1 in. of water which results
inthe RAHF operatingat a negativepressureto the cabin in flight.
Cage redesign to ,_ontainparticu!ates to 150 m!crons required changing the
cage top from the half inch spaced grid to a multi layer 135 mesh screen. In
_,,_dition,he rodent water !ixithas been broughtto the interior of the cage via a
quick disccnnect at each cage compartment and the waste tray has been
s:ugged against the cage bottom. 'Feeders new sustain a longer lasting, low
crumbing fcod bar necessitatingJewermflightchanges of feeders.
The SPAF, incorporatedto control air flow during cage operations, is manually
activated any time a RAHF ct,ge door is opened, a feeder or waste tray
changed, or a cage removedfrom the :IAHF. SPAF activation creates a high
i_lwardair flow permittingparticulate :etention to within two inches from the
frontof the cage.
Changes initiated in the SLS-1 RAHF were the result of attaining a
fundamental undertstanding of the alrfiow subsystem. Aiff!ow thrn.uqhthe
RAHF cages during nominal operations is 80 cfm ( approximately 6.5 cfm at
each cage). Therefore airflow could be treated as an incompressibleflow (i.e.,
oil flow characteristics)with the distributedpaths over and throughcages being
comparable to a "pipeline" system in oil flows. Commercial models are
available for such systems. The approach used analysis data correlated with
test d&_ato review both the SL-3 and the proposed SLS-1 configuration. This
allowed prediction of system performance under all important conditions and a
determination of the system configuration required to meet the performance
objectives. Pr3dacted models compared within 10% to actual system test
results comparing module flow rates, pressure drops, and flow patterns.
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Modeling addressed various parameters including: adequate ventilation for
oxygen (02) supply and carbon dioxide (CO2) removal, restriction to three cfm
design flow required for 02 and CO2 ,control,minimization of thermal losses,
various possible leak paths in the cage module including the many wire
bundles and tubing lines, and the bleed air rate. The cage configuration, i.e.,
cage top design,waste tray packingand materialsall effected flow paths. As a
result,the waste tray packingmaterial has also been changed. Effectsof a dirty
waste tray were determined to be minimal. Flow modelsand particle retention
modeis were correlated to cage withdrawal velocities for various expected
particle sizes. The rodent RAHF system was analyzed for the velocities
corresponding to cage out, feeder out, and waste tray out. Figure 3 is the
Rodent System Schematicwhich was addressed. Figures4 and 5 illustrateSL-
3 particleescape and SPAF reverse flow, respectively.9
Further confirmation of predicted models was obtained during the August-
September, 1988 SLS-1 RAHF Biocompatabilityand Systems SensitivityTests
which were conducted with a full complement of rodents. Odor was evaluated
by a panel of ten persons and SLS-1 crew persons,duringtheir visit to the test.
The pane= represented personnel both within and outside the Project. The
group agreed unequivocally that no odor could be detected throughot:t test
operationsor at the conclusionof the eight-day test.
In the event of power failure, a ;eak tignt system should also result in less
available 02 over a shorter time. Tests conducted with the SL-3 RAHF in
"power off" mode in 1983 showed that four hours were required before rodents
exhibited the typical drowsiness associated with 02 depletion (available 02
measurements were also taken d'.ring the test). The _ame symptoms were
evident in less than 45 minutes in the recent SLS-1 RAHF tests.
Table 4 (Observed Air Flow During SPAF Observations) shows air velocity
_- measurements obtained witt, the SPAF. Data indicate that full SPAF uperation
air velocities are sufficient to contain any size particulate potentially escaping
the RAHF via cage, feeder, or waste tray removal. Inletair velocities, indicated
under SPAF OFF, Normal Flow Velocity columnverify that the RAHF maintains
a negative pressure sufficientto contain odors,as designed. Though additional
testing is still requiredat the sides of the cage during cage removal operations,
lack of particulate during collections in the Biocompatability Test operations
confirmedthe conclusions'hat the SPAF _seffective in particulate control.
Incidental confirmation of the improved "leak tightness" of the RAHF was the
, increased condensate collected. More than twice as much condensate (2.5
liters) was collected in the SLS-1 RAHF comparedto operations with the SL-3
RAHF at comparable environmental humidity conditions. An additional
opportunity to verify 1-G operation of the RAHF will occur during the SLS-1
Experiment Verification Test (EVT) scheduled for February 1989. This test is the
final verification of payload experiment elements prior to release for flight
integration at KSC.
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SLS-1 PARTICULATE CONTROL
The SLS-1 RAHF, Figure 6, along with other ARC developed payload elements
will be verified for particuiate containment under rnicrogravityoperations during
the SLS-1 mission which is scheduled for launch June, 1990. One rodent
RAHF containing20 rats will be flown during the mission.Two cages will oe
reserved for the Particulate Containment Demo-_tration Test (PCDT) activities,
which will verify microgravity paniculate cuntainment of the RAHF and
accompanyingsystems. In thisseries of tests, a particulatesample, equivalent
to a 10 day accumulated load of food crumbs, feces, and hair, will be released
within a cage. Followingthe refe_e of the particulateload, air will be sampled
GrOLnd tha front of the cage to verify absence of escaped particulates.
Particulateswill also be measured during a feeder and a waste tray change of
the particulate laden cage and during transfer of the cage to the General
Purpose Work Station (GPWS). The SPAF wil! be activated during all
demonstrated RAHF operations. Stowage bags will be utilized to further insure
no particulate loss during feeder and waste tray changeouts and a General
Purpose Transfer Unit (GPTU) will be used during physical removal of the cage
from the RAHF.
The ,3PTU, ithJstrated in Figure 7 has beon specifically desiyned for the SLS-1
mission a_¢ Jcondary containment. Particulate release from the cage will be
determinea post flight through observation of any deposited particulates within
the GPTU. The unit is a Tyvek sock connected to a lexan frame. The frame
attaches to both the RAHF and the GPWS for entry and removal of the cage. In
the event no particulates are observed in the GPTU it is anticipated the unit
would not be required in future flights.
Particulates, potentially released as a result of RAHF or PCDT operations, will
be measured in flight using a modified RCS air sampler (u,.'ed for
microbiological sampling in Skylab and SL-3). The sampling head of the RCS
unit has been modified to incorporate a mesh screen instead of .he microbial
media agar strips. The mesh screen entraps particulates from 74 to 350
microns. A series of screen heads will be provided to accompany prescribed
operations; these will be analyzed post flight.
|
The General Purpose Work Station (GPWS), Figure 8, is the second major
piece of hardware to be flown on SLS-I. The results of SL-3 effected
modifications to this unit to insure particulate containment. Modifications have
included • specifically designed windows for RAHF cage/GPWS interfaces,
incorporation of arm gauntlets similar to those used in microbiological glove
boxes, and redesigned front and rear air grilles to ensure entrapment of
particulates and liquids in the lower plenum area when the air circulation 1
blower is off. i
1
The GPWS will be utiliz.ed for rodent processing on subsequent SLS spacelab i
flights and for frog egg fixations in SL-J. Available work space (8.5 cu. ft)
prov;ded by the GPWS make it a "test piece" for Space Station laboratory i
t
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equipment. In addition to verifying the GPWS/RAHF cage interfaces for .._
particulate containment, particulate containment within the GPWS will also be |
verffieC during SLS-I. Particulates will be released within the unit and their
containment measured through sampling outside the GPWS at potential "leak"
areas. Ease of cleamng the unit will be evaluated along'with particulate and
fluid release behavior in the imposed laminar flow atmosphere of the cabinet.
As a ,oiece of laboratory equipment, the GPWS has been designed to support
fixative containment, i.e, glutaraldehyde, formaldehyde, isopropanol. No
volatiles will be released during SLS-1 ; the unit has been previously verified by
Baker Corporation through the use of _pores and dioctyl phthalate (DOP) trace
systems. The Trace Contaminant Cmltrol System (TCCS), a series of charcoal
and lithium hydroxid_ beds arid filters, has been designed to contain
components of defined charc,Gedstics, i.e., carbon chain length and molecular
forces. Two different computer models exist showing the capabilities of the
.- TCCS; chemical removal by the primary cannister has been verified under
normal terrestial conditions. 10
Initial testing of operational concepts for particulate containment in the
microgravity atmosphere has been perfom,3d through use of KC-135 and Lear
jet flights. Though the parabolas are of short duration, they do afford sufficient
time tc evaluate crew/hardware interfaces and potential design problems. In
addition, these flights are readily accessible.
SUMMARY
In summary, methods are available for particulate containment. Those methods
can be proven thlough computer modeling, through ground tests accompanied
by appropriate detection methods, and through short term microgravity testing,
i.e., parabolic flights. The potential impacts are increased crew operations and
hardware constraints. The essential objective is that there be no compromise to
the science. The final test is the microgravity Mission.
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TOXIC AND REACTIVE MATERIAL HANDLING ON SPACELABJ AND USML-1
By Jack Dashner
Spacelab J and USML-1 provideprime examples of materials which are toxicat
ambient conditionsor toxicduringthe processingstages. The materialsare
used in bothi=fescience and materialprocessing experiments.
In additionto the experiments, the mission uses Mission Peculiar Equipment
requiredto integrateth9 payload includinga coolinowater Io_n and a vacuum
vent system. The vacuum vent playsan importantrole intoxi_,tycontrolon
Spacelab J.
While each of the experimenCsprovideinterestingand unique reouirementsfor
hazard control,the Frog EmbryologyExperiment (FEE), the General Purpose
Work Station (GPWS), the FMPT Ufe Sciences(FMPT.LS) and FMPT Material
ExperimentLaboratory(FMPT-MEL) are the elements whichcontain mostof the
toxicmaterials.
The Frog Embryology Experiment is an Ames ResearchCenter experiment
dev,91opedin conjunctionwiththe Universityof Michiganto studythe effects of
weighdessness in the deveiopmentof amphibianeggs fertilized ;n space.
Female African clawed frogswill be flown,ovulationwill t-._ inducedand frog
eggs willbe placed in egg chambers. The eggs willbe fertilized usingtestis
and sperm prepared immediatelybefore flight. Some chamberswill be
subjectedto a one _ centrifuge,Figure 1, to sen,e as a controlgroup. Many of
the chambers will be fixed with formaldehydeat predeterminedperiods
following fertilizationwhileotherswill be returned for continuedground studies.
This is a terse explanationof a very interestin_experiment whichwill probably
be discussedin a later session. Froma toxicitystandpoint,the fixative
formaldehydehas a low maximumallowableconcentration(MAC) and requires
triplecontainmentto meet the two failure tolerance requiredfor hazards wh=ch
could be catastrophic. Containmentis providedby a syringe, sealed plastic
bag, and a hard side sealed containerduring storage. Operationsare
performedinsideof the General PurposeWork Station(GPWS), Figure2. The
GPWS provide_a sealed container (closedenvironment)and providesthe
equivalemof x secondcontainmentbyvirtue of the filteringsystemwhich use:,
speciallytreated charcoal to remove formaldehydeand other toxic materials -i
during the air circulationprocess. In the eventof loss of poweror other failures,
the GPWS is placedin a closed loopoperationwhichstillprovides one level of
containment, i
J|]
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FMPT Life_ciences
The Japanese experimentsuse nardwaredeveloped by both the Japanese and
JSC to ccndu_._13 experiments including:
, Free Fiow ElectrophoresisUnit (FFEU)
VestibularFunctionExperimentUnit (VFEU)
Thermo-ElectricIncubator(TEl)
Light Impulse Stimulator ' .r_(_J,_)Equipment
Fungi GrowthChamber
Enzyme CrystallizationKit
Cell CultureKit
Fly Container i
CosmicRadiation Devices
Egg Rack
PhysiologicalMonitonng qystem
Urine MonitoringSystem (UMS) - SL-3
The experimentscontain n-,mercus materials includingbiologicalmaterials, fish
(2 carp), fur,,,, enzymes,animal _nd plant":.ells,fruit flies, seeds, hen eggs, and
urinespecimens. While each of the experimen_z,has interestingand unique
objectives, the fluidsare low or non toxicand use single +odual _ntainment.
. The ceil culture kits presentthe greatest hazard principallydue to the fixative
agent glut,=raldehydewhich fixessamplesat various stages of g%_,lh. This
exampie has been selected principallyto display a rather innovativesyringe
usedto providedual containment(Figure 3).
The life science experiments have been slightedin order to discussthe material
processingfacilities.
FMPT - MaterialsExOerl_en_Laboratory(MEL)
The FMPT-MEL willoccupy two double Spacelab racks to house _he
experiments and supportequipment. Figure 4 depictsthe configuration and i
Table 1 identifiesthe equipment. +
The FMPT-MEL consistsof 22 experimentsperformed in 11 differentfacilities
Nhichinclude6 differenttypesof fumace_. The e×perimentsand _acilitiesare
liste-_!n Table 2.
In additionto the experiment facilil!e._._ 'Jedicatedvac _mvent facilityis
requiredin conjunctionwitha turbo_::_lecularpump lo providea high quality
vacuum. Additionally,highpressure ,_a.,_9s (3000 psi helium,300(; .,_i
syntheticair, 3000 psi argon,and 1000 p_i krypton)are providedfor processing,
quenching,purgingand I-,_eumati= valve,o;,eration.
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INOTE: The equipment numbers on this page correspond to
the numbers a_d tltles In Table 8-I.
FIGURE 4 FMPT-MELEXPERIMENT
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TABLE 1. FMPT-MELEXPERIMENTEQUIPMENT i
IN SPACELABRACKS8 AN0 10
;!
I Sample StowageContainer (SSC-I)
2 ImageFurnace - Furnace Orlve Controller(IMF-FDC)
; 3 Image Furnace - Control Equipment (IMF-CE) z
4 Image Furnace - Material Processing Unit (IMF-MP)
: 5 SampleStowageContainer (SSC-2)
6 Power OistrlbutlonBox-I (POB-I)
70ata RecordingVideo Tape Recorder (ORVTR)
; 8 Central Interfaceand Control Equipment (CICE)
g ContinuousHeating Furnace - Control Equipment (CHF-CE)
I0 ContinuousM-)tlng Furnace - Material ProcessingUnit (CHF-MP)
II Vacuum Pump Package Equipment (VPPE)
12 Pilot Valve Unit {PLVU)
" 13 Access Panel
14 _xperlmentPower SwitchingPanel CRack 8)
15 Vent Llne
16 VacuumVent Panel
17 Blank Panel
18 Organic Crystal Growth ExperimentFacility (OCF)
ig Large IsothermalFurnace - ControlEquipment (LIF-CE)
: 20 Large Isothermal Furnace - Material Processing Unit (LIF-MP)
21 Gradient Heating Furnace - Control Equipment (GHF-CE)
22 GradientHeating _urnace - Material ProcessingUnlt (GHF-MP)
23 Acoustic LevitationFurnace - Control Equipment (ALF-CE)
24 AcousticLevitationFurnace - Material ProcessingUnit (ALF-LVT)
25 Power DistributionBox-Z (POB-Z)
E6 Liquid Orop Experi_nt Facility (LDF)
-- El SpecificExperimentControl Equipment (SECE)
E8 InterCOmRemote Station (ICRS)
?9 Fluid P_yslcsExperimentFacility (FPF)
30 C%;tal Growth ExperimentFacility and Gas Evaporatio,i
ExperimentFacility (CGF/GEF}
31 CompressedGas Supply Equipment (CGSE)
3Z Access Panel
33 ExperimentPower SwitchingPanel (Rack I0)
t
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Furnaceoperationsgenerallyrequireinstallationof experimentsamplesby
handandautomaticprocessingbycomputeralthoughmanualcontrolsare
availableforhazardousfunctioncontrol.Fo;all furnacesinterlocksanddoor's
are providedto preventsampleremov_priorto coolingto touchtemperatures =,
cf 45°C.
GradientHeatinaFurnace(GHF_
TheGHF, Figure5, hasbeendevelopedforseveraltypesof experimentsuch
as crystalgrowth,melting/solidification,e deutectics.Thefacilityfunctionsby =
positioningthe sample,andafterheatup,thefurnacetranslatesto providea
movinggradientacrossthe sam_¢. The furnaceusestwoheatingcoilsat one
endand a singlecoilat theotherend. Betweenthe coilsisa watsrcooling
chamber.The furnace,whichoperatesat temperature=upto 1100°C,
processesthe sampleina vacuum. Twosamples,M 01andM 22 of Table3
providethreelevelsofcontainmentbythe useoftwoquartzampoule=anda
tantalumcartridge.SampleM 10, F_ure6, isencasedin an unsealedtantalum
cartridge.The metalsinthissamplewillof/gastoxicgasesduringprocessing.
Co.nt._inmentisprovidedbythefurnace(onelevel)andbyuseof thevacuum
; _ vent line. Duringprocessing,thetoxicresidueispulledinto t;teventlinefor
releaseto space. Basedonpartialpressures,theoffgasratesare low. Inorder
to usetheconcepthatvacuumventingprovidestheequivalentof containment
therearesafeguardsrequired.Thefurnacepressureiscontinuouslymonitored
andmustremainnegativein relationto spacelabambientpressure.Inthe
eventthatthe furnacepressureapproachesmodulepressure,the furnace
automaticallyshutsdown. The samplematerialsare nontoxicinthe solidstate
andsampleM 10remainsinthe furnaceafterprocessing.
ImaainaFurnace(IMF_
The ImagingFurnace,Figure7 and8, isdesignedto accommodateseveral
samples,includingcrystalgrowth,by pullingthe crystallizationzoneamongthe
sampleAxis. The IMFcontainstwinellipsoidalmirrorswithonecon:menfocus
wherethesample islocated.Two halogenlamps,eachlocatedat the focal
pointof theellipsoid,providesthe heatsource. Movementof the meltingzone
isaccomplishedby movingthetwinmirrorfurnacealongthesampleaxis. A
quartztubeis installedoverthesamplesduringprocessingandan inertgas,
argon,flowspastthesample. Allpressureinsideof thefurnace,includingthe
argonis at a negativepressureinrelationto themodule. The pressureis
continuouslymonitoredand thefurnaceautomaticallyshutsclownforpositive :
pressure.As intheGHF,thevacuumventservesas a containmentlevel
equivalent.The IMFwillprocessfourtypesof samples. SamplesM 02and
- M 08of Table4 usea quartzampouleforprocessing.Figure9 showsoneof
the quartzampoules.SamplesM 20 and M 03 (Figure10)bothare naked
. samples. ThenakedsamplesusethesealedIMFandvacuumventto achieve
contalr_ment.The IMF isequippedwithtwoviewportsto allowvisualinspection
of thesamplesto assurethattoxicash or residuehasnotcoatedthe interiorof
the furnace. Handlingof processedsamplesrequiresthe useof disposable
glovesand samplesare placedinsealablebagsforstorage.
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ContinuousHeat;no_Furnace !CHF
The CHF, Figure 11, is a unique vacuum ft,mace designedto processsamples :=
¢ontirluously. The CHF combinestwo heatingchar-_Jersand two water cooled
chambersto achieve continuousheatingof two samples and rapidcoolingof
twosamples. The fumaceoperatesat a maximumof 1300°C and can cool two _
samplesfrom 1200°C to room temperaturein approximately10 minutes.
Heatingand coolingchambersare alternatelyarranged. The furnace tra."tslates
fore andaft to positionthechambers overthe samples. Afterheat up and
sample processing,the furnacetranslatesaft, rotates90°, and then translates
forwardsuchthat samples whichwere being heated, are then cooled. At the
completionof the coolingcycle (touchtemperature of 45°C) the cooled samples
are replacedwith new samples for the next phase. The CHF willprocess five
sampletypes - M 04, (Figure 12) IU107,M 13, M 19, and M 11 of T_ble 5. All of
the samples providetdple containmentexceptM 11, Figure 13, which provides
dualcontainment. In thiscase the furnaceand vacuum providethe extra levels
of containment. All of the containmentsare somewhatdifferent,howeverthe
examples, Rgures 12 and 13 are representative.
Lame IsothermalFurnace(LIF}
The LIF, Figure14, is a vacuum heating furnace whichoperates at temperatures
up to 1600°C. Provisionsare made to allowpressurizationof some sample
cartridgesat 6 bar (Figure 15). Furnace heat up and processingare
accomplishedin a vacuumand coolingusss heliumgas at pressureswhichare
negativein relationto the module. In the event of positivepressure,the furnace
automaticallyshutsdown. Three sample types willbe processed- M 05, M 12,
and M 06 of Table 6. BothM 05 and M 12 cartridges providedual containment
whileM 06 is a naked samplewhich remains inthe 'urnace after processing.
Figure 16 depictsone of the samplecartridgeswhile Rgure 17 shows the
. naked sample, i
CrystalGrowthFacility!CGF}
The CGF, Figures18 and 19, consistsof two fumace chambers,one for a
sphericalsample and one for a bar sample. The furnacesoperate at
temperaturesin excess of 1400°C and samples are processed in gaseous =
argonwhich is at a negativepressure in relationto the spacelab module. Inthe
eventthe furnacepressureapproachesmodulepressure, the furnaces F
automaticallyshutdown. Each furnace chamberwill process one naked i
, - sample of silicon (SampleM 09 of Table 7) whichwill remain in the furnace
after processinguntilremovalon the ground. Siliconis a low toxicmaterialand
the furnace plus the vacuumvent provideadequate containment.
]
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AcousticLevitatorFumaca (AI.J_ I
The All =, F'_gure20, is designedfor containedessrefinementof glass in space, s
The All =,whichoperates at approximately1400°C, is very similarto the Image r
Furnace in that halogen lamps, locked at the fociiof twin ellipsoidmirrors
mflact the heat to a commonfocus pointformeltingglass. The ALl= sample is
processedin a kJ_jptongas flow whichis at a negative pressurein relationto the
modulepressure. The pressure is continuouslymonitoredand the fumace is
automaticallyshut down if the internalpressureapproachesambient pressure.
The furnace is equippe0 witha speaker to create an ultrasonictunnel withinthe
furnace. A soundreflectorat the rear of the furnaceis adjustableto enable
sample positioning. The furnace willpcoce_ sample M 17 of Table 7 which is a
nakedglass sample. Toxicityis low and containmentwill be providedby the
furnaceand the vacuumvent.
Omanic CrystalGrowthFacility(OC,_
The OCF Rgum 21 is comprisedof two experimentcells, a large cell and a
smallcell. Contentsof the small cell are insufficiento resultin a toxicityhazard
and is controlledby dual containment. Bothcells am processedat =oom
temperature. The large cell uses an innerquartz container which has throe
chambers, one for the donor fluid,one for mixingand one for the acceptorfluid.
The anisole, Table 8, is toxicand due to the ;'uantitywill requiretriple
containment. The quartz container is located withinan aluminum container
which is housed in a sealed aluminum box. The quartz container and the inner
box have some common penetrations. In orderto achievetwo containments,it
is necessaryto use dual sets of "o" dngsor seals. A vigorousqualification
program includinga 14 monthleak test is being performed.
Other ProcessinaFaciliti_
Other experiments include8 BubbleBehaviorUnit to study fluidmovement in
space, A MarangoniConvection Unit, a Uquid Drop Facility(acousticlevitation)
for fluid dropsand a Gas Fvt_)omtionFacility. Single or dual containment is
provided as required. The containmentsare interesting,howeverthe
expedmenLsdo not providesignificanttoxicityhazards.
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USML-1 Soacelab
The USML-1 is still in the early design stagesand conceptsare not as clearly
defined as Spacelab J. The;a will be several matedai processingfacilities
includingcontainedassproc_s,,_ingby acousticlevitation. Another experiment
will be the Crystal GrowthFaaiity, Fi,_ure22, which will processnumeroustoxic
metalsat differenttemperatures. Ti'Js 'acilitywill have some direct bearingon
the space station. The facilityuses a furnace core whichtranslates along the
sampleaxis. As in the case of some SL-J experiments,the Crystal Growth
Facilitywill use the vacuum vent as a level of containmentand will requireshut
clownif the inner pressure becomespositive in relationto the module. Sample
change out will be manuallyperformedby the crew. To precludetoxic material
release in the module duringsample change out, a collapsible glove box will be
used. The glove boxwill seal around the end of the container while the
insertionport cover is removed. In the event of toxicresidue inthe furnace as
evidencedby discolorizationthe cover will be reinstalled and the glove box
dumped to the vacuumvent.
RecorrlrnendationslConclusions
° Triplecontainment is the preferred methoOfo, preventionof toxic material
release in habitableareas for catastrophichazards. The containmentsmust be
adequate for the intendeduse and environment.
o When operationspreclude triplecontainment, innovate methods shouldbe
explored. While there are several examplesof use of the vacuumventas an
equivalentcontainment,stringentrequirementsexist to monitorinternal
pressuresand shutthe facilitydown for positivepressure. Materialsmust be
nontoxicat ambient temperatures,and offgassed productsmust be compatible
withthe vacuumvent. Offgassed products mustalso be compatible with each
otherto the extentthat exothermicreactions must not occurwhichwould result
in a hazard. It shouldbe notedthat a contaminatedvacuum vent could resultin
groundhazards duringde-integrationactivitiesand will require special
procedures. It is usuallythe responsibilityof the experiment developerto
decontaminateor replace the vacuum vent after flight.
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11. SPACE STATION FURNACE FACILITY I
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, NOTE: No hardcopyof this presentationwas providedfor die WorkshopProceedings.
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SPACESTATIONTOXIC AND REACTIVEMATERIALSHANDLING
WORKSHOP
' Judith Robey
Session 2 Chairman
!
Below is a summary of the workshop objectives. From the
, presentations and the panel discussions some of the objectives
were satisfied and others still need some follow-up work involving
mo;e details than the workshop time permitted.
_ WORKSHOPOBJECTIVES
IDENTIFYSPECIRCAREASFORTECHNOLOGYDEVELOPMENT
_ From the discussions and presentations on the current space
station subsystem designs it was not clear whether new technology
is needed to handle a centralized waste system capable of mixing
multiple chemicals or whether development of existing technology
can do the job. The safe treatment of waste in a centralized system
includes identification of incompatible chemicals, purging the waste
lines and verifying their cleanliness, separating, filtrating and
compressing waste material for storage. How this is to be done
with existing technology was not clear. Another area that needs
development is the technology for sensors and detectors. Many cf
the existing ground based detection systems are large resource '
consumers (volume, power, vacuum, cooling, etc.), and would require
considerable modification for use in space. Space station ,_
subsystems designers should clearly identify how the current
designs will accommodate the users requirements with existing
technology and what, if anything, necessitates the development of
new technology.
ADDRESSPAYLOAD/FACILITYREQUIREMENTSSUCHAS SAMPLESIZE
, ; RESTRICTIONS,LEVELSOF CONTAINMENT,ETC. BY BRINGING
TOGETHERTHE SCIENTIFICINVESTIGATORSANDTHE SAFETYEXPERTS
To satisfy this objective much more detailed information is
needed than was available at the workshop. Experiment ,}peracional
scenarios are needed from the users that address how mu,;h on board
characterization will be performed and how much automation versus
crew interaction will be required during this analysis. Further
communications between safety experts, space station subsystems
-i 16-2
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designers and the user payload designers will need to take place
before any conclu=ionsabout r6strictionson samples or payload
designscan be addressed. User soonsoredworkshopsor studies
including crew utilization, on-orbit characterization and operations
is needed to fulfill this objective.
-_ INSURETHATCREWSAFETYISTHE HIGHESTPRIORITYFORSPACE
STATION
Although the focus of every presentation was on safety
concerns past, present and future, there was not a clear space
station programmatic line of responsibility to address safety
issues. The question "How does space station insure that crew
safety is the highest priority?" was not answered. Safety
representatives from the workpackage centers addressed many
safety related questions, however, safety is a program wide
responsibility and to satisfy this objective more participation from
space station safety organizations is needed.
IDENTIFYPRELIMINARYOPERATIONALCONSTRAINTS
-IDENTIFICATIONOF FACILITIES/EXPERIMENTSREQUIRING
SPECIALIZEDEQUIPMENTAND/ORPROCEDURES
" -CREWLIMITATIONSANDPROTECTIVEGEARREQUIREMENTS
The equipment or operational procedures required to
accommodate some users, such as, a pressurized furnace (to 80
atm), radioisotopes used in life sciences experiments and a high
vacuum (10-6 torr) were not identified. It was unclear whether
these payload requirements could or would be accommodated in the
current space station designs. Preliminary payload or operational
constraints were not identified. These examples all have safety
and or PMMS design implications.
It was pointed out by a university participant that the
Spacelab crew carrying out experiments on orbit were not required
to wear the minimum ground based lab protective gear, such as
goggles, lab coats, gloves etc.
ESTABLISHA FRAMEOF REFERENCEOR BASELINEOFAPPLICABLE
WASTEHANDLINGEXPERIENCE
Lessons learned from Skylab and Spacelab were presented, as
well as how things have changed based on that experience. This
information provided a frame of reference for on orbit experience.
Industry presented some ground based examples of waste handling,
such as, microbial systems, exhaust gas conditioning and reactive
16-3
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¢bed plasma systems. How much, if any, of this informatio._is being
studied for incorporation into sp_ce station systems was not clear.
USETHEWORKSHOPASA BASISFORASSESSINGTHE CURRENTAND
APPLICABLESPACESTATIONREQUIREMENTS
The space stationsubsystemsdesigns(PMMS, FMS, ECLSS),
are currently undergoing revision as a result of the Program
Requirements Review (PRR). To satisfy this objective and to
establish a greater fidelity in the subsystems capabi!ities, user
payload experiment and facility developers need to provide their
best estimate of operational requirements for volumes of fluids
needed, volumes o" waste expected, pressures, temperatures, flow
rates, concentrationand purity levels. The workshop has encouraged
dialogue in these are.,s.
PROVIDEAN EDUCATIONALANDINFORMATIONALFORUMFOR
GOVERNMENTEMPLOYEES,CONTRACTORS,EXPERIMENTALFACIUTY
. DEVELOPERS,AND POTERNTIALHARDWARESUPPLIERSINVOLVED
WITHTHE SPACESTATIONPROGRAM
Presentationswere given by 22 government, 16 industry and 2
university participants. These included contractors, experimental
facility developers and potential hardware suppliers. There was
informationexchange during the discussion periods, as well as
exchange of business cards and telephone numbersduring the coffee
and lunch breaks. Communicationshave been initiated and it is to
the benefit of all of us to keep them going.
DOCUMENTTHEWORKSHOPRESULTSANDIDENTIFYFOLLOW-ONSTUDY
ISSUES
The workshop proceedings will be mailed to the participants in
Jar_uary,1989. This will include the summary report and
recommendationsfrom the Discussion Panel as well as summary
reports from the Session Chairmen and any written questions
submitted from the participants. It will also include Xerox copies of
the material presented at the workshop. The Environmental Steering
Committee, co-chaired by the Office of Space Station and the Office
of Space Science and Applications, will review the workshop results
and propose a follow-up plan. This plan should include the
involvement of the appropriate space station level II panels and
working groups as well as the applicable workpackage
representat;ves. It should also include close cooperation with, and ,
representatives from, the user community.
16-4
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SPACESTATIONTOXICAND REACTIVE.MATERIALSHANDLING
_SHOP
Judith Robey
" Session 2 Chairman '
Many questions were asked during the course of the workshop.
Some answers may exist in the space station documentation being
revised after the Program Requirements Review (PRR) or are
currently being worked in studies or working groups and panels.
However, since satisfactory answers were not available at the
workshop, some of these questionswere flagged as issues and
concernsand some resulted in recommendations. For the session 2
summary report, rather than try to recommend design solutions for
systems that cross many technical discipline borders, I have
summarized the essence of the questions that were asked during the
course of the workshop.
SUMMARYQUESTIONS
1. It was stated that ECLSS would provide 7 locations for
contaminant detection. Is this sufficient given the lack of gravity _ !
driven air flows in micro-g?
2. Does PMMS have the sole responsibilityfor payload leak
detection? Does ECLSS have any responsibility? Are there back-up
systems for payload contaminant detection? What is the users
responsibility?
, 3. What is the range of contaminants that space station subsystems
._ (PMMS, ECLSS, FMS) provided sensorscan detect? :_
4. Will the warning, caution and alarm displays and systems be :
common in all pressurized modules?
5. In the event of a toxic or hazardous material spill within the lab
module, is the responsibilityfor the cleanup redundant between
ECLSS and PMMS, or do they have specific areas of responsib!lity? If
L
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so what are they? Who provides the contin§ency plans and the
necessary tools?
6. Which safety office provides overview of the systems design and
' development, particularly in cases where the subsystems cross
workpackage assignments or where their interfaces meet? What
: safety office will be responsible for developing user payload
facility and operational guidelines and regulations? How do shuttle
safety regulations get folded into space station?
7. What kinds of user safety guidelines or regulation manuals are, or
will be, available to the user facility/payload designers? WhE
safety office, panel or review board will be responsible for
verifying compliance of these regulations? Where and when will
this information be available?
8. PMMS, FMS and ECLSS design requirementsare driven to a large
extent by operational scenarios, such as, the amount of on orbit
: characterization of toxic or reactive materials and vacuum/vent,
glovebox, and lab support equipment usage. Strawman operational
_._ scenarios are needed by the subsystemsdesigners for greater
•_ definition of their requirements. Information is needed in the area
nf fluid volumes (supply and waste), pressures, temperatures, flow
rates, concentration levels and purity specifications.
9. What is meant by triple containment and two-failure-tolerant?
(It was unclear as to whether triple containment was the rnethod by
"= which the requirement of two-failure-tolerant is met, or whether
they were two separate requirements, both with independent
methods for compliance.) Is there consistent agreement across
NASA centers? Will vacuum vent be considered one level of
containment? Will there be a station wide policy on what triple
containmentis, or will it be on a case by case bases as it has been
on shuttle flights in the past?
10. Will gallium arsenide, mercury cadmium teluride, and mercury
iodide samples be processed and characterized on orbit? How will
any restrictions, regulations or guidelines be developed for the
handling of these toxic materials?
11. How much processingand containmentwill be required at each
level of responsibility: payload, lab level (PMMS for USL) _',d station
wide (FMS)?
16-6
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12. Will the PMMS be capable of handlingbiotoxinsand biohazardous I
material? I _4
_ 13. What is the space station plan for handling radioactive waste?
14. Will the emergency shower for crew decontamination provide
enough water to meet flushing requirements?
0
15. Will the waste water reclamation system be capable of
processing the waste water (brine) from the cage washer
(approximately .75 gallons per cage) and the biotechnology facilities
requirement to wash and sterilize between each run? ,
16. What are the international partners planning for waste
management in their modules? What plans does ESA have for
handling payload waste in their module? What capability does the
JEM waste system have?
17. Does a centralized waste system make sense given the problems
of combining multiple chemicals? Ground processing systems do
_- not, in general, operate using a centralized system. '
18. Is this centralized waste system used si-ultaneously by '_
multiple users, or in series? If used one at a time, how will the
contaminants from one dump be purged and cleanlinoss verified?
19. Is there a period when venting to space will be allowed, such as
during station reboost or shuttle visits?
20. Is the vacuum vent for purging experiments a separate line from
the hard space vacuum provided for isolation purposes? i
21. If the vacuum system is provided to 4 quadrants of the USL, does =
this mean a user (in the USL) will risk cross contamination with
another user in the same quadrant?
22. What is the planned disposition of "large" solid waste such as ,
" contaminated "Kimwipes" or empty sample containers?
23. What are the resourcecosts for the PMMS and FMS in terms of
volume, power and mass, consideringsuch things as compressorsand
high pressure storage tanks for the waste material?
,
I
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24. Is space station (PMMS, FMS, safety, operations, logistics, etc.)
looking at how systems are designed and procedures are carried out
_. on the ground? For example:
a. College chemical laboratories are required to store their
. chemicals in a protected area, such as, behind a "blow out wall'.
b. Department of Transportation has categorized chemicals for
storage and transport purposes.
c. Some laboratories precipitate and distill their chemicals to
reduce their storage volume.
d. Ground laboratory safety regulations require lab workers to wear
protectivegear, i.e. goggles, gloves, lab coats, shoes etc.
25. Is space station developing a chemical labeling system that is
: consistent, accurate, common and "user friendly" across all lab
modules?
26. What are the trade-offs and safety concerns of having an
experiment which processes hazardous or toxic materials and is
operated autonomously reducing crew risk, but requires fluid supply
and waste management scheduling with the inherent risk of disposal
schedule overlap of two incompatible chemical waste products?
27. Is fluid delivery, waste disposal and vacuum/ventinga
scheduled service? Is the scheduling local to PMMS, or is it a station
wide operational schedule?
28. Has space station considered safety implicationsin USL rack i
layout? For example:
a. Placing payloads involving hazardous operations in locations such _:
that they do not block the exit route in the event of a leak of a toxic
substance?
b. Placing the emergency, decontaminationshower in a node?
29. Are the space station leak detection and contaminant control
systems looking at the ground based sensors and detectors currently
available? Are they doing any research or development in the new
technology areas such as fiber optics and laser systems?
30. Are the waste management ,_ystemdesigners looking at ground
based systems, such as, microbialsystems, reactive bed plasma and
exhaust gas conditioning systems?
)
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31. In micro-g conditions,stagnant air pockets may reside where
toxins could collect, is the ECLSS air circulation sufficient to flush
out these areas?
_ 32. With the build up of perspirat:on,dust and dirt particles, due to
micro-g conditions, is there a regular maintenance plan to "wash"
the internal surfaces of space station? Who has this responsibility?
33. Will an individualmodule be e_pable of "dumping"its
contaminated atmosphere and repressurizing to normal conditions?
All of these questionswere asked in some form or a'_otherduring
the course of the workshop. Some had no answers, others had partial
answers, still others had definitive answers, but the answers were
not acceptable as solutions. Any follow on work the space station or
the users agree to sponsor should, as a first step, answer the
questions raised at this workshop.
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ABSTRACT
, THE PP.OCESS MATERIALS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
OF TI-I]? ,_R__EEDOMSPACE STATION'S U.S. LABORATORY
The space station user community requirements were .tined during
the phase B study, 1985 thru 1987, and served to identif_ common
%
use set of required unique subsystems and facilities. These
requirements which resulted m the current design are reviewed and
updated. Comparisons are drawn between the Skylab, Spacelab and
._ MIR programs, both as to program goals, methods employed and the ;
facilities provided.
Major system design issues identified are related to the
unprecedented space hardware life expectancy of 20 to 30 years,
_ such as reliability and safety, and to the broad spectrum of
potentially hazardous chemical substances to be used by the science
community, such as materials compatibility, contamination, triple
containment and safety.
The PMMS is defined in terms of the currently basel_ned subsystems
and current issues, design options and schedules are reviewed.
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SPACE SI _.TICN PRESSURIZED LABORATORY SAFE:I'Y GUIDELINES _;
!
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The development of space based laboratory guidelines is a mixture of consideration
of past experience, contemplation of present operations and conjectu,'e regarding
proposed endeavors. This is not to _ay that we must grope for ._nswers but that we must
understand the limi_.s of our experience and factor those limits in as we step forward
cautiously. Underlying the development of laboratory safety guidelines for Space Station
Freedom mu_t be the recognition of :he uniqueness of this resource. While safety
requirements for ground-based laboratories have come about literally by accide._t (and
the loss o', many laboratories and a few researchers as well), we can ill afford to generate
satety r,..quirements for space laboratories in the same manner.
It
P_fore we begin to est._blish technical safety guide:ines and requirements a common ,,
understanding of their origin and importance must be shared between Space Station
Program Manage_,ent, the User Community, and the safety organizations involved. This
is done thro'-;gh organiT_et.ion,_nd communication, of course, but there must also be an
appreciation of each others' interests. A sp,?.r.e-basedlaboratory in which the experiments
are received and returned ir) unopened containers, while useful and safe, does not take
full advar'tage of the facilities' potential for more interesting experiments. Safety can be
built into the facility to allow more interes,*ing e,'tperim¢_ =.bu'. _t a cost to the prvgr._m
manager. Safety guideli,._es and requirements will be dri,,¢n by the nature of the
experiments and degree of crew interaction. The greater and more _omplex the potential i
risk the. more stringent and complex the safety requirements. Once a programmatic .
deci:'ion has been made regarding the level of acceptable potential risk, safer)' guidelines
are _hen applied to generate safety requ,, "nents to prevent the potential risk from I
becoming a reality.
IDENTIFY IHE HAZARDS
The first guideline to be applied is that of hazard identification. Grou,,d-based
laboratory and previous flight experience are combined to yield generic requirements
such as those 'or safety showers and containerization of experiments. For as muchb -
experience as we have, however, there are still significant gaps left when it is applied to
the Space Station 13boratory. SKYLAB, SPACELAB, and shuttle mid-deck experiments
allowed limited crew interaction or manipulation and a high degree of training specific to
each experiment was given to assigned ctewmembers. The new and different work
proposed for the Space Station laboratory, i.e. material transfer and characterization,
increases the probability of material spills to the point that serious consideration must be
given to hazardous material spill response capsbility. We have no significant experience
w:,h micro gravity spill propagation, control or cleanup of toxic and reactive materials. J
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The primary tools for identifyinghazardsare the varioushazard analysesthat can I_
appiied to experiment proposals. SSP 30309, "Safety Analysis and Safety Risk
AssessmentRequirementsand ProcessesEecument for the Sp,.ce Station Program", :_
provides the detailed instruction relative to the application of specific:hazard analysis
, techniques.Safety Engineers are generally well-versed in _he t::chniquesof hazard '
anatysi_ hut theymay ur may not havea backgroundin thearea that a given_xperiment
is designed to inves:igare.It will be necessaryto have experimenters involvedin the
_azard analysisprocessin order to more accuratelycharacterizethe associatedhazards
ar,d controls.As hazardsare identified, methodsof controlling them are developedand
cequireme,ts are established.to implement the controls. The hazard elirr,:,;ationand
control precedencesequenceis found in SS:' 30000, Section 9. in the Je_ign of th+,.,
laboratory, eliminating the hazard source or hazardous operation is the foremos,
__ consideration.For laboratory usage, in;roductionof many experimentsalso introducesa
- hazard sourceor hazardous operation.To perform meaningful experimentsa certain
amountof risk has to be accepted,however,the le,'.=!of risk acceptanceneeds to be
establishedby informedmanagementto screenout thoseexperimentsthat pose {cogreat
,,: a threat to the Space Station. This level r,.-.d not be fixed but may change as the
+ capabilitiesof the laboratory and of space-basedlaboratory e::periencemature. Other
actions for control of hazards incorporate safety devices, special procedures and
personnelprater,re clothingor equipment.
7 ,. ;LOP TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENT__
Technical _afety requirements fall into two categories; those imposed upon the
Program Manager and those imposedupon the User. These are found in SSP 30000,.
section3; SS-SPEC-0002; SS-I_D-0200 and other Space Stationdocuments.
!
IMPOSED ON SPACE STATION o
SSP 30000, SECTION 3 i
:' Emerger:.¢ydecontaminationcf crew members in the event a crew member becomes
contaminateo b_,:. toxic substance used within the _ab. (2.1.2 2.1.I.F)
Containment, tr_n_t'_rand management of both general and toxic trash, materials,
and v,aste used w,thin this laboratory to support payloads. (2.1.2.2.1.2.B)
Stowage of ... emergency equipment. (2.1.2.2.1. I.H/
t
+ Accommodation of safe general storage for payloads in "_telabc'atory. (2.1.2.2.1.1 .G)
Capability shall be provided for detecting and extinguishing any fire ;n Space S_ation
habitable volumes. (2.1.11.2.12)
Co,-,,aminant Sampling (2.1.11.2.16)
Safety !nterlocks, hardware and/or software implemented, shal] be pro,'ided wherever
practical to preventunsafeoperationsfrom beir.ge_ecu_ed.(2.1.=1.2.1.D)"
t
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A cautionand warning systemshall providewarning to the Space Stationon-board
crew m_dgroundpersonnel(as required)of impendingor existingdablgerousconditions
that posea threat _ostationpersonneland/or safetycritical equipment. (2.1.1!.2.2.3) °
Potentiallyexplosive containersshall be located outside habitable areas, shall be
isolatedand protectedso that the failure of one will not causethe failure of the others,
and she!!be designedto leak before rupture. (2.1.11.2.4.1)"
Triple comainmentof hazardousmaterials.The useof chemicalswhichwouldcreatea
toxicityproblem or causea hazard to SSPhardwareif releasedshall be avoider, where
practical. If useof suchchemicalscannot be avoided,theyshall be triple contained.
(2.1.il 2.4.5)"
Hazardous accumulation of fluids. Provisions shall be made to prevent uncontrolled
hazardous accumulations of gases or liquids within me space s;ation. Detection.
monitoring, and control of hazardous gases or vapors shal) be required in critical areas
and closed compartments. (2.1.11.2.5) °
Exposed surface temperatures. Exposed surfaces within pressurized elements shall not
exceed a high temperature of 45 degrees Cent!grade or be protected from crew interaction
with the surface, and a low temperature less than 4 degrees Centigrade. _2.1.11.2.8) °
Hazardou,_ materials. The space station materials requirements for hazardous
materials, flammabili,y, and off gassing are specified in SSP 30233. (2.1.11.3) °
SS-SPEC-0002 CFI SPECIFICATION FOR LABORATORY MC",ULE
Atmosphere Revitalization. The atmospneric revitalization (AR) subsystem will
regenerate the module atmosphere, as necessary, to provide a safe and habitable
environment for ti'e crew. The basic elements of the AR subsystemwill include...
atmosphereconta,_,.inationcontroland monitoring.The atmosphericcontaminantsinclude
tracegases,odors,microbial Iood,particulate anddebrisloadsof the modul_atmosphere.
(3.7.9.3.1)
The Process Material Management Subsystem (PMMS) shall provide.., compatible
waste disposal .... transporting proce:_ inputs or outputs while maintaining isolation from
t_e ge,t:ral USL atmos,_here, ...decontamination equipment .... safe storage of chemicals
and materials (includes user provided materials and fluios), ...support (for) routine '-
, laboratory cleanup.... decontamination equipment. (3.7.16)
The PMMS shall provide decontamination service_ for the crew, laborator_ equipment, ,
and paylcad equipment as follows:
1. PMMS shall accommodate contaminated effluent generated in the process ,_f crew or
equipment decontamination.
2. 'i'he PMMS shall provide the capab!qty to support routine i.'tternal cleanup of US Lab
facilities.
22-4
1991006617-367
_t
3. The PMMS shall have the capability to support non-standard cleanup of leaks and _,
spills in contained volumes.
4. The standard PMMS hardware shall assist in cleanup/decontamination of non-
hazardous leaks/spills of solids and liquids into the open cabin environment, a.ae PMMS
shall not be designed for cleanup of hazardous open cabin spills. (3.7.16.2)
General Laboratory Support Facilities. The general laboratory support facilities
provide standard work areas with subsystem utility support for USL payload operations
These facilities consist of a laboratory sciences workbench, a materials processing
glovebox, and a life sciences glovebox. (3.'1.18)
IMPOSED ON USEl_
SSP 30000, SECTION 3
Several requirements imposed on the space station contain an element of User
responsibility. In some cases (2.1.11.2.2.3) a sensor interface with the Caution and
Warning system may be needed, in other cases (2.1.11.2.8) design of the experiment
: equipment will be required to incorporate the standard. Applicable requi,-ements are
2.1.11.2.1.D, 2 1 i1.2°2.3, 2.1.11.2.4.1, 2.1.112.4.5, 2.1.11.2.5,, 2.1.11.2.8, & 2.1.11.3.
These are marked with an * in the section above.
SS-IRD-0200 CUSTOMER TO USL INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
EQUIPMENT INTEGRITY / SAFETY FACTORS (3.3.18.1) t
All customer equipment shall be designed to withstand the launch, on-orbit, and _
landing environments as defined in SS-SRD 0001, Section 3, Paragraph 2.2.1. These ; _.
environments shall be withstood without the following events., "currmg: failures; leaking
of hazardous fluids; or the releasing of equipment, loose debris, or particles which could "_
damage the USI_,or cause injury to the crew. USL customer equipment shall be designed
such that the equipment integrity and load-carrying capabiEty of structural mounting
provis!ons fulfill the following requirements: ._
a. Factors of Safety: The minimum factors of safety to be used against load limit
condition:_ to establish design loads shall be as defined in SS-SRD-0001, Section 3,
Paragraph 2.2.1.2.4. ".
b. Fatigue Life: Customer equipment shall have a fatigue life consistent with the
requirements specified in SS-SRD-0001, Section 3, Paragraph 22.1.2.7.
c. Fracture Control: Customer equipment shall be designec_ to meet _he fracture
control requirements specified in SS-SRD-0001, Section 3, Paragraph 2.2.1.2.6. .,
d. Depressurization: During normal operations, pressure within the USL shall be _.
m_,ntained at ";60 + 10 torr. Under some emergency conditions, evacuation of the module
22-5
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will be required and depressurization of the module will occur. Customer facilities shall ,
t
with._tand the environment created by the depressurization/reprcssurization without
creating an uncontrollable hazard. : :,
FIRE (3.3.18.2) , ,
a. in addition to the fire detection and .,'uppression capabilities of the ECLSS,
customer equipment which pose a potential fire hazard shall be _nstrumented by the
customer to provide for earl)" detection and warning through the Caution and Warning
Subsystem (CWS) of the USL.
b. in the event a fire is detected in the custon'Jer equipment, appropriate fire
,- suppression t;chniques will be implemented. Airflow and utilities shall be disconnected
-- by the USE
OVERTEMPERATURE (3.3.18.3)
a. Equipment which has failure modes which can produce dangerously heated
surfaces in crew areas shall provide an interface to fhe CWS to alert the crew to the
hazard and allow them to take corrective and avoidar,_e action.
b. Customer loads shall be configured such that Jn the _.ventof power disconnect or
failure, the load will cool down and/or cease operation in a safe manner.
ALERT (3.3.18.4)
The USL DMS and CWS will provide an equipment malfunction alerting system that
will be available to all customers. This system will ;lotify the USL crew members of any
abnormai or hazardous conditions and a',low them to take timely corrective action.
t
LEAKAGE (3.3.18.5)
a. Hazardous materials shall be contained within the customer equipment or the I
hazardous materials work area. All materials representing life-threatening hazards shall
be so contained that any predictable sequence of failures witl not result in celeasing them
into the USL atmosphere. Appropriate customer equipment shall be instrumented ro
detect any leakage which would present a hazard to crew or equipment. Such
instrumentation shall be connected to the USI. CWS and shall initiate both an audible
•d visual alarm at the site of the offending ,;ondition.
- ,=
b. No release ef particulate matter, liquid.s, vapors or fumes into the habitable volume
shall be permitted unless it can be shown that the ce,ntaminant can be handled by the
ECLSS. All potentially contaminating substancesassoci_,tcdwith payloads and processes
shall be identified by type, toxicity, quantity, hazard level, use, and location by the
customer. Customer contamination control is to be performed at the assembly _nd rack i
levels.
=
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SUP,FACE TEMPERATURE (3.3.18.6)
Under normal operations, the mean _radianttemperatureof the habitable interior !
•:olume shallnot exceed30*C. Exposedsu,rfaceswithinthe USL (bothUSL andcustomert
equipment) shall remain within the high and low limits of 45°C to 4"C, respectively.
Surface temperaturesexceeding45°C shall require specific interfacing agreements.No
external equipmentsurfaceswithin the USL, whether reachableor not, shall be cooler
than the dewpointtemperatureof the moduleatmosphere.
MATERIALS (3.3.18.7) i
Customer equipment materials requirements are provided in SS-SRD-0001, Section 3,
- P_agraph 2.2.1.3.
DEVELOP OPERATING PROCEDUR]_ AND CONSTRAINTS
SSP 30000, Section 4, Paragraph 2.2.H states that "all hazardous operations shall be
designed to minimize exposure of the crew to the hazardous condition." This
requirement is supported by the hazard analyses performed to identify hazards. Part of
the process is to develop controls to counter the identified hazards. At this point in the
Space Station Program, a useful project would be the development of a Space Station
Laboratory User's Ma,ual wherein user requirements could be col.3olidated and
laboratory procedures could be codified.
!
PROVIDE TRAINING AND EDUCATION
SSP 30000, Section 4, Paragraph 3.12.B requires that "crew and designated ground !
support personnel shall be certified to perform their assigned dut.es." This would i
certainly include those duties performed in the laboratory. A major resource in the
developmentof the trainingwould be a laboratoryproceduresguide suchas discussedin
the previoussection.
SSP 30000, Section4, Parag,aph 3.12.D requi;'esthat "all crewmembers shall be
trainedin spacesystemsassociatedwith.., safety, and emergencyprocedures."
CONDUCT REVIEWS AND EVALUATIONS
,:rom time to time it will be necessary to conduct reviews and evaluations to determine
if the requirements imposed on the laboratory and on the users are adequate and whether
or not they ar¢_having the"desired effect. Safety is also concer_ed w_th whether or not the
approved operating procedures are being followed. The mechanics of such a review and
evaluation would have to be developed with the view that on-site insp¢ctioc.' wc,uld be
" 22-7
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difficult but not necessarilyimpossible.Membershipof a reviewcommitteeis anticipated ',
to includeboth the safetyand usercommunity.This committeecouldalso be tasked_ilh
developmentand maintenanceof the proposedLaboratory User's Manual. _=
PREPLAN FOR EMERGENCIES
In spite of our best efforts to design against hazards, emergencies will arise which will
require timely response. The history of man's endeavors verifies this statement.
Preplanning is the only way to have the response capability available when necessary.
Included in a goodpreplanwill be equipment,suchas hazardoustnaterial spill response,
controland clear ) equipmentand rehearsalsin the use of the equipment.
AREAS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
1. TRANSACTION MANAGEMENT. A goal of the Space Station Program is to
allow the usersmaximum autonomyin manipulatingtheir experimentsfrom the ground..
: Safety has concernsregardingconflicts betweenoperationsrequestedfrom the ground
awd conditionson-orbit which could result in hazards to the crew. This problem is
currentlybeing workedat Level lI and satisfa(.toryresolutionis anticipated.
2. OPEN CABIN HAZARDOUS MATERIAL SPILLS. Current no system or
subsystemhas been identified to handle open cabin spills of hazaroous materials.
Candidatesystemsare PMMS, Man Sys:ems,and ECLSS. Work needsto be donefirst in
the characterizationof the problem in terms of required responsesto a number of
different types of materials.
3. SPACE STATION LABORATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL. This type of *
manual is necessaryfor the consolidationof requirementsimposedupon the userandthe
codification of procedures (including emergency procedures). This document would also !
be usedin review and evaluationof the laboratoryand its opera( ,n.
_'; 22- 8 ":
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ENVIRONEMTALCONTAMINANTSIN RECYLCEDWATER
A. DEHUMIDIFIER IS PROBABLYA MAJORAIR
DECONTAMIHATIONSYSTEM
1. TYPE CONTAMINANTSREMOVED:
VAPORS- MOST EFFECTIVE FOR WATER
SOLUBLE, LOWVAPOR PRESSURECOMPOUNDS
SOME LOWSOLUBILITY COMPOUNDS EEN
IN CONDENSATES
PARTICULATES - MAY COMEDOWNWITH WATER
CONDENSATES
2. RESULTS OF SPACELABWATERCONDENSATE
ANALYSES
COMPOUND CONCENTRATION(MG/L)
SL-1 SL-3 SL D-1
CAPROLACTAM 0.07 4.30 8.80
DECANOIC ACID 1.60 0.07
ETHANOL 0.52 1._0 0.15
ISOPROPANOL 13.0 0.32 0.04
TOLUENE 0.24 0,01
PHENOL 0.24 0.66
ACETONE 3.31 2.00 1.80
NORMALWATER LOSS INTO AIR: 1.6 L/PERSON/DAY
B. MEANSOF CONTAMINANTREMOVALFROMWATER:
.. ACTIVATED CARBON, ION EXCHANGERESINS
PROBABLYHARDERTO SCRUBCONTAMINANTS
FROMWATERTHAN FROMAIR
C. TOXICITY CONCERNS:
INGESTION
ADSORPIONTHROUGHSKIN
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INTERDEPENDENCE OF SCIENCE REQUIRMJ_[ENTSAND SAFETYUMITATIONS
ON THE SPACE,STATION
Patrick G. Br_Cmr
Professor and Director of ChendsWy
- Long,,u_ College, Fannville, Virginia 23901
NASA.Teledyne BrownEngineering
Huntsville, Alabama
30 November 1988
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Inte_iependence of Science Requirements and Safety Limitations
on the Space Station
Patrick G. Barber
• Professor and D_ of Chemistry
Longwood College, Farmville, Virginia 23901
One of the _mpelling reasons for using a facility such as the Space Station for
scientific research is the ability to earry_jout experiments in an interactive mode. The
increased time in space coupled with the increased availability of equipment and supplies
enables scientists to perform exl_:riments, to observe results, and quickly to repeat the
. experiments using the previous res31ts as a basis to improve the parameters. In past space
experiments this interaction between e_._.",_erimenterand exp,,.,'im_ntwas often severely
limited and often necessitated return flights at much later dates. S:ience conducted with
years between experiments proe',,edstoo slowly to be of benefit to either science or the
economy. Crystal growth experiments provide a case in point. A sample of
lead-tin-telluride semiconductor was flown in October 198.$. One run _vaspossible and no
on-site analysis was available. The sample was analyzed only upon returv te earth. The
results although interesting raise questions that require further experimentation. No
repeat has been possible and will not likely occur before several more years. In ,_ second
example the high school student prqposing the _',wth of lead iodide in space finally had his
experiment run on the recent Discovery (STS-26) flight, but he is now in medical school.
This mode of operation was a fine beginning, but science in the western world will not
progress very far if this continues as the only mode of experimentation. It is too slow and i
inefficiently utilizes time, equipment, and personnel. So, one of the benefits of
experimentationon thespacestationwill betheability to carry out theexperiment,to t
|
immediately analyze the result, to calculate improved experimental parameters, and to i
quickly repeat the experiment. In this improved mode of operation there are new safety/ i
!
considerations that mus_ be addressed in the design stages of both the station and the i
experiments. I shall share with you some of the chemical and procedural requirements,
and I shall discuss some of the earth-bound storage, dispensing, and disposal techniques
that may assist in the development of analogous procedures for the space station.
Each scientific discipline has its own specific lists of requirements for on.boa.rd
analyses in the space station. In the area of crystal Wowtn the manifest of mattrials will
make an industrial hygienist on earth tremble. The aciting crystals of militsry and
industrial importance are not restricted _,_.benign aqueous solutions of proteins and
harmless simple electrolytes. High temperature superconductors have bari_,.m,yittrium,
-. 24-2
] 991006617-386
l-
, _eq
Interdependence ..., Barber, page 2
copper, and oxygen;but some also contain thallium and other toxie, hea_ metals.
Semiconductors contain mercury, cadmium, tellurium, gallium, arsenic, lead, tin, indium,
and antimony. Further, these materials are grown not at ambient temperatures but at
temperatures that are 900" C to 1400"C or higher. Furnace designs are being developed
that safely allow crystals of even these materials to be Wown in space. After the growth has/
been completed and cooled to room temperature, the samples must be analyze0. This
involves non-destrnetive testing if the equipment is available on the Sl_ce station. X-ray
: dift_ction, ultrasonic _aluation, optical absorption, and electronic probes are examples of
these analyses. Often, however, such methods do not enable scientists to a.ecerte,in the
needed information. The crystals must be cut and polished. The cutting operation can
involve the use of corrosive chemicals and dust-producing saws, and the polishing ".nd
etching procedures use solutions t_at are often hip,Myhazardous. Such rea£_nts as liquid
bromine, hydrofluoric acid, and concentrated alkaline solutions are common. A mo_
detailed list of reagents and procedures is _'_en on _ _ handouts. Proper
labeling, storage, handling, and disposal of rx:agentswill be essential to the success;ui, safe
use of space station for sigaiflcant science.
_te interdependence between the need,0,of science and the dictate_ of safety should
serve as a spur to the development of new techniques that will allow .¢afeoperation on the
space station. The science requirements can be clearly defined usi_tgcurrent earth-based
techniques and needs. The safety limitations will determine which of these techniques and
chemicals can be used in the environment of the space station. For those techniques and
chemicals for which safe procedures have not yet been developed, encouragement ought to
be given to develop new procedures. As an example of such safer procedures that can be
developed, consider the development of an electrochemical etching technique for lead tin
telluride, which replaced the highly corrosive Norr etch. Also consider the developmont of
a gel base0 _:ocedure to deliver chemicals in space. The storage, dispensing, spill clean-up,
and waste disposal procedures to be used on the space station need to be developed early in
the design stages so that scientists can begin looking for acceptable alternative procedures
' ": and reagents that can be used on the space station.
A later design feature may also be beneficial. Perhaps not as an initial part of the
space station, but certainly as part of future designs, consideration should be given to the
use of small, limited mission, detachable experiment and analysis modules [EAM]. The
more hazardous reagents and procedures for which safer alternatives cannot be found ::,ay
still be performed in space. In the event of an accident, the modules can be sealed oft from
_. 24-3
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the rest of the station. They can be detached, retrieved, and returned to earth for clean-up.
In this way a spill or accident on one such module will not endanger the station or interfere
with other on-going experiment_
1
In designing equipment and procedures to be used on the s_ace station, some of the
techniques used in earth-based laboratories can be used as starting poipts. The problems
faced by small, college laboratories are in many ways analogous to those to be encountered
on the space station. In both facinti_ there is the need to store a variety of reagents safely.
Often these are incompatible. The volumes of chemicals in both laboratory environments
are small and the variety large. This poses problems slightly different from those
presented by bulk chemicals, but some guidance is still available from the U.S. Coast
Guard's list of incompatible substances and the DOT mandates. Shipping laUels and
container label information are also helpful. Finally the information available in the
MSDS should not be ignored. Storage by hazard category is the general rule in laboratory
stockrooms, and should be used on space station as well. Incompatible reagents in close
proximity are intolerable on earth, and they =re I_kelyto be in space as well. Storage spa_e
is at a premium in both earth-based and space-based laboratories. Many questions rleedto
be answered. How can provision be m_,defor the storage of flammables? Do the same
flammability figures apply bl space? How many separate storage cabinets w_|i be needed?
Must their de;igu be _nodifledfor the way in which flames propagate in 5p_ce? Should they
be vented, and if so what is to be done with the fumes? The procedures used on earth will
be outliped in the _h handouts.
In dispeasingchemical reagentson earth, positiveand i=__!!ve air pressuresneedto
beconsidered.Important asthisprinciple_f laboratorydesignis foreaCh-based
laboratories,it may take onaddedimportancein thespacestation,for thismaybe the
majorsourceof har.ardoussubstancesthat movefrom onepart of thestat;onto another. In
theeventof a spillonearth, theprocedureis to dykewith a neutralizing5olid,andbagfor
disposalas illustrated in the_ handouts.What analogousprocedureswill be
developedfor usein space?Howmanydifferentneutralizingclean-upkitswill be needed?
Howman7will be neededandin whatlocations?If an erv,)ris madeon earth, adequate
ventilationcanbeobtainedbyopeninga windowand turningon a hood;thesamesimple
solutionsare not possiblein space.Or are they? In disposingof,-eagentstheproblems
facedby earth andspacelaboratoriesare likewiseanalogous.The toxicityandreactivity
mustbereduced,thevolumesreduced,andproceduresfor thesafestorageof a mixtureof
wastesdeveloped.Chemistshavebeenworkingon suchstorageandhandlingproblems,
24-4
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t
and the rtcent environmental protection laws have spurred even further developments. A i
list of references for such procedures will be given in the _ handouts. Finally, in
earth-bhsed laboratories accidents often occur in the most unsuspected places; and the
same is likely in space. The drain traps can often be sources of trouble, since a variety of
reagentsare of_e__ixed in them. J
Although it is true that the college and space laboratory environments are similar in
many respects, there are still some significant differences. Liquids will not pour in a
preferred direction in space unless provision is made to force them to do so. They may not
coat the samples or adequately mix. The ab:_enceof gravity driven convection will make
mixing rea_e_._:P..nd the remora! of heats of reaction more difficult. This may allow for _he
unar,acipated build-up of hazardous local concentrations of h_at. The analogous problem
faced in polyraer synthesis will be reviewed.
Just as the problems faced in small laboratories on earth can provide guidance and
insight to experimental procedures that can be adapted for ,Jse in space, the
procedures and reagent handling systems developed for sa','euse on board space station,
will be usefi_!here on earth. One of the greatest future expenses to be faced by these small
facilities is the ever increasing cost and difficulty of safely and legally disposing of spent
and surplus chemicals. Techniques that work for space station have an immediate
application right here, right now in schools, colleges, and small laboratories.
Further commercial possibilities of this spin off exist. Procedures developed for space i
station will likely not r_a_uirecontinuous human intervention. The automatic and robotic
procedures developed for s/race station will have application in improving the safety and i
productivity of industrial processes. Finally, as space station and its technology begin to be
t
¢
applied, further experimentation in the schools of this nation will be possible. This can
only encourage the preparation of the scientifically literate population needed in the next
century.
. Safety and science requirements are interdependent spurring the development of new
procedures and modified engineering ¢_esigns. These de_'elopmentswill not merely be
u_efui on space station, for they have i'ar reaching applications on earth. '_,
i
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: THE SCIENTIFIC UTIUZATION OF THE SPACE STATION
DEPENDS UPON:
, a. Experimenter Interaction with Experiments
b. Rapid Repetition of Experiments
c. On-Station Analyses of Results
24-6
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SIMILARITIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS BETWEEN
COLLEGES AND THE SPACE STATION:
L S_e- limited space which impinges on other functions
b. targeVarie_ofReacflons Requifinll_.paration--not
specialized, must have flexibility.
c LargeVafie_ofReasents Needed-cannot wait
for stores to be crdered and delivered
d. Sa_ReapntStorage- variety must be stored
safely for long periods of time
e. Waste Mltlptlo_ $:_ra$_ and Dispos_ - a
rel:,tively new problem requiring new
solutions
L Spill Control_reparaflonandProcedures- equip
facility to handle all possible accidents
, & A/rFlowand Quali_- regulate unexpected
mo_,ement of liquid and gaseous reaaents
h. Extens_eTraininlofSupervisors-expac'_ the
unexpected.
• 24-7
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• AN EXA.MPLE: REAGENTS AND FXPERIMENT$ FOR CRYST_L
GROWTH -
L SolutionGrowth-rater and/or non-aqueou_
fluid solvents for
proteins -- benign case
organic compounds -- flammable
and/or toxic solvents and solutes
b. MdtGrowth-
: Temperatures: ambient - 400"C, lead
halides and model
co_pounds
400-1200°C, LTT, GaAs
>1200"C, OeAI, ceramic_
ProcsdurlJs: Czochralski
Brldgman
ChemiealVaporD_ompositkm-
gaseous flow systm such as
organo_tallic tin in gaseou_ hydrogen,
sil{ne in hydrogen, and gallium arsenid_t
from trinethyl 4allium and arsine
1
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INSTRUMENTAL TECHNIQUES OFTEN REQUIRE REAGENT
FLUIDS:
I. HPLC - requires solvents which are often orlanic
2. _ - requires solvents which are often organic
mixtures
_ 3. Electrophoresis - requires solutions including organic
ones
4. GC - requires carrier gases. FID requires hydrogen
$. AA- requires times and nitrous oxide, acetylene, and
ox,_jen or graphite furnaces. Both burners generate
metal vapors
6. Optical Microscopy - require sample preparation
including _attin& polishing, ud etching _.
L
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RIP_AGENTS AND EXPERIMENTS FOR ON-SITE ANALYSES:
& CutandPol_h
1. water
2. orqanic liquids
_ 3. acids/bases, dilute to 18M H2SO 4
t and 50% KOH
4. special corrosives, e.g., HF, Br 2,
and mixtures such as NoEr etch
£
Etch
I. less concentrated than for cutting
and polishing but still corrosive
and/or toxic
2. many developed some specific for
particular faces and dislocations
24-10
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AIRANDFLUIDSMANAGEMENT:
by categories
guidance from USCG, chemical sup_li_, "_
MSDS, DOT shipping labels
Di S
microgravity creates the need for new
8olutions but similar to movement
of reagents in vacuun lines.
microgravity creates the need for no_
solutions but similar to polymer
solutions and gels.
& S_nt ReagentManallem_t
traditional methods -- burn, bury, hide,
give away or otherwise forget
newer methods -- dilute, precipitate,
distill, react, recycle
staDilize -- Hazardoq_ Chemicals:
Information and DISPosal Guide by
N.A. Armour, L.M. Browne, and G.L.
Weir from the University of Alberta
safe storage for return i
varIQty leads to unex_:_tcted reactions in
drains or space station equivalent
possible on-station utilization/disposal
will improve on the best methods
developed in r_:_onse to
environmental pressures
SplliManapmeat
traditlonal methods -- dyke, neutralize,
store, disposal
newer methods for space station --
creative solutions nay not
sliminatetheunexpectedaixing of
two innocuous reagents which are
dangerous in co_ination. Remember
the drains! 2_11
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HOPE:
L New procedures can be dtw_ t.g.,
I. d_emiad etches
2. soda straw gels for dispensing reagents in space
4. neworpnometallic reagents of H!.V compounds
5. blow-downtunnelsversus recirculating reagents
in CVi)
b. Motivation is needed.
c. Some accommodation by station designers, Le.,design for
the unexpected and prepare detachable modules for use
with hazardou_ reagents. Use also as robotic
center-of-mass experimental platform.
d. There is an interdependence between the safer7 |
limitation.3which should drive new modifications in the _
science experiments and the science requirements which
should drive new designs for safety.
24-12
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AN ADDED BENEFIT:
As the adlege mid smsil resesrch laborntory prQvidesuseful
- terrestrial m_ples for the ezperimattai problems anticipeted
to exist on the space station, so too do the solutions developed
for the slmce station lin_ L_mediate terrestrial applications.
In thinking for the simce station one ought not to forget the
commer'cia]possibilities on earth now. r
i
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TYPICAL ETCHES :
Ga_s rinses 2-propanol or methanol
1:1:5 H20 : H202 : H2SO 4
3:1:1 H2SO 4 : _202 : H20
Si 10:1:i H20 : H202 : NH 3
3:1:1 H20 : H202 : HCI
i0:i H20 : HF i
42g/100g CrO 3 in HF !
50g/100ml CrO3 in H20
InP 0.2-0.5% Br 2 in methanol
SnTe 6:3:1 HOAc : HNO 3 : HF i
PbSe 4:1:I glycerol : HOAc : HNO 3
r
10:10:1:_ H20 : KOH : glycerol : H202
PbSnTe Br2, HBr, H20, glycerine
HgCdTe spray etch using N2 gas:
Br 2 in methanol, alkaline glycerine with
H202, HF and _1202 in H20
_' rotate sampl_ at >6000 rpm
" GaP 1:3 HNO 3 : HCl (aqua regia)
t
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Design and D_mvelopment of a
' Space Station Hazardous Material System
For Assessing Chemical Compa_..ibility
Richard T. Congo
NASA/_FC '_
I
I.
November 15, 1988
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• As the Space Station nears reality in funding support from 1
I
Congress, NASA plans to perforl over a hundred different i
missions in the coming decade. Incrementally deployed, the
Space Station will evolve into modules linked to an integral
structure. _ach module will have charact*ristlc functions,
_ such as logistics, habitation, and materials processing.
Because the Space Station is to be "user friendly" for
experimenters, NASA is anticipating that a variety of
different chemicals will be taken on-board. Accidental
release of these potentially toxic _hemica!s and their
chemical compatibility is the focus'of this discourse.
The Microgravity Manufacturing Processing Facility (MMPF)
will contain the various facilities within the US Laboratory ,"
i
(USL). Each "facility" will have a characteristic purpose,
such as alloy solidification or vapor crystal growth. By i
examining the proposed experiments for each facility,
identifying the chemical constituents, their physical state
and/or changes, byproducts and effluents, I will be able to
identify those payloads which may contain folio, explosive,
or reactive compounds that require processing or containment
in mission peculiar waste management systems. Synergistic
reactions from mixed effluent streams is of major concern.
25-2 _ -
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LEach experiment will hav_ its own data file complst© with
schematic, chemical lasting, physical data, etc. Chemical
compatibility information from various databases will :'
provide assistance in the analysis of alternate disposal i'
techniques (pretreatment, separate storage, etc.). Along 1
with data from the Risk Analysis off the Proposed USL Waste
Management System, accidental release of potentially toxic
and catastrophic chemicals would be eliminated or reduced.
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-: VOLUI_ Zl
lSSOZ= 212187
; TABLE 7. FLUIOS/WASTE$ OF ASF
MASS PER RUN VOLUM_ PER RUNI "
MATERIAL (kg) (liters) . COMMENT
- " Air 0.BH 700.0 Usedto refl thefurnacecar_sters
_er ouchmn
CloaningFluid 6.00 S.00 Usedto closefurnaces
C)hltilbdWaler I.O0 I1.00 UsedforgeneraJfacilitycleanup
GaseousHoklrn 0.00071 4.00 aosslblocoolantfor rapid sa,mple
quonr.h
Gloves 0.00002 0.00o92 Twop,;r perrun
;
InertGas 0.875 700.0 Used20figfurnacecanistersduring
: eachrun. MayM_:ludeeitherAr. N 2' ,
orHe
W;p4s 0._.1x104 0.44x 104 10w;posper run
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I!PIATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET 0HS23590
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH SERVZCIESp INC. EMERGENCY CONTACT:
450 3EVENTH AVENUE s SUITE .'407 JOHN S. BRANSFORD, JR. (615)_9"--11¢1 ,)
NEW YORK_ NEW YORK 10123 .
(BOO) 4.;_-MSDS {212) 967-1.1.00
SUBSTANCE IDENTZFICATION
CAS-NUMBER 108-88-3
RTEC-NUMBER XS52500OO
SUBSTANCE: TOLUENE
TRADE NAMES SYNONYMS:
TOLUOL: PHENYL METHANE: METHYL 9ENZENE: METHYL_ENZOL:.
METHYLBENZENE: PHENYLMETHANE: METHACIDE: U220: STCC 4909305: UN
1294: T-290: T-2S9: T-330: T-_24: T-324-5: T-324-SK: T-_:
T-32_-S: BENZENE_ METHYl-: ANTISALIA: GHS23590
CHEMICAL FAMILY:
HYDROCARBON, AROMATIC
MOLECULAR FORMULA: C7-H8 MOLECULAR WEIGHT: 92.0
CERCLA RATINGS (SCALE 0-_): HEALTH=3 FIRE=_ REACTIViTY-O PERSISTENCE-£
NFF'A RATINGS (SCALE 0-4): HEALTH=2 FIRE=3 REACTIVITY-O
COMF'ONENTS AND CONTAMINANTS
CCMPC_ENT: TOLUENE PERCENT: >_9
EXF'CSU_E L!_:T:
T.;LUE_E:
200 F;_ :_A T_; 300 FF'M OSHA ACCEF'TA_LE CEILING C_NCENT;:ATZCN
_ ,,HX.,,UM PEAK ABCVE -_= _CCE_'T:_LE50,:) FFM F:R ') MINUTES CSNA ACCEF'TA_LE "'" _'" ' -
CE_L!N_ CONCENTRATION FOR AN S NOUR SNiFT
$00 PPM AC_IH T_A; _50 PPM ACSIH STEL
!O0 F'FM _iCSH RECOMMENDED T_A; 200 FFM NiOSH _ECOMMEN_ED 1,) M_U_= CE:L_;_
• _I5_'_ PPM ROHM AND HAAS RECOMMENDE_ T_; 75 F'PM _OHM AND HA_S RECOMMENE,E_ -mE"
I000 FCUNDS CERCLA _EC_iON !0_ F:EF'ORT_LE OUANTITY
='_,'f__,_AL DATA
;ESCRiFTiO.N: CLEAR, COLCRLES_ LIGUID WITH AN AROMATIC ODOR.
BOILING POINT: 2T,I F (1!I C) MELTING POINT: -139' F : _._C"
SPECIFIC GRAVITY: 0.866 E',..'AF'ORAT:ON RATE: {:-',UTYL _.CETATEll)
2.--.4
SOLUE, iLIT'r "N _iATER: 0.05% 'JAPOR DENSITY: ._.2
Vr-F'_' .-.FESSURE: --'*_ MMHS @ 20 C ODOR-THRESHOLD: 0,.7.-5 F'F'M
25-27
1991006617-425
OTHER SOLVENTS (SOLVENT - SOLUBILITY) :
ACETONE, BENZENE, ALCOHOL, CHLOROFORM, ETHER, GLACIAL
ACETIC ACIDj CARBON DISULFIDE, DIMETHYL SULFOXIDE, LIGROIN, OTHER HYDROCARBONS
FIRE AND EXPLOSION DATA
FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD
DANGEROUS FIRE HAZARD WHEN EXPOSED TO HEAT OR FLAME.
VAPORS ARE HEAVIER THAN AIR AND MAY TRAVEL A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE TO A SOURCE
OF IGNITION AND FLASH BACK.
c VAPOR-AIR MIXTURES ARE EXF'LOSIVE ABOVE FLASH POINT.
DUE TO LOW ELECTROCONDUCTIVITY OF THE SUBSTANCE, FLOW OR ACiTATION MAY.
GENERATE ELECTROSTATIC CHARGES RESULTING IN SPARKS WITH POSSIBLE IGNITION.
FLASH POINT: 40 F (4 C) (CO) UPPER EXPLOSION LIMIT: 7.1%
LOWER EXPLOSION LIMIT: 1.2% AUTOIGNITION TEMP.: 896 F (480 C)
._
FLAMMI_ILITY CLASS (OSHA): IB
FIREFIGHTING MEDI_:
DRY CHEMICAL, CAR_ON DIOXIDE, HALON, WATER SPRAY GR STANDARD FOAM
(1=$7 EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUiDE_OOK, DOT P 5e00.4).
FCR LAA_ER FIREB, USE" _ATER _F_Y, FOG OR STANDARD FGAII
(:9S7 E_ERGENCY RESPONSE GU:DE_OOK, DOT P 5@00.4).
FZR--FI 2HYINg:
_CVE CC_4T-_Z_,--RFROM F'RE AREA IF FCSS'__LE. C%OL FIR-----XPCSED CONTA!N--RS WITH
_-'TER F=:CM ._'_--"NT'L WELL AFTER FIR =. "S CUT. STAY AWAY FROM STCRA@- TAN-'.
E_DS. FCR M_-SS_'VE FiRE _N STORA@E AREA, LSE UN_AN.':ED HCSE HCL-,ER OR :-:$'JITCR
NOZZLES, ELSE WiTH_RAW FRCM AREA Ar,J,_LET FIRE _--_F.N.WiTH._RAW IMMEDIATELY IN
CA_E wr R:S!N3 _OL'ND FROM VENTING SAFETY _EVZ2E CR ANY _ISCOLC._ATZ_N OF
STORAGE TANK DUE TO FIRE (1_=.7 EMERGENCY RESPONSE _Ui._EBOCK, DOT F' 5._(,0.-,
GU:;E FAGE 27).
EXTINGUISH C,_JLY IF FLOW CAN -_E ST_F'F'E,_; L:._E _ATER iN FLOCDIN_ _UANTIT-"ES AS
FO_, SOLI'3 STAEAMS MAY SF'._EAD FIF_. COOL CONTA'hERS WiTH FLOODING AMCUN,= ,.r
_ATER, APPLY FROM AS FAR A DI--3TANCE A-: F'CSSI_LE. AVOID _REATHIN_ T,_X:C '.-FC_-:,
k'EE,=' UFw i ;J'_.
"_TE,_ ";:_'? -=E INEFr=_._VE _NFFA" ;':F_c F,=C:TE:TICN ":V'-E.w 0N H;:ARD:DI._.-" M._-E=:'3 '-_.-_.
E :_--HTHEDITI:N),
TRANSPOF.T a.T:ON
DEPARTMENT CF TRANSPC;'TAT:ON NAZF-.=',DCL;_SIFICATION 4_.CFRIT2.101:
FLAMMA.=LE L :OU I.",
DEPARTMENT CF T_ANSF'CF_TATION LABELING PE_UIF,EMENTS 47-,CFR172.101 AN,_ 172.402:
FLAMMABLE L 1,3UID
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(DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION P_KAGIN6 REGUIREMENTS: 47C_R173.119
EXCEPTIONS: 49CFR17_.118
TOXICITY
TOLUENE:
_00 PF'M EYE-HUMAN IRRITATION; 500 M5 SKIN-RABBIT MODERATE IRRITATION; 4_5 MG
SKZN-R_BBIT MILD IRRITATION; 2 MS/24 HOURS EYE-RABBIT SEVERE IRRITATION;
, S70 UG EYE-RABDIT MILD IRRITATION; 100 MG/_O SECONDS RINSED EYE-RA_DIT MILD
IRRITATION; 200 PPM INHALATION-HUMAN TCLO; 100 PF'M INHALATION-bAN TCLO;
50 MS/KS ORAL-HUMAN LDLO; 5000 MS/KS ORAL-RAT LDSO; 4000 PPM/4 HOURS
INHALATION-RAT LCLO; 12,124"MG/P_3 SKIN-RABBIT LDSO; I600 PPM
INHaLATION-GUINEA PIG LCLO; 80c) MS/KS INTRAPERITONEAL-RAT LDLO; 1960 M3/KG
INTRAVENOUS-R_T LDSO; 5_20 ."PM/8 HOURS INHALATION-MOUSE LCSO; 1126 MS/KS
INTRAPERITONEAL-MOUSE LDSO; 2000 MS/KS UNREPORTED-MOUSE LDSO; 6900 MS/KS
UNREPORTED-RAT LDSO; MUTAGENIC DATA (RTECS); REPRODUCTIVE EFFECTS DATA
(RTECS).
CARCINOGEN STATUS: NONE.
TOLUENE IS A SKIN, EYE, AND MUCOUS MEMBRANE IRRITANT, CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM
DEPRESSANT, AND NEUROTOXIN. POISONING MAY AFFECT THE HEART, LIVER, KIDNEYS,
AND _LOOD. STIMULENTS SUCH AS EPINEPHRINE OR EPHEDRINE MAY INDUCE VENTRICULAR
FIBRILLATION. TOLUENE INHIBITS MITOCHONDR!AL OXIDATIVE PHOSPHCRYLAT!ON.
CC_'JSUMF'TIGN OF _LCOHOL!C BEVERAGES MAY ENHANCE THE TOXIC =rr:u:S.
¢_E,,_O-._I _ .,--IES INVOLVING PETROLEUM r.R=_ZNERY W_k:ERS !NDiC_TE
F_R_ONS WITH RC_T'NE EXPC?URE TO PETROLEUM CR CNE O_ iTS CCr_STiTUE_TS _AY
BE AT AN !_C_EASED RiSK TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF BEN'_N NEC_'LASMS, Di_ESTIVE
SYSTEM CA_'_C_RS_ APeD S)<_N CANCER, PARTICULARLY ,I¢L_Nu,,A.
_-ALTH _----CTS A_D FIRST _._D
",_;_LAT ION :
TOL L'_,"_:
iRR!TANT/NARCOT iC/NEUROTOX._N.
2C:0,'_ F F'H i;_;_EDi_TELY _NGERCUS TO LiFE ,?,R h'E_LT_.
_CL;TE EXPOSURe- T_" LEVEL REgUi_ED TO :-"RODUCE ,_.'ARCOSiS C,:N EXIST _,THOUT
ASSOCIATED RESFI,_ATGRY TRACT IRRiTAT'.ON. ODOR DETF_.CTi_N IS INSUFFICZE_'JT
FOR _JARNiN_ Dt;E TO OLFACTORY FATIt_L'E. -0._-_0,.', FPM F_R UF" TO S HOUR_ C.A;_SED
M'LD U_-R RE-CF:_:AT_RY TRACT iRR:TAT:CN. -.:--'_;_= uEA_..NESS C,';NF_SION
" T_.E SKIN, EUm_C_.I:_, D_'-'Z!;,,E-S,AN_ D"L;_TED F'UF'iLS. ._Or;F'PM CAUSED FA_D
I_RITAT!C.N_ NA-_AL M_JC3L'S SECRETICN_ METALLIC TAST_'_ DROWSINESS, _ND
IMFAIRED E'ALAhCE. _FTEREFFECT_ INCLUDING H_RVOUSNESS, MUSCULAR FATISU_.
_- m,,ll-1¢.,_AND INSOMNIA LASTED FOR BE\;ERAL DAY_. A WORKER FOUND UNCONSCIOUS .... ._'
_XFOSUF:E TO HIgH vAPOR CONCF.NTRAT'.'OHS FOR i,_ hC'JRS DEVELOPED HEF'_T_C "-r'_D
F.ENAL DAMA,._-" "_ITH MYOGLOPINURiA. _ECOVERY W_S COMPLETE WITHIN _ MONTHS.
HEMATOLOGIC EF_'_CTS OCCUR RARELY WITH =.XPOSI.JRETO HIGH CONCENTRATIONS.
RErjOVERY USUALLY FOLLOWS REMOVAL FROM EXPOSURE. EXTREME INHALATION MAY
CAUSE DE_TH _'f FA_'ALYSIS OF 'THE RESPIRATORY CENTER.
".H.='ONICEXY'_SURE - REPEAT_JD OR PF'OLONGED EXPOSURE MAY CAUSES MUCOUS MEM_RA_JE
IRRITATION, VOMITING, INSOMNIA, NOSEBLEEDS, CHEST PAIN, EUF'HORIA,
_.EADAC_E, 'JERTI_O, NAUSEA_, ANOREXIA, BAD TASTE, MOMENTARY LOSS OF MEMORY,
_LPITATIONS, EXTR_.ME WEAKNESS, LOSS OF COORDINATION AND IMPAIRMENT OF
2,-2, OR'G'NAL PA_E |_
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" REACTION TIME, TINNITUS, ALCOHOL INTOLERANCE, _'ETECHIAE AND ABNORMAL :.
BLEEDING. LEUKOPF..NIA WITH BONE MARR(_ HYPOPI.ASIA HAS BEEN REPORTED
OCCASIONALY, BUT MAY BE DUE TO BENZENE C_NTAMINATION. EXAMINATION OF
WORKERS EXPOSED TO IOO-11OO PPM REVEALED HEPATUMEGALY, MILD MACROCYTOSIS,
MODERATE ERYTHROPENIA, AND ABSOLUTE LYMPHOCYTOSIS, BUT NO LEUKOPENIA.
OTHER WORKERS EXPOSED TO TOLUENE FLRtES DEVELOPED LEUK_PENIA AND 4
ESPECIALLY NEUTROPB'IA. WITHIN 6 MONTHS, THEY SHOWED INCREASED COAGULAT;ON
TIME AND DECREASED PROTHROMBIN LEVEL. PERIODONTAL EFFECTS WERE ALSO NOTED.
CARDIAC SENSITIZATION MAY OCCUR AND MAY RESULT IN CARDIAC ARREST DUE TO
VENTRICULAR FIBRILLATION. REPEATED INHALATION OF TOLUENE TO THE POINT OF
ELIF_ORIA HAS CAUSED IRREVERSIBLE ENCEPHALOPATHY WITH CEREBELLAR ATAXIA-
, RHYTHMIC LIMB MOVEMENTS, UNSTEADINESS, BIIZARE BEHAVIORt EMOTIONAL
_. LABILITY AND OPTIC ATROPHY, AND DIFFUSE CEREBRAL ATROPHY. OTHER
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC EFFECTS MAY INCLUDE LETHARGY, HALLUCINATZONSm COMAs
DIZZINESS, SYNCOPE, PARESTHESIAS_ AND PERIPHERAL NEUROPATHY. INTENTIONAL
SNIFFING CAN PRODUCE RENAL TUBULAR DEFECTS WITH METABOLIC ACIDOSIS,
ELECTROLYTE ABNORMALITIES AND POTASSIUM LOSS. SEVERE MUSCLE WEAKNESS
LEADING TO LIMB PARALYSIS AND CARDIAC ARRHYTHMIAS MAY RESULT FROM
THE HYPOKALEMIA; HOWEVER, SENSORY FUNCTION AND TENDON REFLEXES ARE NOT
IMPAIRED. GASTROINTESTINAL EFFECTS MAY INCLUDE ABDOMINAL PAIN, NAUSEA,
VOMITING, AND HEMATEMESIE. CHROMOSOME CHANGES WERE OBSERVED IN SOME
WORKERS UP TO TWO YEARS AFTER CESSATION OF EXPOSURE TO TOLUENE. WOMEN
_ _ OCCUPATIONALLY EXF'OSED TO TOLUENE AND OTHER VARNISH SOLVENT_ HAVE REPORTED
MENSTRUAL DISORDERS, UNDERWEIGHT OFFSPRING WHO OID NOT NURSE WELL, AND
FETAL ASPHYXIA. DYSMENORRHEA HAS BEEN REF'ORT_D IN WOMEN OCCUPATIONALLY
EXPOSED TO TOLUENE LEVELS OF 60-ZOO F'F'M.EFFECTS ON THE FETUS AND FETAL
DEVELOPMENTAL A_NORMALITiES HAVE _EEN REPORTED IN OFFSPRING OF FE;_ALE RATS
AND MICE FOLLOI_ING REPEATED EXPOSURE DURING GESTATION.
F_RST AID- RE;dOVE F;OM EXPOSURE AREA TO FRESH AIR IMmEdIATELY. IF BREAT_!_'JS
_AS STOF'PED_ F'ERF_RM ARTIFICIAL RESF'IRATI:N. KEEP PEF'SCN _ARM A_: AT F=S-
GET MEDICAL ATTENTION IMMEDIATELY.
S._: N CCNTACT :
TOLUENE:
:RRTTANT.
_CUTE EXPOSURE- CC'gTACT WiTH T_E L!0U!._ M_'? CAUEE iRRITAT!CN._ SC-'LI:,JS,
CRaCk:INS AND 'SE_,"_ATITIS, S_.::N A.=SCF.PTION DCES 0CCUR_ ._UT iT IS _E..%E;:-LLY
TOO SLOW TO P=•-.,_UCE SIGNS OF ACUTE SY_-E;'IIC TOXICITY. F'AF_'E._ThES:_'S .._F "7'i--_._.
SKiN MAY OCCUR FF_CMVAPOR EXPOSU_ '¢
CHRONIC EXPOSL;RE- REF'EATED OR F'ROL,._NGED CC,NT_CT WITH THE LIC, Ui; MA',' C;.L;SE
DEFATTI,_G OF THE SKIN., RESULT_N_ IN A DRY, FiSSIJ_E,3 DE.'--:M_.TITiS. TEN TO
TWENTY AF'F'LiCAT:,O,_;S TO F:P.=:DIT SKIN F'R_DL_CED SLIGHT TO MGDER_TE :F.FiTAT_CN
_ND SLi_HT D'ECF:_SIS.
AN EFIDE_InLOF::C=L.. 3T-_Dv QF ;ETF:0LEUM ::E-_NERY-,-. ;JP_,_'P.ERS_3 _E;,_ETE:,
ELEVAT-'GN_ iN STA_'J;_FD MC:RT_LiT'? RAT_=_ F,_R _I(IN C_HCEF ALSNG W'-'T_A
_CSE-RE_PO,'SE FELAT:r_N.eHIP _.ICH I_'JDICATES _N ASSCCZAT_ON ._ETWEEN ,_CUTINE
_ORKF'LQCE EXFCSURE TO PETROLEUM OR ONE _F I" ; CONSTITUENTS AND S_.'.iN
CANCE._, PAF'TICULARLY MELANOMA.
FIRST AID- REMCVE CONTAMI_'ATED CLOTHING AN_ ._HOES ;._,MEDIATEL¢. ',,_AS;_,_,','-:,._.._
" AREA WITH SOAP OR MILD DETERGEHT AND LAF:_E AMOUNTS OF _ATER UNTIL NO
EVIDENCE OF CHEMICAL REMAINS (APPROXIMATELY I._-20 ,'IINUTES). GET MEDICAL
ATTENTION :MMEDIA.TEL v .
EYE C;'JNT_CT:
TOLUENE :
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ACUTE EXPOSURE- CONTACT WITH THE LIGUID MAY C_S __ CORNEAL BURNS IF NOT
PROMPTLY REMOVED. VAPORS MAY CAUSE NOTIC_:L_LE IP_ITATION AND LACRIMATION AT j
300-800 PPMs AND EXT;_I_MELY HISH CONCENTRATIONS MAY CAUSE BLURRIN@ OF --
VISION. CORNEAL LESIONS, VERY FINE VACDULES, HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN WORKERS
EXPOSED TO A SOLVENT MIXTURE CONTAINING TOLUENE, THE LESIONS SUDSIDED .,,
FOLLOWING SEVERAL DAYS OF NON-EXPOSURE. SIMILAR LESIONS HAVE BEEN PRODUCED
IN CATS FOLLOWING EXPOSURE TO TOLUENE.
CHRONIC EXPOSURE- REPEATED OR PROLONGED CONTACT MAY CAUSE CONJUNCTIVITIS.
RARELY, SYSTEMIC OCULAR DISTURBANCES, SUCH AS "REDDENING OF THE VISION",
HAVE OCCURRED.
FIRST AID- WASH EYES IMMEDIATELY WITH LARGE AMOUNTS OF WATERp OCCASIONALLY
LIFTIN@ UPPER AND LONER LIDS, UNTIL NO EVIDENCE OF CHEMICAL REMAINS
(APPROXIMATELY 15-20 MINUTES). GET MEDICAL ATTENTION IMMEDIATELY.
INGEST ION :
TOLUENE:
NARCOT I =.
ACUTE EXPOSURE- MAY CAUSE NAUSEA, VOMITING, COLIC, DIARRHEA, 9URNIN@
SENSATION IN THE EPIGASTRIUM, HEADACHE, TINNITUS: DIZZINESS, W.'-AKNESS,
EUPHORIA, DROWSINESS AND INCOORDINATION; IF LARGE AMOUNTS ARE INGESTED,
SYMPTOMS MAY PROGRESS TO INCLUDE SHALLOW, RAPID RESPIRATION, TREMOR-,
VENTRICULAR IRREGULARITIES WITH FIDRILLATION, CONVULSIONS, STUPOR AND
UNCONSCIOUSNESS. METABOLIC ACIDOSIS AND LIVER AND KIDNEY DAMAGE MAY OCCUR.
APPROXIMATELY 15-_.0 MILLILITERS. IS THE HUMAN LETHAL DOSE. ASPIRATION OF
THE LIC.UID INTO THE LUNGS MAY CAUSE COUGHING, GAGGING, ACUTE HEr_ORAH_GZC
Pt'._'.'J;'IONITISAND RAPIDLY PULMONARY EDEMA.
CHRONIC E×F'CSURE- NO .EFFECTS '_E_E REPORTED IN RATS FE-'3='UP TO 5-T")MC-/P'_/OAY
FC_ _93 DAYS. -'rr_..._ ON T._E FETUS AN_ FETAL D=UELOPMENT_L _.=.NCR_':C,LITI.ES
h_.V, _E.-N ......',= -'C_',,:J FOLL:_!NG _R`E'EATE_r p_MINISTRATZON T_ P_-_N._>JT _-"CE.
FiKST LiD- `EXTREi',E CARE MUST .=,E USED TO F'REV`ENT ASF'iRATICN. USE GA_.T=_'IC L_v_.-E
_."TH ACTIVAT.E3 C._ARCOA'L _.N3 P CUFFED ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE wiT_N _.5 M'NL_TE S. :3 I
T_E A_SENC`E OF C`E.=',=:-'SSICN C,R C_NVUL=._S C,R IMF'_IF, ED ,'_-4G F,EFLEX , ".-"E':'_C
E,:E-'S"= CAN :-E ;ONE. _J_EN V_MiT'N_ B`E3"NS, KEEP HE_D .=EL:_ -"E_r" _',=S, T,3
.-_EV-'NT _=_F':.::,c _.,';. ,--E,_' V=M:T'NG ---,3"_., ...... _ "¢ _ - ,T'- ;.r_ ,_ .._ r _"J- .',0-_0 M'L_ :_ ;-E, ='. C,-- _"LEE-';
P_CS-_O-_09A DZ-UT`E3 ._:4 IN _TE.R. MA_NTA."N _R"_;_Y, _,LOC'D r,-=.E_=_.'.RE,.A'_D
.
F,.E;".._ATZCN...P (.3RE!S.=_.CH_ _AN'3_E:K C,-" F'CZS_NZ,"_ I_.TH E3 ) "=E- :"E._ C; I
ATTENTiC;_. TREATMENT MUST -E _;M_,N_F.TERED _.Y gU_L'.'Fi=D- ME,_'C_L ;E;'SC:-'.--.-_
?-;JTZDOTE :
,'_O SF'ECiF._C A;"TI'_OTE. T;`EAT =.'fMFTr_.;_AT:C'_LLY :,_D SUF',=CRT'VEL','.
,_E;C" Z'._: :" SECT ":N
REACT i:JIT'/:
_T_BLE UNDER NO_.MAL TEMFEF:ATUF.E5 AND FRES¢..URES.
o.
ZP'C_3_¢FAT iB iL I T i .EB:
TOLUENE:
ALLYL CHLORIDE 4" DICHL0_'OET}-WYL -_LLJM'!'JUM ,._R ET_YL.-%LL;MINUM _;E-ECIU!CHLORI3E:
POSSIDLE EXPLOSION.
.=,;'QMZNE TRiFLU_RI:;E :'50L:;%: VIOLENT REACTION.
D!,_ITRO_EN T.ETRAFLUOF,='.'.E: ;0RMS EXPLOSIVE MIXT'JF'E.
:J:-._:-_C_C_D: IP_TENSE REACTi:N.
;',IT;'iCACiD _. MIXED ACIDS- F_SSIBLE RUh'AW_V ,.'._.EXPL:SIVE REACTION.
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NITRIC ACID + SULFURIC ACIOs EXPLOSIVE REACTION.
NITROGEN TETROXIDE: EXPLOSIVE RfACTION.
OXIDIZERS (STROI_)I FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD.
PLASTICS, RItB_ER, AND COATINGSI MAY BE ATTACKED.
SILVER PERCHLORATE: FORMATION OF SMOCK SENSITIVE COMPLEX. 4
SULFURIC ACID: EXOTHERMIC REACTION.
TETRANITROMETHANE: EXTREJ_ELY VIOLENT EXPLOSIVE REACTION.
URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE: VISOROUS REACTION WITH THE SEPARATION OF CARBON.
' DECOMPOSITION:
_ THERMAL DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS MAY INCLUDE TOXIC OXIDES OF CARBON,
POLYMERIZATION:
HAZARDOUS POLYMERIZATION HAS NOT _[EN REPORTED TO OCCUR UNDER NORMAL
TEMPERATURES AND PRESSURES.
STORAGE-DISPOSAL
OBSERVE ALL FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL REGULATIONS WHEN STORIN_ OR DISF'O_
oF THIS SUBSTANCE.
**STORAGES*
5TGRE IN ACCORDANCE W_TH 29 CFR 1910.!06.
FROTECT P3AINST..PHYSICAL DAMAGE. OUTSI_E OR _ETACHED STORA3E ;S FEEFER_3LE.
I_SI;E STORAGE SHOULD BE iN A STANDARD FLAMMA3LE LIQUIDS STORAGE R_OM CR
CA31NET. SET A_ATE FROM OXIDIZIK3 MATERIALS {NFF'A 49j HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS
_ATAj I_75).
B3_,J_Zyg3A_ _ROUNDIN3: SUBSTANCES _ITH LC_ ELECTROC_DUCT_V_TY, _ICH
MAY _E _NITED _Y ELECTROSTATIC SF_KS, SHOULD _E STORED iN CONTaINErS
_ICH _EET T_E D_NDiN_ AND _ROUN_IN_ _U:;ELINES SFECiFIED IN NFFA 77-_:,
_EC_MMENDED FRACTICE ON STATIC ELECT_iCiTY.
STCRE _WA'f _OM INCOMPATIBLE SUBSTANCES.
:_.,r,JT.,iT;_,"JS-_ AVOID
MAY _E 13NITE.3 3Y HEAT, S_-ARK3 _ 7L.:.M.='S.VAPORS MAY T_.AVEL T3 A --._L_'CE_F
I_NITI.3N AND FLASH BACK. CON-TAINER ;n_'fEX_'LODE IN HEAT C.F .--i.=E.';_F'OR
E×PLCSION _AZAF:D INDOORS, OUTDOOr:5 C.':-li::SEWERS. _UNOFF TO SEWER MAY CF:E.':,T--_
"_" FiRE OR EXF'LOSION HAZARD.
S_!LL3 _ND LEAKS
SOIL-R_LE_3E:
D;3 _OLD:NG A_EA SUCH AS LAGOON, FOND O& F'IT FOR CONTAINMENT.
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DIKE FLOW OF SPILLED MATERIAL USING SOIL OR SANDBAGS OR F_M_D BARRIERS SUCH
AS POLYURETHANE OR C0_CRETE.
USE CEMENT POWDER OR FLY ASH TO ABSORB LIQUID MASS.
IMMOBILIZE SPILL WITH UNIVERSAL GELLING AGENT.
REDUCE VAPOR AND FIRE HAZARD WITH FLUOROCARBON WATER FOAM.
AIR-RELEASE:
KNOCK DOWN VAPORS WITH WATER SPRAY. KEEP JPWIND.
WATER-SPILL:
LIMIT SPILL MOTION AND DISPERSION WITH NATURAL BARRIERS OR OIL SPILL CONTROL
BOOMS.
APPLY DETERGENTSm SOAPS, ALCOHOLS OR ANOTHER SURFACE ACTIVE AGENT TO THICKEN
SPILLED MATERIAL.
APPLY UNIVERSAL GELLING AGENT TO IMMOBILIZE TRAPPED SPILL AND INCREASE
EFFICIENCY OF REMOVAL.
iF D_SSOLV,D, APPLY ACTIVATED CAR_ON AT TEN TIMES THE SF'ILLED AMOUNT IN THE
REGION OF Ic) FFM OR GREATER CONCENTRATION.
US_ SUCTION HOSES TO REMOVE TRAP FED SPILL MAT,RIAL.
USE MECHANICAL D_ED_S 0_ L_FTS TO EXTRACT IMMO_IL!ZED .5S_" -- FCL' L_T_N A_D
_CCUPATIO_'L-S_LL:
5_IJT OF_ I_NITZON SOU_:C,S. ST_P L_AK IF YOU CAN WO iT WITHOUT R_S):_. USE _4TER
_;_Y TO r,Z'_'¢__,_u. VAPORS. run'--S_ALL ==TLLS, T_K_ UP _ITH SAND. _ GT_E_ _SC_,_'_T
.&-,._, RIAL AND PLACE INTO CONT_N,RS FOR LATER DIS;'OSAL. FOR LA_S,R ....:;_' _S. D::'E
F_R A_,AD C_ _;iLL FOR LAT,_ D:SFCS_L NO S_IC_.,I'_.• N_. ;LAZES 0_ _LA_,5 IN _ZA=.D
_ _ _1_
"_... F_:,,F' UN_:,C_SSAKY FZ_LE A_AY; ISOLATE _ZARD AR,A AND _=--_'ICT E_T_Y. (
PROTECTIVE ,GUIPMENT _=C-ICI'4_,.
V=NTILAT!CN:
F':_VIDE L_C_L .:.XHA;_ST_R SENERAL D,UUT;_N v--N-:LATI_N TO MEET ,-"___L'-"!-_-m
,X_.'_S;J_:EL-'.*.i-_ 'JKNT" "''ON ,_UiFM=_NT MUST ._-"-:(.LOe.:C,_-F'ROOF.
9--"I;:_ATC_:..r
-',_---FDLLSi4'NG. _'-_'!_ATOFS=_rAND MAXIMUM USE C_'NCKNT_ATIONS _r'-.ER-_-COi'IMENDAT:_NS
_.Y THE U.S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN ,ER'J!CES, NiOSH FOC}'ET m;JI"E "
C_EMICAL _AZAF;'.'.SOR N_OSH CRITERIA DOCUMENTS; OR DEPARTMENT OF L;BCR.,.
2_;CFRI-.-10 S:J_Fr-_,'T ,_.
THE -_F,SCIFIC .''='IS:AT:SR.r S_LECTED MUST DE ='5''.-_= ON CDHTAMINAT'SN : ":ELS --bND
iPJ TH;E WC_K PLACE AND BE JOINTLY APF;:OVED 3"r T'i'-=.NATICHAL ZNSTtT;STE OF
CCCL_PATIONAL _AF_TY AND HEALTH AND T_E MINE 3AFET'¢ AND HEALTH ADM:NISTFATI3N.
TOLUENE :
!:_c,._, F;M- &N'-" :;HKM_CAL CARTF,'DGE RESPIRATOR wITH ORGANIC VAPOR CAFTRI'.---(_)_,= .
:..."_'..'SUPPLIED-AiR Rc-SPIRATOR.
,:.Nv_0WE_ED AIR-_UR_PYiNG RESPIRATOR _iTH 0_GANIC VAPOR
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CARTRIDGE(S). t.
ANY SELF-CONTA_NED BREATHINQ APPARATUS. i'
_000 PFM- ANY SUPPLIED-AIR RESPIRATOR OPERATED IN A CONTINUOUS FLOW MODE.
ANY SELF-CONTAINED _REATHINS APPARATUS WITH A FULL FACF..PIECF.
ANY SUPPLIED-AIR RESPIRATOR WITH A FULL F_CEPIECE.
ANY AIR-PURIFYIN$ FULL FACEPIECE RESPIRATOR (GAS MAGK) WITh A
CHIN-STYLE OR FRONT OR BACK-MOUNTED ORG/:INIC VAPDR CANISTER.
ESCAPE- ANY AIR_PLIRIFYIN$ FULL FACEPIECE RESPIRATSR (_AS MASK) WITH A
CHIN-STYLE OR FRONT OR BACK-M,_TED ORGANIC VAPOR CANISTER.
ANY APPROPRIATE ESCAPE-TYPE SELF-CONTAINED BREATHIN_ APPARATUS.
FOR FIREFIGHTING AND OTHER IMMEDIATELY DANGEROUS TO LIFE OR HEALTH CONDITIONS:
SELF-CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATU_ WITH FULL FACEPIECE OPERATEO IN PRESSURE
DEMAND OR OTHER POSITIVE PRESSURE MODE.
SUFPLIED-AIR RESPIRATOR WITH FULL FACEPIECF AND OPERATED IN PRESSURE-DEMAND
OR OTHER POSITIVE PRESSURE MODE "N _O_i_r_ON WITH AN AUXILIARY
SELF-CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS OPERATED IN PRESSURE-DEMAND OR OTHER
POSITIVE PRESSURE MODE.
CLOTHING:
EMPLOYEE MU3T WEAR APPROPRIATE PROTECTIVE (IMPERVIOUS) CLOTHING AND EGUIrMENT
TO PREVENT REPEATED OR FROLONGED SKIN CONTACT _ITH THIS SUgSTANCE.
GLCVES:
EMF-LOYEE MUST WEAR APFROPRIATE PROTECTIVE _LOVES TO PREVENT CONTACT _TH TH_S
SUgSTANCE.
EYE FROTECTION:
E_L_YEE MUST _EAR SF'LAS_-FROOF _R _UST-RES_ST._NT SAFETY 3_LE3 TO FREVENT
EYE CONTACT WiTH TH_S SU_STA_CE.
AUTHORIZED - OCC_F'ATIONAL HEALTH SE_ViCE_ ZNC,
CREATICN DATE: I,:)1:51_4 REVI310N DATE: 0_122/_
t.
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MATERT_L SAFETY DATA SH_ _ _C1437_ 50 2
J
FISHER SCIENTIFIC _MER@ENCY CONTACT:
CHEMICAL DIVISION @ASTON L. PILLORI
I REA@ENT LANE (20_) 79b-7100
FAIR LAWNj NJ 07410 (201) 796-7100
SUBSTANCE IDENTIFICATION
CAS-NUMBER 71-fS-&
SUBSTANCE: ZIIsI,I-T<ICHLOROL:HANE$1
TRADE NAMES/SYNONYhS:
METHYL CHLOROFORM: ETHYLIDYNE CHLORIDE: UN 2831: T.-391: T-39B:
ACC14370
CHEMICAL FAMILY:
HYDROCARBON, ALIP4ATIC
MOLECULAR FORMULA: CZ-H3-CL3 MOL WT: 133.41
CERCLA RATINFS (SCALE 0-3): HEALTH-L FIRE=O REACTIVITY=2 F'ERSISTENCE=3
NFPA RATINGS (SCALE 0-': HEALTH-3 FIRE-1 REACTIVITY=I
COMPONENTS AND CONTAMINANTS
C_MF'ONEN ": I,i, Z-TR _CHI_OROETHANE F'EF'CENT: _95
COMPONENT: INHIBITOR TO F'REVENT CORROSION OF METALS F'ERCE_:T: <5
OTHER CONTAMINANTS: NONE
_XF_S_R_ LIMIT:
TS:D FFM C_HA T_A
_50 FF'M _C3_H T_; ¢50 AC31H STEL
_50 PF'M NIOSH RECOM;.IENDED 15 MINUTE C_iLIN3
PHYSICAL DATA
DESC=IF'TION: COLORLESS LI@UID WITH A MILD CHLOROFORM-LIKE ODOR.
BOILING POINT: 165 F (74 C) MELTING POINT: -_6 F.(-32 C)
SPECIFIC GRAVITY: I._ EVAPORATION RATE: {CCL4=Z) I TTE
SOLUBILITY IN WATER: 0.44% VAPOR DFNSITY: 4.6
VAPOR PRESSURE: I00 MMHG @ 20 C ODOR-]HRESHOLD: 20-100 PPM
OTHER SOLVENTS (SOLVENT - SOLUBILITY):
ACET3NE, BENZENEj COL4, METHAN_L_ _ND ETHER.
FIRE AND EXIM.OSInN DATA
_.': I,:: FC'¢oR,'!I,,ALI'F,¢' .._,'
7
1991006617-433
FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD
NEGLIGIBLE FIRE HAZARD AND EXPLOSION HAZARD WHEN EXPOSED TO HEAT OR FLAME.
FLASH POINT: NONFLAMMABLE UPPER EXPLOSION LIMIT: 10.5%
LOWER E::PLOSION LIMIT: S.0% AUTOIGNITION TEMP.: 998 F (537 C)
FLAMMIBILITY CLASS (OSHA): IlIA
, F IREFIGHTING MEDIA:
DRY CHEMICAL, CARBON DIOXIDE OR HALON
(1987 EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDEBOOK, DOT P 5800.4).
FOR LARGER FIRES, USE WATER .SPRAY, FOG OR STANDARD FOAP,
(1987 EMERGENCY RESF'ONSE GUIDEBOOK, DOT P 5800.4).
FIREFIGHTING:
STAY AWAY FROM STORAGE TANK ENDS. COOL CONTAINERS EXPOSED TO FLAMES WITH WATER
FROM SIDE UNTIL WELL AFTER FIRE IS OUT (1987 EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDEBOOK,
DOT P 5800.4, GUIDE PAGE 74).
TOXICITY
--"/G,'I,/M.-./!O"_.N"i,"J_ALAT'-ON-r'IANLCLO; !000 PPM _N_LAT._ON-RAT LC ____; ....._r,-r)r)r_S/_:'_
C-._L-RAT LDSC'I li'_,;OORaL-MOUSE LDSO; MUTACENIC DATA (RTECS); -_-F=._DUCTIVE
--FF..-CTSDATA" (R,_'S); INDEFINITE ANIMAL C_.RCINOGEN (IARC). DATA AVAILA_L--_ DO
_r_T F-"RMIT EVALUATION OF CARC!NOGENiCITY GF I,I,I-TRICHLORG--'T_AN-_ TO ._E MAD-.
Z_I,I-TRICHLgR_-'_T_AN-- IS A SKiK IRRITANT AND CENTRAL N-_.ERVOUSSYST-M
-----=_-_-2_ANT,EXFCSURE _AY _,_._ITATE T_-Z EY--S AND MUC,3US _--:;:-.,RA,_--S.P._IS_N:r,J3 :_._Y
:,F,--:_'C'C T_,":CA_i "_.... '" "'.V-o_,.._A.",._'fST-M AND LIv-R ALC.3HOLZC __EV--RA_ES _AY [N_-_NCZ
T_E SYSTEMIC E,--FECT_.
FEALTH EFFECTS AND FIRST AID
:_ALATI_N:
NARCOTIC. I000 PPM IS IMMEDIATELY DANGEROUS TO LIFE AND HEALTH.
ACUTE EXPOSURE- INDIVIDUALS EXF'OSED TO 900-1000 PPM FOR 20 MINUTES
EXPERIENCED LIGHT-HEADEDNESS, INCOORDINATION, AND IMPAIRED
EGUILI_RIUM. EXPOSURE TO A HIGHER CONCENTRATIONS OF EXTINDED
PERIODS OF TIME MAY CAUSE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM DEPRESSION
WITH DIZZINESS, INCOORDINATION DROWSINESS, INCREASEO
.. REACTION TIME, UNCONSCIOUSNESS, AND DEATH. "SUDDEN DEATHS"
MAY OCCUR DUE TO SENSITIZATION OF THE MYOCARDIUM TO
EPINEPHRINE. (CAUSING CARDIAC ARRYTHMIA). DEATH MAY ALSO BE
CAUSED BY ASPHYXIA DU_ TO THE REDUCTION IN OXYGEN AGAILABLE
FOR BREATHING. AT EXTREMELY HIGH CONCENTRATIONS, LIVER AND
KIDNEY INJURY MAY OCCUR. REPEATED EXPOSURE TO THE POINT OF
ANESTHESIA MAY CAUSE REVERSIBLE HEPATITIS (ANIMAL).
CHRONIC EXPOSURe- IN EXPERIMENTAL ANIMALS, LIVER AND KIDNEY DAMAGE HAVE BFTN
MINIMAL. GEE ANIMAL MUTAGENIC AND REPRODUCTIVE EFFECTS
REFERENCES IN TOXICITY SECTION. AT 1000 TO 10,000 PFM:
25-36
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i m .........................
S-MONTH EXPOSURES OF _NIMALS CAUSED SOME PATHOLOGIC _
CHANSES IN THE LIVER_ AND LUNGS OF SOP_ SPECIES. WHEN
REPEATED, REDUCED TO 500 PPI_s PATHOLOGIC CHANGES WERE [
ELIMATED, BUT THERE WAS SOME GROWTH LOSS. i_
FIRST AID- R_qOVE FROM EXPOSURE AREA TO FRESH AIR IMMEDIATELY, IF BREATHING I
HAS STOPPED. GIVE ARTIFICIAL RESPIRATION. IF BREATHING WITH I
DIFFICULTYm GIVE gXYGEN. REMOVE ANY CONTAMIK_TED CLOTHING. DO NOT I
GIVE EPINEPHRINE (ADRENALIN). KEF.J:' AFFECTEJ) PF.RSON WARM _,ND AT _
REST. GET MEDICAL ATTENTION IMMEDIATELY.
SKIN CONTACT:
IRRITANT.
ACUTE EXPOSURE- CONTACT WITH THE LIQUID MAY CAUSE IMMEDIATE IRRITATION AND
REDNESS. THE SUBSTANCE CAN BE ABSORBED TO A MODERATE DEGREE
PRODUCING SYSTEMIC EFFECTS OF DIZZINESS_ H_ADACHE,
INCOORDINATION, AND DROWSINESS.
CHRONIC EXPOSURE- REPEATED FKIN CONTACT MAY PRODUCE A DRY, SCALY, FISSURED
DERMATITIS DUE TO THE DEFATTING PROPERTIES OF THE LIQUID.
SEE ANIMAL MUTAGENIC AND REPRODUCTIVE REFERENCES IN
TOXICITY SECTION.
FIRST AID- REMOVE CONTAMINATED CLOTHING AND SHOES IMMEDIATELY. WASH AFFECTED
AREA WITH SOAP OR MILD DETERGENT AND LARGE AMOUNTS OF WATER UNTIL NO
EVIDENCE OF CHEMICA_ REMAINS (AFTRqXiMATELY 15-20 MINUTES). GET MEDICAL
ATTENTION IMMEDIATELY.
EYE CONTACT:
IRRITANT.
ACUTE EXPOSURE- _:_H VAPO_ CONCENTRAT!0NS (eO0-1000 PPM) MAY CAUSE
I_R!TAT:0N AND REDD_ESS. DIRECT CONTACT OF T_E LIQUID MAY
C_U_ TE!q?35ARY INJURY WITH COMPLETE RECOVERY EXPECTED IN
_3 _CURS. D_RECT AFF'L!CATION T3 T_E EYES 0F F_!TS _A_
C_L'_ED CONJU_CT:V_L _R!TATION_ B_T NO C_E_L _:_E.
CHRONIC EXPOSURE- NO EFFECTS _N_N iN HUMANS.
FIRST AID- WASH EYES I:qMED_ATELY WITH LARGE AMOUNTS CF WATER, OCCASIONALLY
LIFTING THE UPPER AND LOWER LIDS, UNTIL NO EVIDENCE OF ChEMiCAL
REMAINS (APPROXIMATELY 10-20 MINUTES). GET MEDICAL ATTENTION.
INGESTION:
N_RCOTIC.
ACUTE EXF'OSU_E- SYMPTGHS PROGRESS THROUGH HEADACHE, DIZZINESS, NAUSEA,
FAINTING_ RESPIRATORY DEPRESSION, HYPOTENSION, ARRHYTHMIAS,
AND UNCONSCIOUSNESS. LIVER AND KIDNEY DAMAGE MAY OCCUR.
THE ADULT FATAL DOSE IS ESTI:_ATED TO BE 5 ML.
FIRST AID- GET MEDICAL ATTENTION IMMEDIATELY. IF MEDICAL ATTENTION IS NOT
IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE, AND IF VICTIM IS CONSCIOUS, ATTEMPT TO INDUCE
VOMITING BY TOUCHING FINGER TO BACK OF THROAT.
REACTIVITY SECTION
REACTIVITY:
STABLE UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS. REACTS VZu_.ENTLY '..!ITS4ALKALI, EARTH-ALKALINE,
25-37 OR!G_;_L r'i'.L - _"_ i
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!AND WITH VARIOUS RETAL POWDERS. TIlE SUBSTANCE CAN BE HYDROLYZED BY WATER TO
FORM HYDROCHLORIC ACID AND ACETIC ACID. THE SUISTANCE WILL REACT WITH STRON6
CAUSTICSp SUCH AS CAUSTIC SODA OR CAUSTIC POTASH TO FORM FL.RMMABLE OR
EXPLOSIVE MATERIAL, AN INHIBITOR IS REGRJIRED TO PREVENT THE CORROSION OF
METALS.
INCOHPATIBILITIES:
ACETONE • _¢_SE; EXPLOSION.
LZOUID OXYGEN + IGNITION SOURCEs EXPLOSION.
SODIUM-_CTASSIUM ALLOY + LIQUID OXYGEN WITH AN ENERGY SOURCE: EXPLOSION,
STRONG OXIDIZERS= VIOLENT REAC_ @N.
STRONG CAUSTICS= VIOLENT REACTION.
CHEMICALLY ACTIVE METALS (ALUMINUM POWDER, SODIUM, POTASSIUM, MAGNESIUM
POWDER): VIOLENT REACTION.
NATURAL RIJBBER: DECOMPOSES.
SODIUM: SPONTANEOUSLY FL_4PL_BLE COMPOUND FORMED.
SODIUM HYDROXIDE: SPONTANEOUSLY FLAMMABLE COMPOUND FORMED.
NITROGEN TETRAOXIDE: EXPLODES.
DECOMPOSITION:
THE SUBSTANCE WILL DECOMPOSE AT HIGH TEMPERATURES UPON CONTACT WITH HOT METAL
OR UNDER ULTRAVIOLET RADIATION TO PRODUCE TOXIC AND CORROSIVE GASES SUCH AS
. HYDROGEN CHLORIDE, DICHLOROACETYLENE, AND VERY SMALL AMOUNTS CF CHLORINE AND
PHOSGENE.
7.
FOLY_F_IZATION:
_AZ_ _OUS POLYMERIZATION HAS NOT BEEN REPORTED TO OCCUR UNDER NORMAL
TEmPErATURES AN_ PRESSURES.
CONDITION3 TO AV0!D
;'-'Y_'.J'-,N_UT 9CES NOT 13:qiTE READ:LY. CGNT_iNER MAY EXF'L0._- IN h'FAT _r_-FIT-.
_,C'D ULTRAVIDL--T RADIAT'ON. AV0_D 0FEN FLAT_ES, WELD;NO ARCS OR OT:-iE._H'3H
T-._F-RATLJR-" SOURCES, WHICH INDUCE THERMAL DECG_FOS!TIGN OR EXPLOSION. AVOID
A:jTC i3N IT I_N TE_,FERATURE, 537 C.
it
L
SF'ILLS AND LEAKS ',
OCCUF AT iGNAL-SP ILL :
S_UT OFF IGNITION SOURCES. STOP LEAK IF YOU CAN DO IT WITHOUT RISK. FOR SMALL
LIGUID SPILLS, TAKE UP WITH SAND, EARTH OR OTHER ABSORBENT MATERIAL. FOR I
,, LARGER SPILLS, DIKE FAR AHEAD OF SPILL FOR LATER DISPOSAL. NO SMOKING, FLAMES ;
OR FLARES IN HAZARD AREA! KEEP UNNECESSARY PEOPLE AWAY.
b
PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT SECTION
VENTILATION:
PROVIDE LOCAL EXHAUST VENTILATION SYSTEM TO MEET PUBLISHED EXPOSURE LIMITS.
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rRESPIRATOR:
500 PPM- CHEMICAL CARTRIDGE RESPIRATOR WITH AN ORGANIC VAPOR CARTRIDGE,
SUPPLIED-AIR RESPIRATOR,
SELF-CONTAINED _EATHIhlG APPARATUS.
$
10OO PFI'I- SEL.F-CONTAINED BREATHING APPARAI"_ WITH A FULL FACEPIECE
OPERATED IN PRESSURE-DEMAND OR OTHER POSITIVE-PRESSURE MODE,
OR EQUIVILF_NT RESPIRATOR.
ESCAPE- ANY ESCAPE SEt.F-CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS,
FIREFIGHTING- SELF-CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS WITH A FULL FACF-.PIECE
OPERATED IN PRESSURE-DEMAND OR OTHER POSITIVE PRESSURE MODE.
CLOTHING:
EMPLOYEE MUST WEAR APPROPRIATE PROTECTIVE (IMPERVIOUS) CLOTHING AND EOUIPMENT
TO" PREVENT ANY POSSIBILITY OF SKIN CONTACT WITH THIS SUBSTANCE.
GLPVES:
EMPLOYEE MUST WEAR APPROPRIATE PROTECTIVE GLOVES TO PREVENT CONTACT WITH THIS
SUBSTANCE.
EYE PROTECTION:
_ _ EMPLOYEE MUST WEAR SPLASH-PROOF OR DUST-RESiSTANT _AFETY GOGGLES AND A
FACESHIELD TO PREVENT CONTACT WITH THIS SUBSTANCE.
_HE_E THERE IS ANY POSSi_ILiTY THAT AN EMF'LOYEE'S EYES MAY 9E EXPOSED TO
T_IS S_T_NCE, THE EM_'LOYER SHALL F_OViDE AN EYE-WASH FOUNTAIN WITHIN THE
:_MEDI_TE wO_ A_A FOR EMER3ENCY USE.
AUTHC,RIZE_ - F.',Sh'E_ SC."-"NTIFZC
T_E _.=.C'JE I_F_R_AT:CN '5 BEL'_EvEO TO BE _CCU,_ATE A._D REF'REBENTS ThE BEBT
:'<,--::::'"TS3;'J CU-_.:.E:_TLY _v"-IL___LE TO US. _O".'EVE._, WE MA,_:'ENO '_A.=.:F.¢I';TY CF
;-'E._C:mA;;T;I:ILITY OR ANY 0Ti-_ER ;;ARRA,_TY, EXF_'ES._E3 CR I,_F'L:ED, :-;ITH ,_E-3F'ECT TO
_:JCH ;.',;-C_,'_AT'CN,A,_3 _E ASSUME NO LIAgILITY RESULTING F;,_M iTS USE. U_ERS
-2.'-_OL:L_HAKE THEI_ Q_,_NINVESTI3ATIO_S TO DETERS'lINE THE SUiTAbILITY CF TFE
irJ_:O._dAT:,ONFO._ THEIR PARTICULAR PURPOSES.
CREATION DATE: 05/15/B5 REVISION DATE: 07/16/87
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SESSION 3
SUMMARY AND K£Y ISSUES IDENTIFICATION
by
Session 3 Chairman: Richard Tyson
NASA - Code R
27-1
1991006617-464
SESSION 3
i ,
, Sesslo.n3 presentations addressed various chemical and contamination detection 't
methods currently under study, under development, and those used in induz.'xy. In a
general overview of chemical detection, several existing detection devices were shown
along with their specifications and capabilities. Applications of MS/MS technology for
Space Station internal contamination detection was addressed by Teledyne CME. A
presentation on the applications of fiber optics technology for chemical containment
detectors discussed Rarnam scattering, fluorescence-based optrodes, absorbance-based pH
sensors, organochloride optrodes, remote fiber optics spectroscopy, general categories of
fioers, a_,dbending losses and other limitations. Another presentation on particulate
- detection technology discussed optical particle counters, condensation nucleation counters,
- electrical aerosol analyzers, electrostatic precipitators, a cascade impactor, aerodynamic¢.
particle sizers, and a summary of optical, electrical, and mechanical detector methods.
Also, overviews of both the Space Station Freedom life sciences glovebox and mater':als
processing glovebox were given. These presentatio,s touched lightly on glovebox
contamination control systems, potential hazardous materials, and material handling issues
attecting design. A presentati.on on USL chemical hazard remediation addressed the
"" objectives of th_ PMMS, USL chemical storage, USL chemical handling, USL chemical
isolation, USL waste h,',.ndlingrequirements, r,otentially hazardous operations in the USL,
hazard remediason approach, criteria for USL experiment ma,e,rials screening, development
of USL material classification and waste remedi3tion techniques, PMMS approach to
_ ha,:diing hazardous chemicals, rack-level waste handling methodology, and personal ,
protective equipment. A presentation on the _afety practices of ground-based electronic 1
crystal growth discussed considerations in selection of facility, equipment, and personnel. !
t
Facilir,' safety, equipment safety, _rsonnel protection, and training were also addressed in
: this presentation. A presentation aadressing the importance of biological systems in
treatment discussed treatment methods for toxic chemicals in water, soil, sediment, and
• . sludge. Among the methods discussed we_'e: microbi_.lreduction of metals, bacterial
reduction of m_tals, sulfate redt,ction, solubility of metal :,!tides, and filtration methods. :
A presentauo_ on exhaust gas conditioning equipmentand technology addressed issues of *"
growing concerns, causes of fires at semiconductor plants, ant' central conditioning
methods and equipment. The last presev.tation in Session 3 discussed reactive bed plasma
systems for contamination control. This method addressed phosgene decomposition,
benze'ae decomposition, and aerosol removal mechanisms.
I
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1. Combining all wastes into one pipeline or tank is a concept thathas been abandoned on
' the ground. Ground systems similar to me needs of Space Station Freedom use
dedicated treatment and processing at each facility location. Combining wastes may
create _,o muchof anexplosion potenual.
2. Development of a hazardous materials classification system that astronauts can quickly
and easily use in emergency situations needs to be implemented early in the Space
Stationprogram.
3. Applying biological systems for combating waste treatment in the _pace Station
modules s ,,'ned to be a new idea for many of the attendees. Comments suggested that
this method be investigated for applic,_tionto the Station.
4. The Space Station Program shoLdd fully utilize existing technology and where no
existing technology meets all the requirements, new technology should be develeped
and men shared with the ground-basedindustrialand scientific communities.
/-
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This presentation is a brief overview of some potentially useful
analytical techniques currently available for the investigation
of gas phase contaminates in ambient air. I would like to
acknowledge my supervisor, Ted Galen and our technical monitor,
Duane Pierson who both assisted in making this presentation
= possible.
l The scope of this presentation includes a brief overview of someof the analyticai techniques currently used in monitoring and
analyzing permanent gases and selected volatile organic compounds
in air. Sampling techniques and the exact analytical methods
used to identify an¢ quantitate specific compounds are not
included in the presentation. Further, I need to state that
this presentation is not an endorsement of any of the hardware or
systems mentioned for any project applications.
This is a basic outline of what I will discuss. First, I will
discuss some of the analytical ccnsideratio_s in developing a
specific _thod. Next, I will discuss four broad groups of
hardware are: compoun_ class specific personal _oi'itors, _as
chromatographic systems, ,nfrared spectroscopic systems, and mass
spectrometric residual gas analyzer systems. Unaer the group
of personal monitors, I will discuss three types cf detectors:
(A) catalytic sensor based systems, (B) Photoionization
detectors, (C) wet or fry chemical reagent systems. Under gas
chrcm_tograph based systems I will cover five detector systems
used in combination with a GC: (A) thermal conductivity
detectors, (B) photoionizatlon detectors, (C) fourier transform
infra-red spectrophotometric systems, (D) quadrapole, mass
spectrometric systems and (E) a relatively recent development- a
surface acoustic wave vapor detector.
I would like to begin with a brief outline of some basic
analytical considerations in developing a method for a specific
application. First, the analytical problem should be as well
d_fined as possible us_._q the information and data available_
The need for qualitative information may require the exact,
stereo_pec_.fic identification each species, or the need may only !
require a general classification (such as halocarbons and
alcohols). The expected levels of the species _o be monitored
28-I
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will influence the instrument sensitivity and range required.
The system should prod_c_ u&_£ul information in time to respond
to significant changes in the species monitored. The method of
standardization and quality assurance will vary with the i :
analytical svste_ and the requir_ level of precision. The basic
an lyrical requirements of the problem guides the selection of
s_ table types of methods. The selection of suitable methods
narrows the selection specific hardware and procedures. The
actual testing of the hardware selected should produce _',fficient
data to make comparisonq between ¢ _idate systems. Following
some iterative testing and modir_c; _ion, the precision and
accuracy of the final prototype is cdrefully estimated. The
amount of operator training required usually is dependent on the
level of automation of the system.
This is a list of twelve criterion usually included in the
selection of suitable types of methods: the reported detection
limits and dynamic range, the samples needed and type of inlet
used, the overall speed of analysis, the ruggedness and
resistance to vibration, the reported accuracy, the interference
from other s_,ple components, the predictability of performance
of the system, the training required, the physical dimensions and
: power needed to operate the system, the other utilities needed
(such as vacuum), and the potential hazards in operating the
system.
This is a photo of a personal monitor which contains four
separate sensors for carbon monoxide, explosive gases, hydrogen
sulfide _nd molocular oxygen. The unit has a digital read-out
and it can De used with a data logger.
This is the same monitor with the protective cover removed from
over the sensors. The sensor which responds to volatile organics
is a c_talytic, pelli_tor type sensor and, the CO, H2S and 02
sensors are electrochemical type sensors, i
This is a summary of some of the important characteristics of the
multi-sensor, personal monitor. The overall dimensions of the
monitor unit are 2.3 inches by 4 by 9 inches and it weighs
approximately 3 pounds. The unit depicted above is designed to
respond to the three permanent gases and c_talytically oxidizable
organics. The response range of the above unit is _0' to 500 ppm
for carbon monoxide. The unit is powered by alkaline batteries.
Some of the limitations of may include: short battery charge
life, single point calibration for a specific compound with the
assumption that the response is linear over the full range, and
the sensitivity and selectivity of the sensors is dependent on
the red-ox potential of compounds reaching the sensors. The
response of each sen_or is calibrated against one or more gas
phase standards. The estimated run to run precision is about 5 %
of the reading. One advantage of having these monitors present is
that response is immediate to any change in the levels of the
target compounds.
28-2
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This is a prototype total hydrocarbon monitor designed for us to
demonstrate the possibilities of size r_duction for personal
monitors. The unit is literally shirt pocket - size, it has a
digital display range in hundredths of ppms and it could be
fabricated w_th a tnceshold alarm.
The unit dimensions _re 1.5 by 2.5 by 3.75 inches.
The weight of this unit is much less than a pound.
The semiconductor sensor responds to oxidizable organics.
The response range to is from about O.l to 1000 ppm for many
organics.
The monitor is powered by an alkallne battery.
Limitations of particular interest are slmilar to the previous
unit in that the response is depei_dent on the organic compounds
present in the air _nd on the partial pressur_ of o_,gen.
The response time is less than a minute.
_ The system is calibrated with a single point external standard.
The level of precision or repeatability is about 2% of the
reading.
This unit is based on a photoionization detector. When the
• compound of interest passes into the detector cell, it absorbs a
quanta of energy _hv' emitted by the UV source and the compound
is ionized. The cations are collect_d at an el_ctrode surface
producing a measurable signal.
The dimensions are 5 by 9 by 6 inches.
The weight of the unit is 5 pounds.
The unit responds to species with photoionization potentials
below _he energy of the lamp (around 10eV) and some exceptions
above this limit.
The digital display range is from 1 to 2000ppm.
The monitor is powered by a 12V battery.
Limitations of particular interest are the low selectivity a,_
the variable sensitivity to the _arious volatile organics.
'the response time is sufficiently fast to allow this type of
detector to be usedwith cap_llary gas chromatography.
The system is calibrated with a single, _olatile organic
standard.
The ]eve] of precision or repeatability _- reported _s around 2%
of the reading from run to run.
This is a wet or dry chemical reagent tubt_ system for monitoring
various individual compounds. The syst_m consists of a hand
operated sample _ump used to draw _n air sample through
disposable glass tubes containing the chemical reagents and
indicators.
The weight of the pump plus several disposable tubes is about 2
pounds.
There are ove_ 300 different reagent tubes available to measure
various permanent gases and volatile organic compounds.
The reported response range to benzene is from 2 to 60ppm.
28-?
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The _ump is hand operated. I
Limitations of particular interest are the training requlred for
interpreting the indicator changes, and the disposal o£ the used :,
reagent tubes.
The response time varies _=om i to 5 minutes for various tubes. ._
._ The tube respons_ ma_ be calibrated by a duplicate run of an
external standard.
: The level of precision or repeacability of We benzene tubes is
reported am plus or minus lppm for a 5ppm reading.
_he next broad group of analytlcal 8y_;_ems is based on the gas
chromatographic separation of the co_pounds of interest prior to
detection by one or more devices.
This is a photograph of a portable, dual column, dual detector
gas chromatograph manufactured for environmental applications.
The temperatures of _he individual column_ are controlled
independently. The columns have different stationary phases and
are about 10 meters in length. The chromatograms are typically 2
minutes long. The detectors are both micro chip sized thermal
conduct:.vity detectors. The response of the detectors can be
transferred to a separate integrator and the data can then be
down loaded to a _lap-top' personal computer.
This is a view of the internal pack_gin_ of the unit sho._ing the
two indivl_ually insulatt_d columns with the chip size d_tectorso
The dimensions of the MTI GC are 6" by i0" by 14".
The unit weighs only 5 pounds:
The miniaturo therm_! uonductivity detectors _espond to most
permanent gasem ,nd volatile organic compounds.
The detector response range is reported as from ippm and
extending to 6 orders of magnit_2de.
The unit requires a helium carrier source, 120Vat power, and some
type of recording device. !
Limitations of partlcular interest are: shor_ columns have
limited _peak ca_a¢_ity', compound identification is ba_ed on
_etention time, the need for an additional, very fast recording
device or !rtegration device and the d_ector sensitivity does
not _xtend below the ppm level.
The _verage chromatogram for simple mixtures _s less than 5
minutQs long. ..-
The system i_ calibrated using on_ or more external standards. _
The chromatographic repeatability has been reported as better
than 5% fzom run to run.
Here is another _cmmerc_ally availabl_, portable _as
chromatogra_nlc system. Th_s unit is now available with
capillary columns and temperature control. The unit _so
contains an integrator capable of making concen_-ation
calculations based _n an external standard runs savwd _n memory
a_d ar_ continuously updated. The unit can be operated remotely
through a m.odem and it contains an internal reservoir for the |
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carrier gas. The uni_ is avallable with a photoionization
detector only at this time.
This is a view of internal configuration of the unit showing the
column area. This particular unit is one of the older models
without temperature control.
• J
: This unit'_ overall measurements are 18" by 13" by 6".
The entire system weighs 26 pounds.
The detector responds to most volatile organic compounds.
The response range is reported as 0.1ppb to over 100ppm.
The system requires high purity air to replenish the internal
pressurized reservoir and operates from a rechargeable 12V
battery.
Limitations of particular interest of this version are the
ambient temperature column, limited _peak capacity' of the short
column, and the variable retention times resulting from no
independent temperature control.
The average run is about 10 minutes for simple mixtures.
The system is calibrated usin_ an internal pressurized container
of an external standard gas mixture.
The chromatographic repeatability is better than 5% run to run.
Here is a photograph of a laboratory model of a saquentia!, gas
chromatograph, Fourier t_ansform infrared spectrophotometer,
qu_drapo!e mass spectrometer with the dual computer operating
system, This system is capable of generating a tremendcus amount
of analytical data from a single sample. The FTIR and mass spec.
data comp]ement one another in that the infrared spectra can be
u_ed to distinguish between certain isomers of the same compound
and supply additional structural data the mass spectra may not !
supply. Notice the relatively small size of the FTIR component J
of the system: which may su¢;gest the possibility of a _ortable;
GC/FTIR unit the future. I
The FTIR component dimensions are 12" by i0" by 26". i
The weight of the FTIR unlt is 55 pounds. 1
The unit responds to infrared absorbing species and produces mass
s_ec_l data to any species eluting off the column.
The _TIR response range is from ppb to above 100ppm and is
approximately one to two orders of magnitude less sensitive than
the mass spectrometer, i
The sys _m r_auir_s liquid nitrogen for the T_ cell, Re carria,:
gas and _perates u£f 120Vac.
One limitation _f interest is the tremend _ amount of computer
memory spa ze required for a single GC run.
The average run tim_ for a sample of moderate complexity As 45
minutes.
The system i_ calibrated by external standard, internal standard
or standard add_:ior methods depending on the application.
The level of chromatographic repeatability is about 5% from run
to run and depends on the conditions used.
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Another interesting system is this combined_ gas chromatograph, *i
quadrapole mass spectrometer system. In this case the recently ,
developed version of the mads spectrometer has aI_ extremely small
footprint. The netal bo_ contains the ion source, the quadrapol¢ :_
flight tube and all the electronics boards.
The mass spectrometer dimensions are roughly 12 _ 0y 8" by 26"
The weight of MS without the pump and other hardware is about 48
pounds.
The system responds to any permanent gas or volatile organic
which can b_ eluted of the colu_m.
The system can be used to detect sample components from ppt to
about 100ppm.
The system requires mechanical roughing vacuum for the oil
diffusion pump, high purity helium carrier gas and 120V_c power.
Two of the limita_lons are _he peak capacity of selected
capillary column &nd the nearly indistinguishable mass spectra
produced from so_e isomers.
The average _:n time under certain conditions is 45 minutes.
The system is often calibrated using external standards for
_ quantitative determinations.
The 1_vel of chromatographic precision is 5% for some
applications.
Another recently developed type of GC detector in_ended for
ambient air monitoring is the surface acoustical wav_: vapor
sensor. One commercially available unit is now being developed
for production _hich include_ a packed column gas unrom_tograph
and u&es ambient air as the carrier gas. The dimensions_ of th_
unit are reported by the manufacturer as 12" by i0" by 5". The
unit weighs 15 pouy:us. The detector can be custom designed to be
sensitive to a broad group of volatile organics commonly found in _
environmental _ir. The response range is reported as ppb to ppm.
The 1_nit mat be run ,ff a rechargeable gell cell battery. One of
the reported limitatiuns is that the pre_ent sensor too slow for
capillarf columns. The average cbromatogram is 5 min. long_
The third group of monitors is based on infra-red
spectrophotometry. This is a portable, commercially availabl,_
dispersive IR unit desi_md for en,ironmental applications.
The dimensions of this unit are 28" by 9" by 11".
The weight of this unit is 30 po_:nds which m_kes it very
difficult to carry for any length of timo. i
The system responds in a ucanning mode or _ixed _requency mode to
/ species in the _ mpied air which absorb n the IR _egion °r m 650
to 4000 cm-l.
The response range to benzene is reporte_ as 2.2 to 50ppm. ,
The monitor is powered by a rechargeable NiCd battery.
_imitations of particular interest are the _hort battery charge
life, the sensitivity co_pounds _uch as benzene and th_ loss of
selectivity for _pecific com_uunds in complex mixtures often
found in air sample_;.
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The response time is less than a minute in fixed frequency mode.
The system as calibrated with an external standard gas mixture.
The level of repeatability is reported as abou_ _5% from run to
run.
The forth and final group of analytical systems that I will
briefly discuss is based on small quadrapole mass spectrometers
with some type of speciallzed inlet system other than a gas
chromatograph. One approach to the sample inlet problem has
_ucently been published in Analytical Chemistry by Scott A.
McLuckey and _is colleagues at the Oak Ridge _ :onal Laboratory
wheze they reported an estimated limit of dete_tion of 1.4 ppt
for head-space vapor over solid TNT using their atmospheric
sampling glow discharge ionization source.
TL%s is a photograph of a commercially available, quadra_:_le
residual gas analyzer system. This particular unit is useQ by
the toxicology laboratory a JSC as vacuum measuring device. The
unit is part of a vacuum oven system use to evacuate and clean
air sample cylinders and stainless steel chambers used to perform
materials out-gassing measurements. The ion source and flight
tube are located in this area of the vacuum system. The system
is m_intained at approximately 10 to the minus 7 torr by a turbo
pump backed by a mechanical roughing pump. The co_ trol _nd
acquisition electronics are located in this module with digital
display of sever31 mass channels for N2 and CO, 02, et cetera.
The mass range of this quadrapole is to 65 amu. The unit is
remotely operated and data is down-loaded to a personal computer.
In this application, the mass spectrometer is used to measure
extremely low levels of permanent gases and trace contaminants by
single mass assignments of these compounus and simpie ion
patterns of isotopic abundances. Other commercially available
systems have been used with ambient pressure, dJffere.,tially
pumped iDlet_ to monitor air contaminants.
This presentaticn is by no means an exhaustive listing of the
wide variety of methods and hardware avaiiable for monitoring and
analyzing volatile organic compounds in air. The adaptation of
existing analytical systems to monitor s_cecraft breathing
environment h_, some obvious advantages for saving time and
resources in hardware development. The engineering and safety
constraints should be coordinated with the analytical
c_nb_de_atio_,s in the selection and modification of candidate
_ardware. Iter_ive testing and evaluation of the analytical
perfor_anca o£ e_cl candida_ system during development would
aid achieving the _st result_
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"Particulate Detection Tecnnology"
Robert Caldow, Applications Engineer
TS[, Incorporated, St. Paul, MN
For presentation at:
Space Station Toxic and Reactive Materials Handling
Workshop, 11129/88 - 1211188, Huntsville, Alabama.
ABSTRACT
> This talk will cover an overview of the major types of
particulate cunteminatlon detection and monitoring
instruments av&ilable which would be useful In a space
station e_vironment. The In_ ruments can be grouped
according to measurement method. These methods consist of
optical, electrical and mechanical. The o?tlca instruments
which wil I be discussed are the Condensation Nuc leus Counter
" (CNC), and the Laser Particle Counter (LPC). E ectrical
instruments include the Differential Mobility Analyzer
(DMA), and Electrical Aerosol Analyzer (EAA). Mechanical
instruments include the AErodynamic Particle Sizer (APS),
the Diffusion Battery, and the Impactor.
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Outline
I. Opqcal Methods
a. Optical Particle Counter
b. Condensation Nucleus Counter
?
2. Electrical Methods
a. Electrical Aerosol Analyzer
b. Differential Mobility Analyzer
c. ElectroStatic Precipitator
3. Mechanical Methods
a. Cascade Impactor
b. Diffusion Battery
c. Aerodynamic Particle Sizer
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Optical Method Summary •
; Advantage Disadvantage
very fast, inexpensive may not be accurate for
versatile, compact, non-spherical particles,
lightweight, coincidence problems.
OPC high flow, multimode, unstable, short life.
LPC compact, very stable, lower power, single-mode.
rugged°
_ very high sensitivity, no sizing capabilky, uses
a working fluid.|
i
¢
i
J
31-12 i
1991006617-531
• °
I
I
i
Electrical Method Summary •
Advantage Disadvantage
can collect sample, long samp!ing time, large,
very ruggcd, versatile, heavy, high power
consumption.
EAA rugged, short sample large, heavy, requires
time, self-contained, error correctior..
. DMPS versatile, accurate, large, heavy, requires
: very high resolution, particle sensor, hard
to set up, slow sample
time.
EP collects representative no sizing capabilities.
sample, sin2 contained.
i
!
J
r
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I
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MechaaicafL Method Summary
J
Advant_.:ge Disadvantage
uses aerodynamic
properties.
.x
CI very rugged, collects very labor intensive,
sample, steep size cut: slow response time, hard
compact, to sample very small
; particles.
I313 very rugged, compact, slow resporse, requires
measures to CNC limits, a CNC or counter, requires
data reduction.
APS very fast response, expensive, less rugged,
steep size cut-off, very measures only low
high resolution, concentrations.
computerized,
repeatable.
|
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Maria Junge
Lockheed Missdes and Space Company
O/53-13, B/580
P _ Rn_ ."4R(34
.,unnyvale, CA 94088-3504
#,.408)756-5644
Workstations and Gloveboxes for Space Station
Lockheed Mis_iles and Space Company is responsible fo_designing,
developing, and buhding the Life Sciences Glovebox, the Laboratory Sciences
Workbench, and the Maintenance Workstation plus 16 other pieces of
equipment for thP U.S. Laboratory Module of the Space Station Freedom. The
Laboratory Sciences Workbench and the Maintenance Workstation have been
functionallycombined into a double structure to save weight and volume ,,'hich
are importantcommodities on the Space Station Freedom. The total volume of
these items is appro×imately180 cubic feet. These workstationsand thp
_ glovebox will be delivered to NASA in 1994 and will be launched in 1995. The
requirement for all equipment on board the Space Station Freedom to have a
very long lifetime of 30 years presents numerous technical challenges in the
areas of design and reliability. The equipment must be easy to use by
international crew members and also easy to maintain on-orbit. For example,
seals must be capable of on-orbit changeout and reverification. The stringent
contamination requirements established for Space Station Freedom equipment
also complicate the zero gravity glovebox design. The current contamination
control system for the LJfeSciences Glovebox and the Maintenance Workstation
will be presented. The requirement for the Ufe Sciences Glovebox to safely
contain toxic, reactive, and ra_.._active materials presents unique challenges.
Trade studies, CAD simulation techniques and design ,'hallenges will be
discussed to illustrate the current baseline conceptual designs. Areas which
need input from the user co_,munity will be identified.
J
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Summary of Presentation Entitled :
The Materials Processing Sciences Glove0ox
Date of Presentation: 10:55 am, 12/1/88
Presenter: Larry Traweek
Summary:
The Materials Processing Scienc_ _ _jvebox is a rack mounted workstation
which allows on orbit sample preparation and cl" racterization of specimens
from various e,,periment facilities. It provides an isolated safe, clean and
sterile environment for the crew merrL,er to work with pott_[:fially hazardous
I !1 .I
materiai_. It 'Has-to x_lu_e a la[lge of chemicai_ ......u[oauer man e yen FMMS.
The theme of ,he presentation is that The' Space Station Laboratory
Experimen 'reparation and Characterization Operations Provide
The Fundamental Giovebox Design Cha_'acteristics. The
presentation discusses Glovebox subsystem concepts and how internal
material handling operations _,ffect the design.
Current Estimated Cost: $5M
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DONALD E. STAFFORD
Principal
Comp!iance Consulting Services
Scott_dale, Arizona
Don is the founder and principal engineer of this service
dedicated to assisting businesses, large or small, in meeting
the demands of numerous local, state, and federal regulations
pertaining to safety, health, and environmental issues.
Don receiv_ his BS in _.igineering at Arizona State
University and has over twenty years of experience with the
design and construction of semiconductor facilities and
process equipment. A major effort at Motorola in the project
management of a new GaAs crystal growth business followed by
a major contribution in establishing a GaAs epitaxy business
for Epitronics lead to a heavy involvement in hazardous
materials issue"
Speakor and participant at numeL-ous SEMI seminars on
hazardous materials as well as participation with the
Institute of Environmental Science and American _ tectronics
Association.
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SAFETY PRACTICES
o KEY CONSIDERATIONS
* FACILITY SELECTION
* EQUIPMENT SELECTION
* PERSONNEL SELECTION AND TRAINING
O. DESIGN F_R SAFETY
* FACILITY
* FQUIPMENT
* PERSONNEL PROTECTION
o TRAINING
!
* FACILITIES OPERATION
J
* EQUIPMENT OPERATION j
* EMPLOYEE SAFETY
i
i
O SUMMARY - Q&A 1
4'
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GROUND BASED ELECTRONIC CRYSTAL GROWTH
SAFE _"/ PRACTICES
A. FACILITY SELECTION
I. ASSESS HAZARDS PARAMETERS
o TOXICITY
o QUANTITY
o SITE LOCATION
2. DEDICATE SPACE AND SERVICES
3. COMPARTMENTALIZE
o SMALLEST CUBIC FOCT OF SPACE REQUIRED FOR PROCESS
o MINIMIZE POSSIBLE CLEANUP AREA
i
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GRuuNu BA_D I_LWCTRONIC CRYSTAL GROWTH
SAFETY PRACTICES
B. EQUIPMENT SELECTION
i. IDENTIFY POSSIBILITIES FOR A CATASTROPHE
o PRESENCE OF TOXIC SOLIDS OR GASES
o FIRE POTENTIAL
o CHEMICAL CONTAINMENT
2. DESIGN "IN" SAFETY FEATURES VS. ADD-AS-YOU-GO
3. EVALUATE VENDORS KNOWLEDGE OF HAZARDS
t
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GROUND BA_D IL_"EK_j_w_ _Z_T.UJ _uw_n
SAFETY PR.%CTICF_
C. PERSONNEL SELECTION AND TRAINING
i. ESTABLISH BASELINE MEDICAL RECCRDS
o HEAVY METALS BASELINE
o PULMONARY FUNCTIONS BASELINE
2. HAZARDS TRAINING
o CLASSROOM BEFORE PRODUCTION AREA
o EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
o OSHA RIGHT-TO-KNOW
o SPECIAL NOTES ON HANDLING HAZMAT
!
J
35-5
1991006617-593
GROUND BASED ELECTRONIC CRYS_'Ar. GRO.WTE
SAFETY PRACTICES
D. FACILITY SAFETY
i. FIRE PROTECTION
- 2. DETECTORS
o SMOKE
o TOXIC GAS
o COMBUSTIBLE GAS
3. CENTRAL AL%RM CENTER
o MONITOR FIRE SYSTEM
o MONITOR DETECTORS
o EVACUATION ALARM !
o 24-HOUR MONITORING, ON OR OFF-SITE
i:
4. CONTAMINATION SURVEILLANCE i_
o WIPE SAMPLES
o GAS/VAPOP DETECTOR PU_PS
i
I
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GROUND B_ "_ _LECTRONIC CRYSTAL GROWTH
_'ETY PRACTICES
E. EQUIPMSBf _AFETY
i. DESIGN FOR SAFE OPERATION AND SHUTDOWN
o REMOTE MONITORS OF CRITICAL PARAMETERS
o REMOTE SHUTDOWN AT CENTRAL ALARM CENTER
2. DESIGN FOR CONTAINMENT OF TOXIC MATERIAL
o HIGH VELOCITY EXHAUST HOODS
o EXTENSIVE USE OF GLOVE BOX APPARATUS
O NEGATE NEZD FOR FULL-TIME RESPIPATORS
3. DESIGN FOR EXPEDIENT CLEANUP
o ISOLATE AREA/EQUIPMENT
o EASY BREAKDOWN OF EQUIPMENT
j _
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F. PERSONNEL PROTECTXON
i. PROTECTIVE CLOTHING
o DUAL D3EAGE-CLEANROON AND HAZMAT PROTECTION
, o CONSTDER DISPOSABLF GARMENTS, GLCVES
2. RESPIPATORY PROTE "ION (OSHA 1910.13_)
o ROUTINE DUTIES VS, NON-ROUTINE DUTIES
o AIR SUPPLIED VS. CHEMICAL CARTRIDGE
o MASK MUST BE FIT_O TO THE INDIVIDUAL
o MEDICLL SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
o REQUIRES WRITTEN PROCEDURES
4m
3. EYE/FACE PROTECTIOn! !'
I
o CHEMICAL SPLASH
o FRAGMENTS
,|t
4. SPECIAL PROTECTION |
o HAZARDOUS MATERIAL CLEANUP _,
o MAJOR _ACILITY MODIFICATIONS i
t
I"
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tI
GROUND B_.SED El CTRONIC CR_STAL C._W_i1_
SAFETY PRACTICES
G. TRAINING
!_ FACILITIES OPERATIONS
c REVIEW WRITTEN PROCEDURES
o HAZARDOUS MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
: 0 EM_GENCY RESPONSE
2. EQUIPMENT OPERATIONS
o COMMUNICATE CHANGES
o REV-EW WRITTEN PROCEDURES
• l
3. EMPLOYEE SAFETY
o SCHEDULED SAFETY MEETINGS "
o SEEK _MPLOYEE INPUTS
o CONTINUAL REVIEW OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS I
. !
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IMPORTANCE OF BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS IN INDUSTRIAL WASTE TREATMENT
POTENTIAL APPLIC'TION TO THE SP_E STATION
I
NATHANIEL REVIS AND GEORGE HOLDSWORTH
O_K RIDGE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
OAK RIDGE, TN !.
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INTRODUCTION
Hazardous chemicals in the environment are a global concern and in
recent years this subject has received considerable a_ention. The
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) (Hirschhorn et al.
1983) esti,nates that the cos.s for cleaning up existing sites
containing hazardous chemicals could range from 80 to 300 billion
dollars using conventional technology. These p-o jetted costs have
stimulated several federal agencies to support research into
the develooment of less e_pengive methods for treating hazardous
chemicals. In recent years, with the s,Lpport of th_ Federal
Government, several such technologies have b_en developed_ includi_Ig
incineration and vitrification. Although these technologies are
"t
effective in treating hazardous waste they are expensive.
!
An addltional technology which is currently being d_-veloped is the j
!
u_e o.= nicrobial systems for the degradation and/or immobilization of t
hazardous waste. Thit latter technology has been shown to be effective
in the treatment of some hazardous chemicals at costs that are less
than conwvntlor.al technologies.
t
i
Microbial degradation of waste is perhaps one of the oldest waste
t
management system known to man. This system has been used for i
36-2
1991006617-599
centu;les to treat human waste (e.g., si_age). In fact, th_ majority
of organic waste products, both natural and synthetic, are probable
degraded by microorganisms (Alexander, 1981). Since many hazardous
organics ar_ related chemically to naturally occurring ch_icc'_ it is
not .urprising tha_ microorganl_me capable of degrading hazardous
organic chemicals have been isolated from the environment (Cook et al.,
1983; Ahmed and Focht, 1973; Fedorak and Weitlake, 198_; Johnson and
Talbot, 1983). Microorganisms capable of immobilizing hazardous
chemicals through biological processes which facilitate adsorption,
absorption and/or conve_io_ of the chemicals have also been identified
in the environment (_evls et al., 1988; Postgate, 19B_).
Although several microorganisms isolated from the environment have
been sho_n to (_grade and/or immobilize hazardous chemicals the ra_s
at which some chemicals are degraded and immobilized is very slow. _or
example, Brown et al. (1988) estimates that it would take appro_imatel./ i
300 years 1'or microbial s_-tems in the sediment from the Hudson River
to completely dechlorinate existing concentrations of polychlorinat_d
biphenyls (PCBs). Such slow rates aould reduce the cost advantages of
industrial application of microbial systems.
In an attempt to increase the rates of microbial degradation of
organic chemicals, several investigators are exploring biochemicals
pathways in microorgQnisms capable of degrading the organics (albeit at
i
slow rates) with the hope of amplifying these pathways through genetics
engineering. Since many of the degrading pathways require enzymes to
J
metaboiize the organics scientists are investigating methods for
* 36-3 !
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increaling the rate of lynthesii of the degrading enzymes. _ a r=c_nt
, study Rojo et al. (1988) engineerid a Pseudomona_ species capable of
degrading chloro- and methylaromatics. Thls organismm prior to genetic
engineering_ was only capable of degrading chloroaromatici at
relatively =low ratmi. Howeverp aftIr _ngineeringp this strain the
bacteri_ _as capable of degrading both the chloro and me_hylaromatlcs
at _ignicantly increaied rates. ThuI_ genetic engineering may provide
a method for increasing the _e at which microorganisms degrade
hazardous organics. Beca_4e microbial _,stems used in waste treatment
are generally lesq exp=nsl,a than the conventional chemical and
physical methodsp furth=r d-vel_oment of engineered organisms may prove
to be the method o_ choice /or treating hazardous chemicals in the
environment.
In addition to having applications for _aste management issues on
planet earthj microbial systems may have application in reducing waste
volumes aboard space craft. A candidate for such an application is the t$
space station. The National Aeronautics and Spat-- Administration plans
to launch a space station by the year 2000. The station will serve to
support the space research efforts of _he United States and several
western counties. Many of the planned experiments will generate
aqueous waite. Beca,.ie of space and weight limitations in the space
station a need exists forI l) minimizing the amount of aqueous waste
generatedw 2) reclycling of air and 3) recycling water. To recycle
air and water the contdminants from previous experiments must be
#
removed before the air and water can be used for other experiments.
This goal may De achieved using microorganisms in a bioreactor.
36 -4 "
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Contaminants in the air and water may b_ r_moved via degradation, :'
' adsorptlon_ absorption and/or precipitation by microorganisms. The
microorganisms and contaminants are then both
removed from the aqueous phase usln_ ultra filtration. The air and
water are recycled and the sludge is solidlfiIKl by heating. It is of
interest to note that water vapor from the hoate_ sli:dge can also be
collected if the contaminants in the sludge do not volatilize.
Potential Bioreactors for the Soace Station
a) Inorganics
_ Described in Table 1 is a list of potential contaminants that may be
found in air and aqueous waste generated from experiments planned for
the space station. For the inorganics, several microbial systems have _
been shown to be effective in precipitating metals from solution.
f
These metals include mmrcury, silver, cadmium, nickel copper, iron, and {
aluminum. However syst_s have not been identifled_ to the author's
knowledge that precipitate gallium, t_llurium, germanium, niobium, and
7"
indium. For arsenic, beryllium, silicon, and tungsten, microbial
_. systems have been identified which adsorb and/or abs_ "hese metals.
-,=
b) Organics ,
j,
Several microbial systems have shown to degrade the organics t
?
methanol, ethanol, acetone, benzene, trichloroethylene, xylene, and
toluene (Table I). Systems can also absorb and/or absorb the organics
1991006617-602
Idimethyl sulfoxide, acetonitrile, trichloro_hylene, carbon
tetrachloride and sodium azlde. To the auttors know,ledge microbial
systems which degrade the organics glutaraldehyde,
chlorodifluoromethane, _richlorotrifloroeti_an_ and methyl _thyl ketone |
remain to be reported. Howeve:- based on reports in the literature
which describe microbes which can degrade chloroorganlcs_ it
is likely tha_ mlcrobes will eventually be fgund that can degrmde
chloro and fluoro compounds.
c) Etchants
A sulfate-reducing bacterium that m_tabolizes nitric and sulfuric
acid to nitrogen _nd _ulflde, respectively, would be an appropriate
microbial system for r_ducing the levels of these acids in the aqueou_
waste. Furthermore, sulfuric acid could be used as a sulfate source in
a bioreactor designed for the precipitation of metals through the i
formation of metal sulfides.
!
It is thus possible to r_duce the concentration of _any o_ the
contaminants shoNn in Table 1 using microorganisms in a bioreac_or.
i
The microbial systemt identified above for the organics, Inorganics and
}
etchants include both aerobes and anaerobes. Thus it m_y be necessary
to maintain two bloreactors (e.g. an aerobic and anaerobic r_actor).
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RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS i_
5ulfate-reduci_9 bacteria reduce sulfate to sulfide under anaerobic
conditions and in this process they derive energy. The sulfld¢ is
release from the _acteria as hydrogen sulfide (Figuru I). Follow;nq
the displacement of hydrogen the sulfide will react with a variety of
metals to give a metal sulfide. Since metal sulfides are relativel,
insoluble (Table 2) in aqueous solution they precipi_;ate and the metals
can be recovered through ultra filtration of the solution.
These bacteria will gruw in lolutlon ¢ontalning metals at
?
¢oncentrationb ranging from 0 _o 10,000 _pm. An example o_ the effect
of sulfate-reducing bacteria on metals is shown in Tai_l_ 3. _n this
i
experiment bacteria were added to a solution containing sulfate, lead,
cadmiun, mer=ury, nickel, copper, and zinc. Aft¢7 incubation a_ 32 oC
for 1_ h., the mixture was filtered and analyzed f_r th_ above metals.
As shown, the f_tratlon process reduced the concentration of all of
the added _etals. That these metals were not filterable suggests that
.
they are in the sulfide form. Thus, metals which form Netal sulfides
are potential candidatee for treatment with _he sulfate-reduc;ng
bacteria. Since the metals gallium, tellurium, germanium, tantalum and
indium can exist in the sulfide Form they would be candida_.es for
sulfide precipitation by sulfate-reducing bacteria. However i
experih_ents wo.ld be necessary to ronfirm this suggestion.
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Su_f=_s-re icing bacterl _ have ali_o b_en associa _d with thei i
m
degradation o ethanol, methanGl, _etone and toluene (Postgate, 19_).
The degradation of these organics appear to occur when sulfate l_vels
L"
in the mt_dlum is low_ The ra_es of .radati_n for tnese organics
remains to be determined. Thus experiments _uld be _ecessary to
determine the degradation rate and whether this bacteria ca, degrade : F
some oI" the other organics sho_n in Taole I. _i __
: For the r_moval of metals from solution, an aerobic bacteria has
receT tly b_en Identified which will reduce ionic me_ _I_ to the
e)ems_ C_l form. Tnls bacteria has been shown to reduce mercury,
silver, selenium, copper, lead, gold, platinum, and cadmium tr, the
elemental form (Figure 2). Results from experimenta showing the _mF
effects of this bacteria on the above metals _rt shown in Table 6. The
|-
above metals in the chloride form (except for selenium _ich addec as
N_ SeO=) were added to medium containing the bacteria Psue_edomon_s
!
l
maltiohiL_ (02) and incubated at 3E °C for 1_ h.. After incubation,
the samples were fl!_sred through an 0.;5 u filter and the filtrate _as
analyzed "or the above metals. As shown, the solublu c_._centration
of mr3t of these metals were reduced by lO-fold. This bacteri_Jm _as
also _en used "o treat photographic fixer waste with results sho_ing
that silver in the fixer could be reduced to 0 005 ppm (the)nitial
silver concentration was iO,O00 ppm). The _ac_erium has been sho_n to
grow cn _ither methanol and eth3nol alone, which suggests that i_ (_n
degrade these org;anics.
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SeveTat microbial systems have been investigated that reduce the
solubility of i,,organics in aqueous waste. These Inorganics can be J
removed from the aqueous waste by ultra filtration, in contrast, only
a few microorganisms have b-ten identified that can _egrade most of the
organics shown in TaSie 1. Furthermore, results showing tI_at
microorganisms can degrade the organics glutaraldehyde,
. chlorodifluoromethane and trichlorotrifluoroethane r_main to be
reported. Ho_ever, through genetic engineering one may develop an
organism that can degrade these three organics. Thus it would seem
highly plausible that microorganisms could be sed to tre_ the aqueous
- waste generated in experiments abroad the space station.
Clearly, a_ditional studies .ould be necessary to design a bioreactor
for treating the aqueous waste. However, as oiscussed above,
b_oiogical waste treatment systems are effective in reducing the
concentration of hazardous wa_t_ and may be considerable less
I
expensive _han the che_ica] and physical technologies currently
available for waste treatment. Zn summary, Tabie_ 5, b and 7 describe
the current technologies that may be applied to waste tre .ment, an_
provide exa_le$ of how biological systems _ay be used in treating
waste on the space station.
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ODNTKSI/3_DFflIMPOSITIONAND OXIDATION -- A TRFdMENT
METHOD FOR GASEDUS PROCESS EFFiUENTS
Roger J. B. McKinley, Sr., President
InnovativeEngzneering, Inc., Santa Clara, CA 95054
ABSTRAC£
The safe disposal of effluent gases produced by the electronics
industry deserves special attention. Due to the hazardous nature
of many of the material_ used, it is essential to control and treat
• the reactantsand reac-rantby-productsas they are exhau3ted from
the process tool and prior to their release into the manufacturing _"
facility'sexhaust system and the atmosphere.
Controlleddecompositionand oxidation (CI_) is one method of
treating effluent gases from thin film deposition processes. This
report discusses (DO equipment applications,field experience, and
._ results of the use of C/X)equipment and technologicaladvances gained
from field experiences.
INTRODUCTIC'"
A number of extremely hazardous gases are routinely used by the
semiconductorand photovoltaic industries to manufacture integrated
circuits and ether devices. Altho,,ghthe prr-esses generally consume
only small quantities of these ga_=-_s,the nature of the gases is
such that even small amounts of gas can do considerabledamage to
people and equipment in a very short time.
Effective controlled process exhaust gas conditioninghas been
and is becr,-ing&n issue of growing concern for specialty gas pro-
cessors, process equipment manufacturers_users of process equipment
various governmentalagencies, insuranceuncerwriter_, and the
general public.
CODES AND _TIONS
, During the last few years, there has been and continues to be
growing concern over finding safer methods of storing_ dispensingp ,.
and monitoring these gases. More re=ently, the disposal of these
gases has been receiving greater and greate_ attention.
In response to growing concern over toxic substance problems,
Congress has enacted over two dozen regu]atorystatutes covering the
routes by which certain chemicals or aspects of chemical use :an
threaten human health and the environment.
b
I
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_,e laws are a4ministrated by various federa_ regulatorY I
agencies. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSH,A)
has been given responsibility to insure a safe workplace. It sets _
_datorv.iob safety and health standers and nr_vid_._ r_nnr_in_
proce_ur_'for all industrial injuries and fatalities. The E_ircn _- _,
mental Protection Aaer_y [EPA) attempts to prevent further poisoning
of the environment by requirin_ ;-4ustz_/to develop air quality'con-
trol. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act dic_mtes controls to
improve water quality. The Toxic Substances Control Act regulates
the use of certain toxic materials add establishes a toxic substar_.e
data base, wi%ilethe Resource Conservation _ Recovery Act gives
EFA added authority over how waste materials are disDoseo.
The Department of Transportation sets stan_rds for labeling
(DOT Hazard System), packaging, testing, and har_ling cxxnpressed
gases. Other agencies such as NIOSH (part of OSHA), the Uniform
Building Code (UBC) and its companion doctxnent, the Uniform Fire
Code (UFC), and other codes and state and local regulations have
meaningful mandates that also deserve our attention.
: The _/BCpublished by the International Conference of Building
Officials is the most widel> used model building code in the country.
: It is the code for the western United States. The Basic/National
Building Code is used primarily in the northeaster_ part of the
country, and the 5tan4-_rd Bt_ildingCode is used almost exclusively
in the sout__aster_ _rt of the country.
Oc_-_apar_yis one of the primary regulatory criteria in the
building code and is based on the usa or occupancy in the proposed
-_ building. The seve_ major classes or Occupancy Groups are:
A - Assembly
B - Business
E- Educational
H - H_-_rdous
I- £nstitutional
M - Miscellaneous
R - Residential i
Within each of these O up- y Groupsare sub-categories called Div-
isions. In Group H Occupancy, there are six Divisions; and Division
6 may be briefly defined as semiconductor fabrication facilities.(2) 1
"Division 6. Semiconductor fabrication facilitiesand comparable
research and development areas when the facilities in which hazar-
dous production _aaterialsare used and constructed in accordance
with Sectioo 911 .m4 when storage, handling, and use of _mzardous
materials is.in accor_m_ce with the Fire Code." (2)
The UFC, which is 'the product of the Western Fire Chiefs Assoc-
iation, is a companiuo document to the UBC. Many provisions of the
codes are interrelated and cross referenced. Administratively, the
fire cod_ is organized into e_t basic parts consisting of one or
more articles in each p_t. v,._
Part I Admini_tration
Part II Definitions and Abbreviatior_
Part III General Provisions for Fire 5afe_y
Part IV Special Occupancy Use
37-2
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Part V Special Processes I
Part VI Special Equipment i
Part VII Special Subjects
Part VIII Appendices
_a ir_f" • _.r.Fa u _ _= _, .-._
appears in part V of the fire code. Arti,.ie51 deals ,_i_h_ontrols
required for h_._utilization of hazardous materials in the produc-
tion of semiconductor devices and related research functions. The
required controls relate to the nature of materials encountered,
their physical _ter__,and t_hecondition in which they are fourd in
the buildi_ig,i._., storage, handling, or use. Control over the
materials is achieved by limiting the amount of material in use at
any particular _rk station and applying engineering controls such
as sprinklers, automatic le_k detection, local exhaust, and warning
systems.(4)
The purpose of the UBC and UPS is to protect the public by reg-
ulating the con.ct_ction, alteration, and maintenance of str_c-tures
_- and the storage, handling, m_ _se of hazardous _.te_als. The codes
establish certain minimttmcriteria that define the code intent. The
UBC and UFC are __oncernedwith fire and related hazards. The codes
may be adopted locally or on a statewide basis. The adop=ion may be
_nadeby ordinance or by a legislative act.
An exue!lent reference concerning H-6 Occupancy is available
through Larry Fluer, Inc., P.O. Box 10386, San Jose, C2.95157.
L_o new pieces of "legislation" confronting the semiconduutcr
wafer fabrication industry and other institutions using hazardous
materials are:
I. Uniform Fire Code -Atcicle 80 Re#rite
2. C=lifornia Assembly Bill #1021
.r?:eviouslythe codes primarily addressed the storage, dispensing,
and monitoring of hazardous materials. With the addition of Article
80, the codes now address STORAGE, DISPENSINC, MONITORING, and
DISPOSAL.
O3NrROLLED F_O¢_S _YL_UST GAS CONDITIONING
Effective co_trolled process exhaust gas conditioning has been
and is becoming an issue of growing concern for specialty gas pro- !
cessors, process equipment manufacturers, users of process equipment, i
various gover_mmntal agencies, insurance underwriters, and the .'-
general public.
Exhaust gas cooditioning or removing harmful substances from ,,
process exhaust gase_ is not necessarily needed for succesful device
wa_er fabrication; and perhaps since exhaust gas conditioning
' equipment is no_ revenue producing, its importance has not been
, previously fully acknowledged. However, Factory Mutual, a leading
insurance company for _,_iconducr_-. manufacturers, reports ,'
$60,000,000 in claims were paid for 112 incidents from 1974 t.h_'ough
1986. The $60,000,000 reported by Factory Mutual does not include
claims covered by other underwriters, unreported losses, and self-
insured claims. Fire was by far the most frequent cause of loss
F
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and the ignitio_ of flammable and pyrophoric gases was the leading
cause of fire. Hydrogen and silane gases were involved in approxi-
mately 90 rx_rc_ntoF the_r_rw_rt_Iine.ld_nt__
Table I: SI_IOONDUCIDR PLANT LOSSES
1974 TFAOUGH 1986 $60,000,000
N_MBER OF
CAUSE INCIDENTS
Fire 72
Liquid Leakage or Spillage 29
Human Element Ii
: TOTAL 112
Table II: CAUSES OF FIRES AT SDIIOOhDUCfOR PLANTS
hUMBER OF
" CAUSE INCIDENTS
Ignition of Flammable or Pyro_oric Gases 19
;_ (27 of the 29 or approximately 90%
involved Hydrogen or Silane)
; Electrical Origin 20
Immersion Heaters 13
Ignition of Flammable Liquids 6
Hot Plates 4
TOTAL T/
" Although exhaust gas conditioning may not be. essential for
scmicoDductoz wafer fabricatiu_,,it is important for the protection
of personD_l, protection of the em_ironment_ and, as stated above,
the protection of the manufacturing facility.
The contamirmnts encountered it,process exhasut gas streams are
extremely varied. Rarely does an exhaust stream contain only one
classification of contaminant -- whether it be particulate, gas, or
vapor. While the gases introduced into almost all semiconductor
wafer fabrication processing chambers are well defined, the composi-
tion of the gas mixture exiting the process chamber is generally not
: precisely defined. Furthermore, since the mid 1970's, there has '
been an ever increasing utilization of subatmospheric or reduced
pressure (vacuum) processing in semi(.oDductor wafer fabrication. 1
This has introduced additional _mkmowos m,ch as _ oil vapors into
the process effluent.
For the most part, reactive gas_ are not released unreacted
from a process chamber; and in _ost cases, the gases are present
only in low cormantrations. However, aL,ost all are _/ghly toxic
' (AsH_, PH3, B2H6)= pyrophori¢.(Si}g), fl_able (H2), or corrosive
(HCI]. Hydrogen (H2) is a by-product of all hydride (SiH4, ASH3,
B2H6, PHi) reactions; add under controlled exhaust conditions, Si_; 1
ca_ be tRe ignition source for a serious H2 reaction. _
I
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'nEE PENINSULA TIMES TRIBUNE
DAMAGE MAY RUN HIGH IN FIRE A I/)CALPLANT
MOUNTAIN VIEW -
...ll_efire, ignited by gas and vaporized
oil, spread tl-_ough_- air duct system in
a fabrication room _ere valuable silicon
chips are manufactured.
...The fire began in an air duct sy_n
where vaporized oil from a vacuum p,_p
and gas from a malfunctioning reactor
had collected."
No manufacturer wants a mishap due to improperly handled exhaust
gases to end up in the morning paper.
In the past, dilution or simple water washing was employed to
dispose of exhaust gases. Dilution to "safe" levels has long been
an accepted practice, but public sentiment and new codes are
diametrically opposed to any practic_ ir ;_i_iluh_icals of any kind
are released into the atmosphere untreated.
Corscientiously, we shov'A address pounds per hour, not parts
per million (ppm).
"DE/fYION IS NO SOLUTION TO POLI/NXON:"
- Plain water sc_,bbing is ineffective for most of the hazardous
gases encountered it far fabrication.
SOURCE VS. CENTRAL EXHAUST GAS OONDITION!NG
• Exhaust gas conditioning equipment may be divided into two
broad categories -- source and central systems.
Fig. i. Central Conditioning - Mul_i process tools with incom-
patible exhaust effluent entering common duc_ system,aod being I|
transported to remotely lecated exhaust treatment system. |
5 1
I
i
I
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iBecause of the nature and low volume of effluent exiting most
wafer fabrication systems, it is desirable and _ore effective to
conditioning process exhaust gases a_ =lose to their sou___eas is '
2_TO Pt,,ANT_,XHAUST
 0iiim
Fig. 2. Source Conditioning - Dedicated gas treatment system
located as close to process tool ex/must as pnysicai_I
possible.
B__ause of the nature o[ the gases ar_ vapors exiting most pro-
cess systems and based on the interpretation of zedes add regula-
tions, source conditioning may be mandatory in the future. Fro_
UFC Article 51: "Duct Systems - Reactives. Two or more operatior_
shall not be connected to the same exhaust system when either "he
or the combination of the substances may constitute a fire, e_._.o-
sion, or chemical reaction hazard within the duct system." (4) _L
Also, Section 1105 of the 1985 Edition ef the Uniform Mmzbani-
cal Code: "A mechanical ventilation or exhaust sy_tem shall be
installed to control, capture.,and remove emissions generated from i
produc_ use or handlirg when required by the Buildi_ Code or Fire
Code _d when such emissions result in a hazard to life or property.
l_e 4=sign of the system shall be such that the emissions are con-
fined tc the area in whi_-.hthey are generated by air currents,hoods,
or encl)sure__,a_ shall be exhausted b_'a duc_ system to _ safe
lo¢_tion or treated by removing contaminants. Duct_ conveying ex- i
plosives or flammable vapor_, fumes, or dusts s_mll extend directly
to the exterior of the building _thout e_:_ring other spaces.
Separate add distinct systems shall be providzd for incoe_tib!e i
materials." }
6
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lCONTROLLED "SC_CE" PROCESS EXHAUST GAS CONDITIONING IS: !
i. THE WAVE OF EHE FUTURE !
2. EVOLUTIONARY/EVOLVING
3. MORE E_'I_VE
4. DESIRABLE
5. SAFER
6. ESS_flAL TO CCMPLY WITH CODES
PROS TOOl =XHAUSF
Many of the process systems in use today and proposed for the
future are sub-atmospheric pressure systems utilizing vacuum pumps.
The required pumping syst_n%sfor sub-atmospheric processes ?re
fairly well defined and for simplicity may be broken down into "_ee
areas (see Fig.l): foreline (inlet), pump, and eymaust.
That portion of the pumping system connectir,gthe process c_.-
bet to the vacuum pump may be called the foreline or inlet. %he
foreline generally includes a flexible stainless steel interconnect
- line, a particulate trap, and a vacuum valve. Pumping precautions
which should be taken Znclu_e:
; (a) preverting the condensation or trapping of chemicals in
the pump rotor and stator area;
(b) preventing oxygen from entering the pump (i.e., through
the ballast valve);
(c) preventing the accumulation of explosive, toxic_ and/or
corrosive gases in the dead volume of the pump oil
reservoir.
Itsns (a) and (b) may be accomplished by injecr.inga i tc 2 SLM dr/
nitrogen flow i_,tothe pump ballast inlet. Since most pumps are
equipped with an idler to the pump oil chamber, item (c) may be
acccx_iished by flowing 2 to 3 SLM of dry.nitrogen into this inlet.
ADother ef_=ctive technique for the oil chamber purge is to bubble
the dry nitrogen through the p_np oil. This dry nitrogen flow will
help to dilute and eject the _piosive, toxic and/or corrosive gases I
fr_ the pump oil chamber. Ideally, regulators, flow meters, a_
pressure gauges should be used to set aM monitor the dry nitrogen
gas flo_.
It s.houldbe noted that large flows of purge gas through the ,,
oil chamber may result in an unreasonable loss of fluid from the
" pump due to rapid removrl of fluid vapor. Excessive nitrogen purge
may also dilute the exhaust gases to such a diluted concentration as
to be detrimental to effegtive exhaust gas co_itioning.
The effluent exiting the pump casing frequently contains pump _
fluid vapors and toxic and flammable or explosive gases. An u_con- !
trolled mixing of the reactive gase_ (i.e., silane or hydrogen) with
_. air can create explosive conditions. Uncontrolled discharge of '
toxic gases (i.e., arsine, diboran&, and phosphine) can create en-
vironmental as well as personnel hazards. Unconditioned vacuum
pump fluid vapors can condense in exhaust ducting causing main- "_
tenance and health and safety hazards.
37-7
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The toxicity and flammabi7".y of vacuum pump effluent is hazar-
dou_ enou_ that particular attention should be given to "gas-tight-
, _e_s" of _he entire _/4_',pressure (exhaust) section and to the
"&onditioning" or trea_._entof the pump effluertt_rior to its re-
| .leaseinto the atmosphere.
Ehe desigL_of the gas exhaust line mou_ted on the discharge
"_ port of a mechanical mmTp should follow certain basic reules (see
F Fig.2):
a) Exhaust lines should be s_zed so as not to create pump
discharge back pressure.
b) The exhaust line should be constructed of gas tight metal
tubing. Stove pipe type 'joinzed' ducting sP_uld not be
used as it _s r_t air tight. Air must not be allowed ro
mix with the gases prior to eonditioninB.
c) The line sh_mld have slightly sub-atmospheric pressure (½
ir_.hto i ir_/_ef water below atmosphere) to assist in
ejecting the effluent. However, this pressure should _ot
be so low (i.e., 8 to 9 negative inches of water) that
excessive pump oil vapors are sucked from the pump.
d) A pressure gauge should be installed on or just downstrea_
of the pump exhaust port to monitor exhaust line pressure.
e) The exhaust line should incerporate a device to condense
- fluid vapors from the pump effluent.
f) "Conditioning" of the pump effluent is necessary for per-
sonnel safety, protection of property, mvd protection of
. d.a e_nvironment.
g) Pressure (v_:uum) gauges should be mounted on the inlet
ar_ discharge s_des of the conditioning equipment.
While the gases introduced into the process chamber are gener-
ally well k_ow_, ,he composition of the gax mixture exiting the pro-
cess chamber, passing through, and exiting the pump is generally
not precisely defined. However, the pump effluent generally contains
enough toxic, explosive, and ca_,b_stib].ematerials that effluent
"conditioning" is esseml:ial
TA_,LEill: TYPICAL SUBATMOSPHERIC O._DGASS EFFI//£hT
CVD PROCESS PR0(IESSGASES PROCESS EFFLUENT
Poly _T_74 _i_ Sill4,H2,
Pump Fluid Vapors
Doped Poly Sill4,PH3 Si, 51_I_4,P__3,H2
Pump Fldid Vapors
Low Temperature Oxide (400_C)- Sill4,02, I_3 Si02, Sill4,02,
PH3, H2, Pump
Fluid Vapors
Tungsten?Tungsten Silicide Sill4,WF6. H2 WF6. WFx, Sill4,
$iHx, H2, N2,
Pump Fluid Vapors
i.
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IPROCESS E_L_J_USTGAS CON_IT!OHT_NG I
Controlled ¢_bustion is a .ethod of reducing the toxic and ,_
flammable hazards ef vacuuTnpump effluent.
Process exhaust gases enter the Controlled Combustion, Decompo-
sition, Oxidation (cI_TM) System (see Fig. 3) through tbm Lmit's
f-lamecheck and unde_ controlled conditions are mixed with an oxygen
source in the oxygenator. The o_'gen enriched gases then flow
through a hi_n temperature -__ction_#nerecombustion takes pLace and
exit the CDOIM System _/%rougha water mist cooling and scrubber j
section. Tases and pump oil vapors and combusted and oxidized.
in the CDCTM umit, the pump effluent is oxyge_ emriched _der
controlled conditions a.ndexposed to a high temperature o_nvironm,ent
thereby increasing the liklihoo# f a ccmplete c/%_ical reaction.
C,O01J _ C,OOL_NG/BCRUBBE_
OXYGF_NATOR SECTION HIGH TEk_ERATuRE SECTION SECTION TOWER
WATE]=I Ml_r _ OUICK DISCONNECT
PG'wF_R FEED-T_ROUGHS COOUNG CHAMBER - /FLANGE
\ _EATER.ELEblENT WATER INLET _ [
C_MISUSTleL_ _ :_, - • 'Y. IV', i_', _ _1 GAS
G_ INLET _ _ ' ' _ _J " l I',," _ _ _ _ T_u" E S_N_
[ _----- .... ---_---._ .......... _ .... , _ WATER INLET
QUICK DISCONNECT [ T _ • k _ 7_._
FLANGE / I. _t_ CUARTZ LINER \ REMOVABLE _8/_-..K PLATE ._
fCt FLOW OXYGEN SOURCE \ # _ OUICK D,SCONNECT
SENSOP FLOW SENSOR _ LIQUID LEVEL SENSOR -_" FLANGE
HEATER ELEMENT _1
CONTe_OL THERMOCOUF_E 11 3
C_a-_m -..__.,_ -._,-w_ gaa- -_ _ ._.__._$ ._m_._ Su-_ ¢_,_¢- • "
_p_l _lmi_l I,"i_¢11 N iIII Ill ¢,WII, lt_¢_ II i_1_41Illl ll't_ I1_, ¢_l_lullmlt i_111nl_ "
. v'_ie_t _ _ m _ =.'_e,._ N u_ll _ _ I_ e.._N I_ I_ C..OO _ DRAIN
=i_ 3. Controlled Combustion, Decomposition, and Oxidation System
Cross Section
Control of _ime, temperature, turbulence, and oxygen is essen-
tiaO for complete r=_ction. Time is the period of residence of the
waste gas(es) in the combustion c___.mbe:c. 'fi, r,e is a function of corn-
bastion chamber length and diameter a_d gas volume.
Temperature is the temperature of the waste gas(es) in the com-
bustion c_ber. Turbulence is necessary to insure the proper mix-
ing of the waste gas(es) and the oxygen source. Ox_gem is required
to support the complete reaction of the waste ga:(es). !
As reported by Arcm Solar, Inc. in their Jamuary, 1987, "Evalu-
ation of Hazards Associated With the Manufacture of Thin Film Solar
Cells for Brookhaven National laboratory": '_fheCDO approach has
been shown to be highly effective in the controlled C_T,bustion of
silane and d_borane, the results suggesting performancy efficiency L
approaching 100% for silane. However, under the defined operating
cor_ditions,the syst_ appears less efficient in the removal of
,osphine." (ll)
Since publication of the A_co report, Innovative Engineering -_r-
inc. has performed extensive testing with arsine, diborane, and
 op ne.
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The Reactive Bed Plasma System f_r Contamination Control
by joseph G. B=rm_-ngham, Robert R. Moore and Tony _. ._e._,_,v
!
Introduction
. . .... e . .as,'Tl_ (Jro'Jp _', ...,-"
'"era:ca -. h" n'."_:.c __r._inee._'r._ Car. e._ (C.KDZCI a
_:st c: z:'.ez_'_c_Ls "_nc ":d:n._ .'_qu- Jz, v_r.,rs, and zart.,_-ula%es 1
at a:',: ar.-i_-i_,_tec °_ ca"s- c-r.tamlnKtlon ;,:,ob.emz a'.,oard the
,.;a_"e Station _.. C3.-"&u has 3e' ec'.ed seve._a. _: =haze compcund_
- - -+_- .... r,ve_t_on,, des,if'be_. . as the. Reactive Bed P_asma
".'ea-,ter. The obsectlve o: th_s paper is %0 summarize the
con%_,_nat:¢n con%to- capaD:._%:es of the .rieact_ve Bed ._'asma
,=-..._.'.-Isystem hy de "_nea_:n_ the results of %o:<:c chemlcal
:e'. ::r,T.,ozit., stud:e_, aeroso flitratlon work, and other
_.93",1n_
Description of ,,eac tive Bed Plasma
_he Reac _:ve Be _ Fiasma (RBF) was invente at the
_'hemlcal ._ese__-ch, Development and Engineering Center (CBDEC) to
orev'_de breathable air :n chemical and blologlc_' warfare
env_ronme;,_3 The RB_ "_s a synergistic comblnat_on of a plasma
_¢,r ionized _as) and ca%aiy%ic technologies to produce an alr
pur:flca'_ion system. The catalytic packln_ material's maln
function :S to fac:lltate an increased amount of time _n the
act,.ve plasma region for contaminant molecules in a flow.ng alr
stream. The plasma _enerated high energy electrons and
subsequently produced species decompose toxic materlals. In
add,.t'.on, the RBP can perform as a highly efficient electrostatic
prec:pltator to collect and eventually deactivate hazardous
partlculate mater_al. Since, the RBF can handle toxlc cheml-_is
as well as hazardous aerosols, it can be described as an :
un,_versal filter, i
it iS understood that trade-of fs exls% for any new
technology. Some d_sadvanta_es of the RBP concept include the
emlss_on of electromagnetic no_se (necesslta_.in_ the shielding of !
the device), high voltage hazards and the treatL.ent of reaction
products. The advantages of the RBP include the ; %entlal for
operatlng as an efficlent, low temperature, long-ll% :d, minimal
energy-consumption, universal contamination control device.
Toxic Chemical Decomposition Studies
The llst of chemicals provided by NASA included l_quzds
and gases such as chlorlnated compounds (such as hydrochloric
acid, trlchloroethane and chlorlne)_ organics (such as benzene),
and others. The RBP system has been tested against several
ccmpounds including cyanogen chloride (2) , phosgene (3) and
benzene (4). The_e test gases allow the contamination control
capability of the RBP to be extrapolated to many chemical groups
• i
Each gas's decomposition results reveals an important attribute
of the RBP system. The efficient decomposition cf cyanogen
chlorld_ demonstrated that the RBP did not exhibit the i
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charac%erlstlc polsonlng mechanisms of catalysts. Add:t_onally.
the phosgene results indlc_ted that the RBP u%_!Ize _ low
temperatures (around 150 degrees C) and its performance does not
} • _ .... t_ J •
_c_:'&d: qulc__=;. A._o, =_y .,y_',_,.h ,_':': a_:d :ormeu was converted
%c, 2Z.crlne (as expected from a .ow temperature process).
F_na..',,. _ne benzene cestln6 showed that th_ R27 can easily
_com_,,:.se orderlies f .DwlnR " ;_ ar alr z_eam. T_e maln reactlon
_rc.duc_2 frDm these decompos=5_on studles lnc' uce carbon d_o:<lde
an: wa'er, salts, and sea " amounts o_ ac:d gases (=nc'udln_
n_i:4ens :tom %he parent compounds and nl_ro_en dloxlde from the
air stream:. The RB? has demons%rated the potentlal as a low
temperature, ef flclen5 and unlversal decomposztlon system for
hazardous compounds In a flow:n_ alr stream.
Aerosol Processing in RBP
?artlculate ma_erlals on NASA's Contamination Control
" _st _nc'ude Poiystryene Latex Spheres, mlcrobes(wh_ch might
_nclude Bac_' lus Glob_= spores and T-2 _ycotoxln) , and
sem:conductor process_n 8 aerosols. The Beactlve Bed Plasma (RBP)
reactor combines electrostatic prec_p_%at_on w_th a packed bed to
form a new aerosol f_!trat_on device. The test_n 8 o_ th_ RBP
w_h Folystryene Latex spheres revealed that the RBP was a more
efficient f_Iter than for the empty plasma reactor (electrostatic
precipitator) or a s_ng!e packed bed (5). The b_olo_cal aerosol
chal_en_es of the EBP Includ_n 8 Bacillus Globig_ spores (a heat
r_stant s_mul_nt for pathogenic species) and T--2 mycotoxln
demonstrated efflc_en5 deactivation and decompos_%lon,
:espect_vely (_). The RBP could become an ultraf_itra_on devzce
_th the _ncorporat_on of a ceramic H:gh Efficiency Particulate
Aerosol (HEPA) f11ter. Therefore, the RBP has the poten%1_l to
become an aerosol flltrat_on devlce for many appilcatlons.
Post-treatment of RBP Effluent I
The requlrement to neutralize any products found In the
reactor effluent will be undertaken zn the post-treatment section i
of the _BP system. Two approaches of removing the reaction
products are packed beds and _as separation membranes. First,
pacMed beds cons_stln_ of reactlve materlal coated onto alumina
support spheres has demonstrated the efficlen% removal of
n_tro_en dloxide and chlorine. Thls packed bed system w111
undergo additional testing. Next, some contamination control
appllcatlon_ would allow a _as separation membrane to sepaTate
products to undergo further treatment _n a scrubber solution.
S_nce post-treatment burdens for contamination control are
m_n_mal, the solutions sugSested may be adequate.
Contamination Control Approach Utillzln_ an RBP
The Reactive Bed Plasma (RBP) system has demonstrated the
capability of efficiently processing many of the chemicals
suggested by NASA. The ability to process liquids will require
vaporlzat_on of the contamznate materials. Thls phase change may i
require the use of heat and a_r to introduce the hazardous
, 3S-2 ORIGINAL PAGE I$
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mater;a_ :nto the RB_'. Alternate y, waste _ase_ car. be pr:,,=essec
,_re,z_. 'Y Add:t_ona work _s requ::'e./ t,_ z:eet the -tr:n;en_. _ze,- _,
we: _h: and vo.ume co nstra= nt_ of the Space Star : on
};everthe[ess. :_ :s hollered tha_ _he Rea,ztzve Bed ?Jasma system
can prov:de contam:natzon control for many applzcatzons.
t
Sumumary
.he Keac_zve Bed P.asma tRBP) system has demonstrated :ts
unique zapab:i_:es _o decompose toxzc materza!s and process
hazardous aerosols. The post-treatment requirements for the
reac_lon products have posszble solutlons. Although addltlonal
work iz requlred to meet NASA requzrements, _he RBP may be able
to meet Contatn_natlon Control problems aboard the Space Statlon.
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This appendix lists issues, concerns, and _commendation" noted by workshop
attendees They are as follows:
Ken Li_neman_n Tel_lyne Browa Engh_ee' .,g
i. There is a strong conflict betwee_ tl_ payload desire to vent waste and tile resu'ic, ons
on external contamination. A! sides appear to be unaware of the rational on the part
' of others, and little informatioa i:, being exchanges. This issue calls for coordination
by Level £I since it involves many Code areas and Work packages. Just because final
data is not available yet is no reason for preliminary information not to be
disseminated
2. Another area which should receive direction fi-t_mLevel H is the shared atmosphere
between modules and the comatt,ination tlmre..of. This is a key element in safety, and
is relevant to ECLSS desSgn, contamination control, toxic materials handling, and
open cabin spills.
3. Protective clothing and equipment should be a part of _afe processing Inputs are
required from many sottrees (work packages, systems designers, facility designers,
etc.), l'hese should be coordinated at lc ;el higher than individual NASA centers, to
find an approach that is acceptable, technically reasible, and provides adequate levels
of safety. Duplication of effort should be avoided.
4. Everyone needs to operate with the same definition of safety terms; a similar attitude
towards safety; a common interpretation of safety requirements; and a timely
judgement of whether or not they have been met. We often write down a set of rules
and procedures and feel as if we have legislated safety, but this is not true. Situations
are amorphous, multi-dimensional, modified by exceptions, and continuously
variable. A centralized authority should be established to field safety questions,
provided immediate judgements, direct the questioner towards appropriate
docurnenr,r_,m, or defer the question to resource panels at the Work Package level.
This should not become another required"hoop" or a full bown analytical group, but
act as a "help line" to give quick answers or referrals, and "focal point to establish a
common safety mind-set.
5. An area related the previous item which requires special attention is establishing the
process by which toxic/hazardous ma,erials safety will be ensures on Space Station
Freeaom. It is ob\.!ous frr,m the discussion that occurred at the conference, that
many op_i _ns exist on w_tat will be alloweat and what will r-'_e it safe. User
facilities want no materi:d rostriction;, but are working in an informataon ,,acuum
Rules, limitations, and szffety procedures must be defined before designs mature to
prevent costly redesign and reduce residual risks (a safety Faxis seldom as safe as
good initial design).
In addition to tl-¢ facilitie o many systems are involved: PMMS, Manned _ystems,
ECI,SS, etc. The currer, t approach seems to be to let each entit3 work independantly
'_ and w_Jt until later to see ff the pieces fit together. WP01 should establish the
" framework now for approval of facility design, materials handling, materials i
approval, containment, and other safety related issues. Evea if the process were net i
1
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' implemented yet, the outline wonid serve as a design guideline, and ensure that i
everyo.e was headed in the same direction.
6. Co- -'_on iaterfaces, both physicaiiy and functionaiiy, betwee_ the varievs Space
_. StationMe,dalesarecriticaltothepayloadcommunity.SomeoneatLevel_ orhigher
needstotakeanactiontoensurethathisbecomesareality.Puttingeverythingina
common 74-inchrackisirrelevantffFMM$ equivalent,nterfacesarenotavailableill
theESA andJEM modr!es.
7. DirectcommunicationbetweenFacilitydesignersandWork Package01 systems
designersi atoppriority.Thecurrents ructurefordatacquisitionandexchangeis
. baseduponapretm_¢oflinear,sequer.d_l,developmentwhereonetaskleadstothe
nextInthiscenario,acentralizedinfo,ant,i,sourceunderconfigurationc trol
ensuresthateveryoneisworkingswiththesamerequirements.Hz.wever,sucha
systemhasthedisadvantageofbeingcumbersomea,_dslowtorespond.
' A moresignificantproblem,however,isthat_ReSp_._.eStationPhaseC-D isona :
risky"fastrack'withPayloadsandLab Accommcdationdevelopinginparallel
(ratherthanoneproceedingthec_er) Communicationthereforen edstooccur
directlyandcontinuouslyata lowerlevel.LevelIIneedstoactasan"off-line"
listener,recordingdatathatisfedup,butnotforcingallinformationexchangeto
funnelupthroughit.Otherwisedesi;saersonbothsideswillbestymiedbythe
system;eachwillmakehisown assumpuons,interpretations,andderivehisown
requirements;andthedisasterwe weretryingtoaverwillhavebeenfueled.We may
:" build a car with square wheels in 7 different sizes.
8. fikeyissuehighlightedby theconferencewas therelat,onshipbetweenwaste
r_enemtedinternally and external contamination. Venting of expcS.ment waste. _sa
strong desire of the payload community which is severely restricted by the li_:.itations
in JSC-30426. Unfortunately, many of the pa_.ss wi:h an interest in the external
contamination were not present to participate in the discussion. Resolution of this
issue is key to the design of paylaods and US Lab systems.
A follow-up workshop on external contamina:ion would greatly enhance exchange of
information and concerns from all intexested parties. A number of tests and studies
are ongoing on this topic, and interim results could be presented. Partclpating groups
c_uld include:
Level II
RepresentativesoftheNASA Codes
Work package rel_sentatives ,_,
Vacuum vent: _I
The Payload community (materials, Life sciences, and external)
Shu_!e & astronaut offices
Plasmaworkingroup
Neutral workingroup
NickJohnson(ontheRus_SanSpaceStation)
Groupsexperiencedinlowdensityphysicsandmodeling. (
i
I
i
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Cha,'les A. Horton E.I Dupom DcNemo_,'s & Co.
1. Utilizing Existing US Industry Laborat¢_ Expense
NASA hasprover,expertiseinthedesign,fabrication,n'alning,procedures,use,and
_--naintenanceof the Space Station and also in the integration of syst,_ms that are
needed to put people and payloads into space. This expertise was developed ovcr
many years with thousands of people contributing.
Now NASA is designing me Space Station to be a national laboratory. We in the
chemical industry, and at Du Pont in particular, have developed laboratory expertise
the same way NASA has developed the space ¢_
Why not utilize this expert k_}owlcdge in the Space Station design, fabrication,
training,procedures,use,andmaintenance?
+
2. Establishingadefm_xlsafetymanagementsystem
Leadership,responsibility,communicatiot_,and a systemsar)proachunderstoodby
: allandinvolvingallarcbasicn_luirementsforsuccessfulsafeb}performance
Safetyislikeanyothermanageableactivity.Goalsmustbc establishedwithcheck
pointsalltheway todetermineifthegoalsarcgoingtobz met. Earlywarning
indicatorsofsafetyproblemsmustalsobcstudied.
Many peopledo notbelievesafetycan be managed likeotheractivitiessuchas
quality.Du Pontl)clievesitcanbcdone.
Du Pore has 26 separatelaboratoriesmploying 9,779 people. Our safcty
managementsystemhasprovidedguidancetothelabs othatwc achievedan OHSA
recordablerateof 0.953which occurred uring1987. Thissafetyperformance
measurementmcan:;tlm.anOHSA recordableistheminimum safetyrecordingevent
requiredby U.S.law.Thistranslatestothefacthatoneindividualworkingina Du
Pontlaboratorycar.expecttcwork I0.3yearsbetweenrecordablcinjuries.Our
laboratorysafetyperformancein1988hasimprovedover1987to15 yearsbetween
rccordableinjuries, j
Ifyou needmore informationon successfulsafetymanagement systems,pleaselet !
' me know. +
I
t
3. Cre'_,%v__.,__ coqtlmfing hazard management system -_
b
The lessons Do Pont has learned in operating dangcrt as processes and equipment
over the past ! 86 years arc responsible for the development of ota Process Safety c
Management . steer, in eve, _' serious incidert we have studied, twr ings have ]
occurred--the manageme:_ system has broken down and/or t' _rocess and
equipmenthavechanged. ]
!
+
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IWe have developed a workable Process Safety Management system to manage these
twoareasandifyouareinterestedinmoreinformation,pleaseletme know. _
4. Studying spills, containment, and clean-up
The transport, loading and unloading, and storage during the experiments need to be
studied and protective designs and workable procedures need to be addressed.
5. Communicating standards, rules, and procedures
Communicating between the engineers and scientists at all levels of NASA need
,, specialattention.
i-
Robert N. Hager, Jr., Ph.D. Engineering Consultant
.m 756 Woodrid_e L,Jad
'_ Franktown, CO 80116
I suggest a Mission Specialist As_onaut be assigned the primary responsibility for
determining tq,. safe operation of all experiments and systems planned to be a partof Space
; Station Freedom. This person would sustain contact with all contractors and agencies
as._ociated with hardware on Freedom during each phase of design and fabrication, looking
objecd_ ely from experience in safe and effective laboratory operations.
._, I'his safety spec_ialist would w--k with a Space station Safety Committee to develcl: safet7 .
., standards and requirements similar to those now existing for Shuv.le fl_.ghts. In addition,
he or she would serve as an overall facility observer, viewing the intexaction of the three
labora.tories as well as the facility control systems for integrated safety _.2 cre,_,
workabili .ty.
This individuai would be experienced in laboratory equipment operations, laboxatory
mavagement, hazardous materials handling, toxicology, ventilation engineering, trace
contamin_t monitoring methods and standard safety practices in a laboratory work
environment.
1I_equest to be this individual.
t
Wallace W. Youagblood Wyle Laboratories
Como,_stion Fa_lity Waste Disposal:
The Combustion Facility proposed by NASA/Lewis is m,dcipated to generate gaseous,
lit_u_d and solid waste materials as a result of various combustion experiments. A 1
methodology must be devalopeq to collect and store these waste materials, some of which
are likely to be toxic and/,.t reactive. Also, a methodology is requir_.d for preparing tke. I
stored wa.,'te materials for delivery to the Space Station PMbtS. )
i
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Atmosph=..reMonitori,'gfor IncipientFire Det_'fiou: ',
Monitoringofl_ecabinandavionicsairhasbeendiscussedandra.md,r_l-t/m+-.-_._,o.,,_ito_,Sng '"
isd_suat)le.Itisrecommendedthatsuchmonitor;ragbeextended,ultimately,roinclude
detectionfk_cipientfireconditionsa anadditionallevelof£_,e.6erection.Micro-
encapsulated,racegasescouldbeincor,+,/Jm'a'.edoncomponent/c_hinetsurfacesforreler+se
anddetectionatteml_atmesweii-L,,iowmateriali_+"tion.
GeorgeL.Curran '+theBioneticsCorporation
I. DesignsofanymaterialshandlingIv'.xdwarendoperationsshouldbereviewedby
so_'cesoutsideofNASA. Theseshouldincludeatleasta rafetyoffice,.,",om a
chemical producuon c_pany and people involved in the cleanup _f, _z-:doas
mata'bJs spills, Le. theEnvironmentalPro_ectionAgency.
_t
2. Many materialshandlingoperationscouldbenefitfromautomatJ+:+ntoavoid"human
e_r"potential.
3. SpaceStationperationsplamlingshouldnotbeviewedasanextendedspacelab
flight!Theresourcesa,,")ailableonfreedomwill_ _ different fromSpacela0. :
)
Dr.M. Vedha-Nayagam WyleLa)'-"mtories
e
MicrogravitylquJdDynamicsforWasteMaterialTransport:
Allthen'mjorhatd,.vaxesystemsproposedfortheSpaceStationproduceprocessedmaterial
intheformofliquids,solids,andgase_insidetheirworldngvolume.Ultimatelytheyaxe
removedandrecycledorstoredeitherbythePMMS orbytheECLSS. However,the
mechani._rr_through which the transfer ot these materialsare effected was not discussed in
de,aft technical and basic scientific issues associated with separation of solids/liquids/gases,
_x'uum fi'llingand venting, and multi-phase flow dynamics deserve more atte"tion.
I
RogerChassay NASA/MSFC/JA52 ,
i.
1. Absence of pla;-s/requirements for use ef robotics in handling hazardous conditior,s it"
(e.g. overpressure sating, cleanup or spills, sating of ruptured toxic experiment
samples) !-
i
2. Apparent absence of materials science inputs in establishing the venting constraints of
JSC 30426, i.e., it appears that the observing science r.,eop!ehaven't trieclto achieve '
mutually satisfactory_nstraints ,wth the materials science people.
3. Limitations on simultaneoususe of PMMS by mul,iple users. ]
1
I
i
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IW. Bouchelle Hamilton Standard '
t
I
Factors of sa.fe,_ anctbacX-up analysis requirements seem to vary from center to center. Is .,st"
there a wa_ this could be made uniform to enhance the possibility for r.o,-.,:_onality of
hardware items? ,_.
- Ross Cushman Hamilton Standard - Space and Sea Systems
, Before we sp,,,,4 .niUions on systems to avoid or timelin¢ venr;,::g, some.one must evaluate _L
the impact ot unavoidable Space Station cabin leakage on t'.,e local environment (200("
lbm/yr). This contamination may render venting avoidance usel_,s,,, i,
i
=
F. L. Worley it. Univers,ty of Hour:on ,
Concern: The design of thr. hb (USL) is probably tryin.', fox too much _,s a first stage.
Why not set r_,egoal for our "wisla list", but have a mor_ tT.,c,dt,,:first level objective '_vhich
does not ".'net,Lye solution of these very difficult problems and _tara the progress of the
o, _r-all project.
Don Staffr,rd Compl_ar :e Consulting Scrvkes
1. As an "outsider" to th,; Space Industry, I felt a general absence of u_tity in a very large
effort.
2. The workshop covered a subject of hazardous materials that much research has bc_-_
done in other industries and I have concerns that .ms information is not being used.
3. How is large quantities of wast_ returned to earth to be handled? _'_
P. K. Seshen JPL ,
The workshop was very valuable fgr the magnitude of new irF,_rmadon gamed. On the
contrary, it became glari_,g:y clear that system concepts devc;,"pment (though recognizing 1
the ,,_ue of il at fi'om guidance to sub';ystem d_.v_lopers) continues to proceed .vithout the t_li.
participation of subsystem deve/opers and end users. D') ,,_e have to wait for these
!' frequent workshops and b," s'_rised or even shocked into knowing what ,re sh _u!,4
r. ,',z been aware cf before the wcrk_hop? Because of this, (l_e_raps delibera'*,) lack e _
intormation exchange, the workshop lacks depth (i.e., nuts and bo!_ discussion).
1
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iCatherine C. Johnson NASA/Ames
(4i5) 694-5768
1. 02 and CO2 provided by PMMS. Cylinders provided to the user need to be
compatible with our system or else have the capabilir) for recharging user provided
cylindel_.
2. Materials of construction for dis_bution of electronic grade water was not
suffiei,.-afly addressed in the workshop. Plants are very sensitive to heavy metal_,
i.e. p af Ni in toxic.
3. Are contaminants from the International partners being factored in?
Dinah B. Higgins NASA/MSFC
The. workshop was well organized and desperately needed. My primary conce_ is the
safety of the PMMS as presently designed. I have not seen any evidence that would
indicate that _oeing or TBE have even considered altema.'e approaches to the .:)u-rent
concept. It would probably be cost effective in the long t_rm for them to do _9 t_ow.
Judging from at least two of the presentations at the workshop, I am not the only person
vAth thin opinion.
The payload community needs to have a facility where the experiments can be interfaced
with the PMMS and other systems, and experiments conducted, and wastes disposed of.
: Usefulness of shnalations only go so far.
I f:hink that future workshops are required, with more time alloted to discussion amongst
the participants. The issues and concerns brought up need to be addressed (and actions
taken) b, NASA, Boeing, and TBE.
.............................................................................................................
Bill Hanks Teledyne Brown Engineering
•: An area of great concern to me in the design of the Space Station Process Fluids
distribution/storage system is to define the Process Fluids Requirements _,f the laboratory
facilities, both user experiments and lab support. Four questions I would like to pose to i
every user of Process Fluids are:
!
1. What fluids are needed? (Ar, N2, O_.,He, CO2, H2)
• 2. How much ofeacharcneededperuse?(kg,I) !
' l
3 What pressure and temperau,_ should they be at?• _l
4. At what flowrate are they delivered? (kg/s)
'1
1.
{
)
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John R. Little Jr. Boeing Co./Space Station Mi.qsion Operations
.i.A.McCiendon i---_ESS Mission_uons
Concern:CommonalitynccdeJforstandardizedoperations-
ItappearsthatsimilarpayloadoperationsffconductedintheU.S.Lab,ESA, and JEM
Moduleswillhavetobcdonedifferentlyduetodesigndifferencesinthemodules.Ifthis
isso,itisa realconcernforlong-termoperations.Itaffectsthedevelopmentand
maintenanceofcrewproceduresandcrewtraining,aswellastheplanningandscheduling
oforbitaloperations.Further,theneedforcommonalityinsupplyofsubsystemresources
toracks,_t,hineachmodule;USL, TEM and ESA isessentialtoenhancestandardized
developmentofthesecrewproceduresandtraining.
Concern:SafetyOfficeInvolvement-
Duringseveralsessions,itbecameapparcn;chatvisibilityofsafetyrequirementsforthe
programandlevelefauthorityforimplcrncntingthemisnetclear,particularlyintheareaof
thisworkshop,USL contamination.Thisgroupwouldenjoyseeingclearpicturesofthe
- safety office span of influence for the SS program from Level 1]I up through Level I. As
an example, it is thought the activities of the WP-01 (Boeing) safety activities have
contributed to SS developing requirements but apparently, this is not visible to the various
:. working groups. It is suspected the same situation may exist for the other work packages.
Visibility throughout the program of these activities is needed by all.
The user handoook development mentioned by MSFC safety should most certainly include
the involvement of both the WP01 (Boeing) safety office and mission operations
contingent. As an initial thought, separate sections for the USL, ESA, and JEM should be
considered.
............................................................................................................
Dr. H. J. T. Powell User Integ. MDAC-SSD-KSC
":.._,ological aspects with respect to experiments have hardy been touched in this
workshop. Make known any existing "rules/regs" regarding this area or have a proposed
position presented at the next workshop. This should cover both ionizing and non-ionizing
areas A speaker on radiological experiments would be good if you could find one. The
Cape has processed spacecmfis that hive used RTGs and RHUs.
A-9
q
1991006617-666
Report
on
Space Station Freedom
Toxic and Reactive Materilds Handling Workshop
by
Patrick G. Barber
Professor and Director of Chemistry
Longwood College, Farmville, Virginia 23901
3 December 1988
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NASA-TBE REPORT, Space Stalion Safety Conference, Barber, page 2 I
t
J
There are many tasks that must be completed and
coordinated before a variety of toxic and reactive materials
can be handled safely on the Space Station over extended
periods. This and similar workshops are very necessary.
The mutual recognition of still existent problems, the
effective utilization of past experiences, and the increased
communication and coordination that result from such
meetings are all important.
Because chemicals may eventually be moved from one space
station module to a-other, coordination among the three
agencies involved is essential. Labeling and storage
procedures must be coordinated. Spill response procedu_e_
and emergency equipment must also be coordinated. Further,
it would be beneficial if the procedures to be used in all
three experimentation modules were at least well understood
by all. Franco Ongaro repo_ted that ESA may be considering
a rule that all experimenters must handle all chemicals and
wastes within their experiments and not rely on a commu, i
collection and handling system. This seems to be different !
t
from the philosophy adopted for the U.S. and Japanese
modules. Can both procedure_ be used simultaneously on the
Station? Is one philosophy better than the other? To a
chemist the common collection of toxic and hazardous wastes
is a difficult and dangerous undertaking that has not even
- been effectively accomplished on earth. The potential for
catastrophe may be increased when the variety of collected
chemicals is increased. Countering this observation is the i
fact that hazards also increase when a large variety of
researchers each handles their own waste_ and stores them in
proximity to other wastes.
J
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NASA-TEE RY'_PORT, Space Station Safety ConFerence, Barber, page 3 T,
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Recommendations :
, Continue to have such meetings and to shorte, lines of communication.
, Involve to a greater extent those m:sponsible for similar tasks in Japan
and EiA.
, Evaluate whether the general collection and treatme_._ ot wastes is safer
than requiring each experimenter to treat and contain their own wastes.
"he presentations indicated _hat the best uvailable
data, procedures, and equipment were being evaluated to
; solve the problems of handling toxic and hazardous materials
add wastes on the Space Station. The Space Station will
operate in a very fragile environment, i.e., one without the
numerous and extensive buffering systems that exist on earth
to mitigate and to dissipate hazards and wastes. The level
of care and preparation needed for the safe handling of such
materials on the Space Station is accordingly greater than
required on earth. The question of whether or not to vent
into the ecospace about the Station is one that must be
carefully weighed. This is especially true in light of the
experiences of the Soviet MIR Station described by Mr. Nick
Johnson.
Recommendation: !
, Continue to adapt the best data bases, procedures, and equipment _r
use on the Space Station. Where suitable ones do not exist, develop the
needed technology. This applies to the sa_ storage of reagents, )
dispensing procedures app_p_ate _r mic_gravity, collection
procedures, deto_fication pr_edures, and lon_ and short-term storage !
of spent reagents.
t
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rNASA-TBE REPORT, Space Station Sa_ ConVince, barber, page 4 t
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Because the environment in which the reagents are going
to be used is different from that found on earth, it may be
necessary to break away from the traditional methods of
handling chemicals. For example, on earth the traditional
method of moving chemical and biological wastes is to do sc
with copious amounts of water. To plan to continue to do
this on the Space Station may needlessly involve processing
ever increasing volumes of wastes. It may be _eneficial to
consider if it would be h_tter to move, reprocess, and store
smaller but more concentrated wastes. It must first be
ascertained that this may be done safely. It will mean that
any leak o_ spill will be more hazardous than if it were
diluted, but it will also mean that there will be far less
of it to be handled and accounted for.
An example of earth-based technology that could be
considered for moving chemicals and wastes without large
volumes of water is the manner that is used to mcve natural
gases from Texas and Louisiana to the mid-west and east.
Different gases are moved along the same pipeline by
inserting moveable plugs between samples. On the Space
Station such lines and containers should be transparent so
that astronauts can visually observe what is actually in the t
lines and tanks.
In microgravity it may be beneficial to consider {
designing air flows to give directionality to the movement
of fzuids in the cabins of the Space Station. On earth
gravity is relied to pull hazardous and toxic chemicals down
away from the faces of experimenters. On the Space Station
a creative solution may have to be found to do the same job,
for the greatest peDsonnel hazards are from eye contact,
inhalation, and ingestion. '
A-13 _
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The fact that the quality of air in the mid-deck region
cf the Space Shuttle is an order of magnitude worse than
that in the actual laboratory, e.g., 34000 vs. 3000 m -3, and
the fact that animal feces moved from the laboratory to the
command center are disturbing to a chemist. On earth the
experimenta%J_n spaces should be at negative pressure
compared to office spaces. Why should air-flow management
be different in mlcrogravity? If the toxins move throughout
the Shuttle, where is the safe haven? Because ingestion is
a major mode of entry for toxins, food is never consumed in
a laboratory on earth. In the Space Station where may +
food safely be consumed? The old rhyme takes on _ew meaning
in microgravity:
"Alas, poor Jack is no more
What he _hought was H20 was H2S04."
Is the Space Station being designed with the same air-flow
patterns as used on the Shuttle?
Procedures developed for the Space Station ha_e direct
and immediate applications on earth. Procedures that
effectively handle wastes in the physical chemically closed
system found on the Space Station can be adapted for use on
earth to improve the more open industrial processes and to
reduce the costs associated with preserving the environmenu, i
Further, during the thirty year use of the Space Station, i
water may well become the resource in short supply on earth.
It has already become a significant factor in industrial and
military decisions in the Western U.S. Space Station
, technology may well become necessaly on earth in the next
century. .
I
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N?..SA-TBE REPORT, Space Station Safety Conference, Barber, page 6
Recommendations:
, Explore aiternatlv,; procedures for moving and reprocessing wastes that
do not involve the use of large volumes of water.
, Explore alternative procedures for controlling the movement of fluids
inside the cabin. Consider moving them away from the astronauts' faces.
, Review the air.flow patterns.
, Expand the el_rt to adopt technology developed for the Space Station to
industrial and environmental problems on earth.
From the report given by Bonnie Dunbar, the potentially
hazardous and toxic accidents that occurred on the D-1
mission were due to unknowns. The rod that broke may not
have been the one anticipated. The ability of silicon fluid
to creep into otherwise inaccessible spaces and coat
equipment was not anticipated. The leaked electrophoretic
buffer solution may have be_n changed just before flight.
In working with chemicals no matter how careful the _-
preparation, there is always to possibility for the ._
unexpected. Procedures and preparations must be developed
to handle tl_e unexpected.
In laboratories on earth, chemists rely upor their
senses and past experiences to alert them to the unexpected.
If the color or odor of a substance is not as expected, the
chemist rill not proceed without first checking. Because of
the variety of experiments to be run on the Space Station,
it is not possible or desirable to use only scientists
experienced in handling chemicals. This puts an increased
burden on adequate preparations and design°
t
Recommendations:
. D_ign and p_pire _r handling the unexpected. Have spill clean-up
equipment and procedures.
. Broaden the training of astronauts to include recognition of potential
chemical hazards by _ving them expo_ence in recogni_ng colo_,
textures, and odon of subs_nces to be used in space laborato_es.
A-15
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APPENDIX B. WORKSHOP SUMMARY PRESENTATION TO
SPACE STATION ENVIRONMENTAL STEERING GROUP
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